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ABSTRACT 
 
Mississippi Mau Mau expands upon existing historical analysis of the ideological connections 
between African liberation struggles and the Black Freedom Movement in the United States by 
concentrating on the ways in which American civil rights activists absorbed and utilized 
knowledge from anti-colonial movements. This dissertation focuses on the career of NAACP Field 
Secretary Medgar Evers and connects the growth and development of his approach to fighting 
white supremacy in Mississippi to his interpretation of the Mau Mau movement in British colonial 
Kenya. While Mississippi may have felt as though it was worlds apart from Kenya, Evers was 
profoundly influenced by the Mau Mau use of force and mass participation to compel political and 
social change. Mississippi Mau Mau explores how, after being introduced to the story of the 
Kenyan uprising in both the mainstream and African-American press, Evers examined the racial 
climate in Mississippi through a transnational lens and transformed his analysis into grassroots 
strategies for change through his work with the NAACP. In realizing the significance of grassroots 
mass participation, unremitting dedication to action in the face of massive retaliation, an emphasis 
on class unity, and the use of a publicity campaign to highlight select cases of discrimination for 
broadcast on the national and international stage, Evers sought to permanently cripple 
Mississippi’s white power structure. His determination to achieve his and the NAACP’s objectives 
sometimes led to his frustration with the reactions of the National Office to the movement’s 
failures in Mississippi, as well as with the numbers of black Mississippians who did not participate 
due to pressure from state authorities and private organizations resolute in their mission to maintain 
white supremacy. Nevertheless, Evers’ strategic efforts not only helped lay the foundations for a 
mass movement in Mississippi, but also positioned it at the heart of the global struggle for black 
liberation.  
  1 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 1, 1963, three individuals carrying picket signs stepped onto the sidewalk 
in front of the Woolworth department store in Jackson, Mississippi. Though the first 
official day of summer was three weeks away, hot sticky air permeated the downtown 
commercial district as Medgar Evers, Roy Wilkins, and Helen Wilcher marched with 
placards decrying police brutality and imploring passersby not to buy from white-run stores 
on Capitol Street. Within minutes, police officers brandishing electric cattle prods arrived 
on scene, confiscated the signs, and arrested the picketers. At the nearby corner of Capitol 
and Farish, Justice Department officials and newspaper reporters documented the incident. 
This was not the first arrest of protesters in Jackson that week, nor would it be the last. 
Only a few blocks away, almost five-hundred teenagers seized in earlier mass 
demonstrations lingered inside a makeshift jail at the state fairgrounds. Thrown into 
garbage trucks for transport to the temporary stockade, the young detainees staved off 
uncertainty and boredom by discussing the significance of that afternoon’s arrests. Evers, 
Field Secretary of the Mississippi state office of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and Wilcher, a member of the Jackson branch, 
were no strangers to the oppressive tactics employed by city law enforcement to shut down 
civil rights demonstrations. Wilkins, Executive Director of the NAACP, personally 
experienced Jackson’s notorious brand of justice for the first time.1 
                                                 
1 “Jackson Exhibit Halls Are Converted to Jails,” Washington Post, Times Herald, May 31, 1963; John 
Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi, (Urbana and Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1994), 163. 
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At the Hinds County Courthouse, they were each booked on felony charges of 
restraint of trade and released on $1,000 bonds. The bail money was authorized by NAACP 
Director of Branches Gloster Current, recently arrived from New York City headquarters 
with Wilkins and other high-ranking Association officials to assist with coordinating 
movement operations in Jackson.2 A boycott of Capitol Street businesses launched the 
previous December had expanded to include a succession of protest marches, picket 
demonstrations, and sit-ins collectively labeled the Jackson movement. Students from local 
black high schools and colleges served as its primary foot soldiers, inspired by the wave of 
direct-action protests moving across the South. By the hundreds, they risked life and limb 
to engage in mass demonstrations that brought worldwide attention to the plight of 
Mississippi’s black communities and connected their struggle to the national movement 
for black freedom. For Medgar Evers, the militant, grassroots movement evolving in 
Jackson was a culmination of nine years of efforts to grow the NAACP in Mississippi and 
a representation of the future of civil rights activity within its borders. As he returned to 
the Association’s Jackson headquarters, he was greeted by two-hundred students lined up 
two and three abreast, ready to initiate another mass march against the forces of 
segregation.3 
On that same day in Nairobi, Kenya, newly elected Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta 
climbed atop a dais to take his oath of office. When he solemnly promised to uphold the 
governing principles embedded in the national constitution, the man nicknamed “Burning 
                                                 
2 John R. Salter, Jr., Jackson, Mississippi: An American Chronicle of Struggle and Schism, (Malabar, 
Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1987), 155. 
3 M.J. O’Brien, We Shall Not Be Moved: The Jackson Woolworth’s Sit-In and the Movement It Inspired, 
(Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2013), 171-172. 
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Spear” set the British colony on a new course of independence and legitimacy. Afterward, 
with a beaded tribal cap atop his head and his famous bakora walking stick in hand, he led 
British officials and cabinet members in a parade through the streets of the capitol to 
rapturous applause. It was an extraordinary moment. Nine years prior, Kenyatta had been 
arrested and convicted of organizing the Mau Mau Rebellion, a bloody uprising of native 
Africans against supporters of the Kenyan colonial regime. He denied masterminding the 
insurrection to the High Court, but colonial officials conducted a show trial to justify a 
violent counter-insurgency campaign and offset the growing hysteria of the white settler 
population.4 Imprisonment of nationalist leaders, however, was not enough to offset the 
slow death of Britain’s empire in Africa. By 1961, intensifying anti-colonial agitation blew 
winds of change across the continent that rendered imperialist rule no longer feasible in 
Kenya. That year, Kenyatta was released from prison after a nation-wide election and 
assumed a principal role in the transformation of the colony into a parliamentary 
democracy. Resolved to faithfully guide the new nation to prominence, Kenyatta’s rallying 
cry was karambee, a Swahili word meaning “let us get up, put our shoulders to the wheel 
and go.”5  
Though they lived over eight thousand miles apart and never physically crossed 
paths, the lives of Medgar Evers and Jomo Kenyatta intertwined in a world characterized 
by the intersection of geopolitical tensions and destruction of global white supremacy. As 
                                                 
4 David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 2005), 63-64. 
5 “Kenyatta Sworn; Nairobi Jubilant: Prime Minister and Cabinet Take Over in Kenya,” New York Times, 
June 2, 1963; “Kenyatta Takes Over Leadership of Kenya,” Los Angeles Times, June 2, 1963; Caroline 
Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (Henry Holt and Company: 
New York, 2005), 358-359. 
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the Allied defeat of fascist states in World War II gave way to rising Cold War tensions, 
millions of colonized peoples utilized the global conflicts as a means to alter their 
physical, political, and social conditions. India, long considered the “jewel in the crown” 
of the British Empire, emerged as a democratic republic after achieving independence in 
1947. In Africa, liberation movements developed or intensified in several regions of the 
continent. Eager to point out the hypocrisy of empires condemning native “barbarism” 
while they viciously exploited the labor of subjugated masses and drove the world to the 
brink of nuclear disaster, African anti-imperialists rooted their arguments for 
independence and sovereignty in the rhetoric of human rights and self-determination. 
These assessments were best summed up in the words of Nigerian political leader Dr. 
Nnamdi Aykiwi when he remarked that West Africans would no longer wear chains or 
allow the British to “fatten on the backs of the colonists.”6 For weakened European 
empires, the specter of decolonization loomed like a hydra with a thousand heads as they 
struggled to contain the rise of nationalist sentiment within their vast territorial holdings. 
When an insurrection was vanquished, others sprouted in its place.7 
As colonialism teetered on the edge of collapse, African Americans reexamined 
their attitudes toward worldwide liberation struggles and drew on their wartime 
experiences as justification for intensifying their aims to destroy white supremacy in the 
United States. Since the first decade of the twentieth-century, prominent voices in the 
fight against racial inequality connected the experiences of black Americans to those of 
oppressed peoples of color around the world. Pan-Africanist organizations such as the 
                                                 
6 Bill Brinkley, “Africans Seek Free Rule, Nigerian Says,” Washington Post, December 28, 1949. 
7 “Africans Call ‘Family of Nations’ Same Old British Imperialism,” Chicago Defender, July 12, 1947. 
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Marcus Garvey-led United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) and the work of 
NAACP founder W.E.B. Du Bois promoted the formation of a collective Afro-American 
consciousness. As urbanization and access to information increased in the interwar 
period, the expansion of black institutions and international studies programs at 
historically black colleges fostered interests in world affairs. This expanded conception of 
ethnic kinship translated into widespread condemnation of the 1935 invasion of Ethiopia 
by dictator Benito Mussolini. For black Americans, enthusiastic support for Ethiopians 
was both a means of championing black power and achievement in the face of fascist 
aggression and of viewing their own experiences within transnational frameworks. 
Whether through religiously oriented peace organizations, gender-based associations 
such as women’s clubs, or Popular Front groups, black men and women articulated 
programs for racial progress in global terms. World War II witnessed the construction of 
a new double-pronged campaign built upon those institutional building blocks that 
focused on defeating fascism abroad and racial oppression at home. In its aftermath, 
black Americans demanded nothing less than full political rights and inclusion at the 
postwar peace table.8  
Recent scholarship in the fields of African American history and American 
foreign relations has shed much needed light on the connections between twentieth-
century liberation movements abroad, U.S. foreign policy, and the Black Freedom 
                                                 
8 Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 1-36, 42. For more on the history of Afro-American responses 
to the Italo-Ethopian War, see also William R. Scott, The Sons of Sheba’s Race: African-Americans and the 
Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-1941 (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1993); Joseph E. Harris 
African-American Reactions to War in Ethiopia, 1936-1941 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1994). 
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Movement in America. Building on the work of Paul Gordon Lauren, who placed the 
issue of global white supremacy at the center of his study on international relations, 
studies followed that focused on the role transnational pressures played in prompting US 
government action on racial reform.9 Works by Mary Dudziak and Thomas Borstelmann 
spotlight the impact accusations of American hypocrisy by the Soviets and foreign critics 
in Africa and Asia had on U.S. foreign policy. Presidential administrations from Truman 
to Nixon preached the superiority of American democracy over Soviet communism, but 
the reality of race relations at home consistently threatened to derail policy decisions 
abroad. In his analysis of the U.S. State Department, Michael Krenn expands on earlier 
histories to include the efforts of black diplomats to influence foreign policy through the 
application of their distinctive perspectives on global affairs.10 Studies by Brenda Gayle 
Plummer, Carol Anderson, and Gerald Horne concentrate on the interest and actions of 
the NAACP and other African American organizations to link struggles for desegregation 
at home with the ideals embedded in the Atlantic and United Nations Charters. Far from 
being outside observers but unable to play a more direct role in crafting policy, these 
organizations were forced to narrow their goals to work within the political margins.11 
                                                 
9 Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination, 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988). 
10 Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000); Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: 
American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Michael L. 
Krenn, Black Diplomacy; African Americans and the State Department, 1945-1969 (Armonk, New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1999); Plummer, Rising Wind. 
11 Brenda Gayle Plummer, ed., Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs 1945-1988 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), Carol Anderson, Eyes Off the Prize: The 
United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), and Gerald Horne, Black and Red: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Afro-American 
Response to the Cold War, 1944-1963 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986). 
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Scholars have also studied the ways organizations ranging from the NAACP to 
leftist associations such as the Council on African Affairs (CAA) worked to support and 
influence African liberation movements through the spread of intellectual ideas, money, 
and manpower. In her analysis of the politics of the African diaspora, Penny Von Eschen 
pinpoints the myriad of ways internationalist anti-colonial discourse shaped the lenses 
through which black Americans viewed themselves and formulated their political 
demands. These lenses often pinpointed the importance of specific African nations or 
liberation struggles, including work by Kevin Gaines on the influence of African 
nationalism on the experiences of African American expatriate experiences in Ghana.12 
Despite the contributions of these works, James Meriwether has noted historical accounts 
“generally have understated the role that African liberation struggles played in promoting 
action by black Americans,” adding that the myriad of ways in which African freedom 
movements inspired the leaders and participants of the black freedom struggle in the 
United States has frequently been overlooked. “The domestic civil rights movement,” he 
argued, “in fact absorbed knowledge and lessons from African liberation struggles, which 
in turn helped shape ongoing interpretations of the domestic struggle.”13  
One example lay in the career and civil rights activism of Medgar Evers, who 
served as Field Secretary for the NAACP in Mississippi from 1954-1963. Murdered at 
age thirty-seven by a member of the Ku Klux Klan, Evers’ role in the history of the Black 
Freedom Movement is mostly celebrated in the context of his martyrdom for the cause of 
                                                 
12 Penny M. Von Eschen, Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1997); Kevin K. Gaines, American Africans in Ghana: Black 
Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006).  
13 James H. Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black Americans and Africa, 1935-1961 (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 6. 
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civil rights and for carrying of the torch for the NAACP in an area of the United States 
infamous for its brutal racial violence. Less has been written, sans the memoirs of his 
wife and brother, about what influences led him to devote his life to the cause of freedom 
in Mississippi.14 Following his return from military service overseas, Evers developed an 
interest in the Mau Mau Rebellion. Stretching from 1952-1960, the uprising included 
members of several displaced African ethnic groups, the largest of whom were the 
Kikuyu, who sought to rebel against the white colonial government and its repressive 
social, political, and economic policies towards Africans. In response to the mounting 
crisis of violence, the colonial governor declared an official state of emergency. For the 
next seven years, a bloody war raged between the Mau Mau and British and African 
loyalist troops.15 
Looking towards Kenya and recognizing a system of racial caste and violent 
oppression similar to Mississippi, Evers was inspired by the movement’s proclaimed 
leader, Jomo Kenyatta, and the Mau Mau use of force and mass participation to draw 
attention to their cause. Though colonial authorities were unclear whether the uprising 
was a centralized independence movement or a more dispersed, tribalist insurrection, its 
violent nature and the resulting consequences for the British colonial system captured the 
attention of millions around the world. Evers was motivated to create a Mau Mau army in 
Mississippi to retaliate against perpetrators of racist violence and bring attention to the 
horrors of white supremacy. But the logistical realities of carrying out a campaign of 
                                                 
14 Myrlie Evers-Williams and William Peters, For Us the Living (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & 
Company, 1967); Charles Evers and Andrew Szanton, Have No Fear: The Charles Evers Story (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997). 
15 Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 9-53.  
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guerilla warfare and an internal philosophical struggle regarding the ethics of fostering 
mass violence eventually turned him off to the idea. Nonetheless, Evers’ examination of 
the Kenya uprising helped shape the strategies for dismantling Mississippi’s racially 
oppressive system he implemented in his work as NAACP Field Secretary. Through his 
dedication to grassroots organizing and his construction of Association-sponsored 
campaigns to bring national and international attention to the statewide fight for civil 
rights, Evers’ efforts embodied the militant spirit of Mau Mau resistance and centered the 
Mississippi Freedom Movement within the global struggle for black liberation.16 
The significance of the Mau Mau as an inspirational symbol of black resistance to 
white oppression is familiar to historians of foreign relations and African American 
history. In addition to Meriwether’s work, Gerald Horne has focused on the role the 
Kenya emergency played in the way black Americans interpreted their struggle for 
equality at home. In Mau Mau in Harlem, he noted African Americans equated the phrase 
Mau Mau with the notion of fierce resistance. Evers was one of many black Americans to 
connect their struggles to one that projected strength, fierceness, and determination. 
Horne’s work extends beyond these experiences to the ways in which US colonialists and 
Dixiecrats in Washington framed the violent uprising in Kenya to argue Africans – 
including those of African descent in America – were not ready for freedom or first-class 
citizenship. Seeking to offset such ridiculous notions, black Americans embraced the 
desire for Kenyan liberation as part of the larger struggle to destroy global white 
                                                 
16Charles Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom 
Struggle, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), 49; Evers and Szanton, Have 
No Fear, p. 76; Myrlie Evers-Williams, For Us the Living, 93. 
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supremacy, and when Kenyan students or labor leaders entered the United States they 
were warmly welcomed by their African American supporters.17   
 A prominent black champion of the Mau Mau was Malcolm X. In his speeches, 
he argued the militant defiance of the Mau Mau signaled the right way to seek 
independence from white oppression and called on black Americans to “even the score 
with whites” by creating their own Mau Mau armies.18 In his analysis of these statements, 
historian Mickie Mwanzia Koster argued Malcolm’s praise “facilitated a much needed 
conversation between Africa and its Diaspora” that pushed black Americans toward 
greater militancy.19 His framing of the Mau Mau as freedom fighters who transformed 
their fear and frustrations into aggressive action can also be placed within the context of 
the tradition of armed resistance to which many black Southerners, including Medgar 
Evers, adhered. The significance of this tradition in the movement for racial equality in 
Mississippi is explored in Akinyele Omowale Umoja’s work, We Will Shoot Back, which 
argued armed resistance was a key ingredient of a successful civil rights program in 
Mississippi. According to NAACP Regional Director Ruby Hurley, Evers “always 
wanted to go at it in Mau Mau fashion.” While he refrained from creating a black 
commando unit, his decision to keep and carry guns signified his desire to push back 
against the system of white supremacy in an aggressive manner.20  
                                                 
17 Gerald Horne, Mau Mau in Harlem? The U.S. and the Liberation of Kenya (New York: Pelgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), 12-14. 
18 Arnold H. Lubasch, “Malcolm Favors a Mau Mau in US,” New York Times, December 21, 1964. 
19 Mickie Mwanzia Koster, “Malcolm X, the Mau Mau, and Kenya’s New Revolutionaries: A Legacy of 
Transnationalism,” The Journal of African American History, Vol. 100, No. 2 (Spring 2015): 250. 
20 Akinyele Omowale Umoja, We Will Shoot Back: Armed Resistance in the Mississippi Freedom 
Movement, (New York and London: New York University Press, 2013), 44-48. 
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Mississippi Mau Mau builds upon this body of literature by analyzing how the 
interplay of ideology and influence between black America and Africa played a 
significant role in the ways a younger generation of civil rights leaders interpreted and 
defied Southern systems of white oppression. In Mississippi, the strategies employed by 
Medgar Evers to build an organizational base for the NAACP and inspire Mississippi’s 
youth to directly challenge the white power structure were inextricably linked to his 
interpretation of the movement for independence and sovereignty in Kenya. Throughout 
its colonial history, Kenyan economic growth and its position of importance within the 
British Empire was reliant on the exploitation of black African labor and the elevation of 
white landholding settlers to positions of authority. The Kikuyu ethnic group, subjugated 
and rendered powerless by racist imperialist policy, existed alongside black 
Mississippians in a transnational framework of white supremacist oppression. From Jomo 
Kenyatta and the Mau Mau, Evers drew inspirational examples of militant resistance to 
white rule that emphasized the significance of mass participation and attracting publicity 
as tools for dismantling oppressive structural systems. Through his work with the 
NAACP, Evers encouraged mass action among black Mississippians to break the back of 
Jim Crow by forcing the federal government to actively intervene in protecting the rights 
of its black citizens.  
To understand how Evers’ background influenced the way he conceptualized the 
struggle for black equality, chapter 1 details the entrenchment of the Jim Crow system in 
Mississippi, begun in the wake of post-Civil War Reconstruction’s demise. To redeem 
southern society through the restoration of white supremacist power, Southern Democrats 
masterminded the dismantling of Republican governments that had empowered 
  12 
freedmen. Stripped of their citizenship rights, black Mississippians were forced into 
positions of socioeconomic subservience through acts of terror. By exacting control in 
this manner, the white power structure renewed its sense of authoritarian dominance and 
constructed a vision for a “New Mississippi” upon a foundation of capital investment 
predicated on black economic exploitation. Given the high levels of violence required to 
maintain control over a sizeable black population, Mississippi developed a reputation as 
distinctly repressive and resistant to outside criticism. In this environment, blacks turned 
inward for survival and protection through the creation of family, religious, and economic 
institutions that challenged white supremacist conceptions of black identity. 
As Medgar Evers came of age in this repressive system, his observations of racial 
terror and participation in these local support networks informed the development of a 
sense of racial consciousness, activist sensibility, and understanding of how the black 
experience in Mississippi fit within a global framework of white supremacist oppression. 
Chapter 2 focuses on Evers’ efforts to transform this analysis into action when he 
returned home from the European battlefields of World War II. Like all black soldiers, he 
fought to defend democracy and was welcomed as a liberator abroad but treated like a 
second-class citizen in the military and at home. These experiences helped shape the lens 
through which he viewed the plight of black Mississippians and black liberation 
movements in Africa. In news reports on Kenya, Evers discovered a system of racial 
caste like the one in Mississippi and developed a deep admiration for how the Mau Mau 
inspired the masses to rise up for freedom and shed light on the injustices perpetrated 
against Africans in the British colonial system. Initially, he considered creating his own 
army of Mississippi Mau Mau to bring attention to the systematic oppression of blacks 
  13 
through violent means, but eventually decided against it for logistical and moral reasons. 
Instead, Evers joined the NAACP and set out to transform the definition of Mau Mau to 
fit the specifics of the Association’s fight for racial equality in Mississippi.  
Chapter 3 chronicles the beginning of Evers’ work with the NAACP. Ultimately, 
this led to his decision to accept the position of Field Secretary in Mississippi and build a 
grassroots base for the organization in the wake of the landmark Brown v. Board of 
Education Supreme Court decision. While the case was a major victory in the fight to 
dismantle the Jim Crow system of separate-but-equal across the South, white reaction to 
Brown led to the inception of a campaign of massive resistance and hysteria that gripped 
Mississippi. Officials utilized legislative obstruction, fear-mongering, and violence to 
block any attempts to integrate the halls of public education that threatened to turn the 
state on its head. In this unstable environment and with the lessons of the Mau Mau 
firmly embedded in his consciousness, Evers worked to carry out the NAACP’s 
organizational directives and publicize every attempt by whites to humiliate, threaten, 
and carry out open acts of violence against black citizens. In the process, he emerged as 
the primary leader of the Mississippi movement for black equality as he helped push the 
state’s antidemocratic, white supremacist system front and center onto a world stage 
beset by Cold War pressures.  
In due course, those pressures placed British colonial authorities in a precarious 
position regarding the purposes and design of imperialism. Chapter 4 examines the ways 
Evers transposed his knowledge of those international pressures and concerns into ways 
the NAACP could fight Mississippi’s white power structure on the ground. By the mid-
1950s, British forces managed to successfully quell Mau Mau resistance in Kenya, but 
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their reactionary policies – including the mass imprisonment of thousands of Kikuyu in 
prison camps rife with human rights violations – aroused criticism and debate at home 
and abroad. At stake was Britain’s rationale for empire. At the same time, NAACP 
efforts to push forward with its civil rights campaigns met with waves of massive 
resistance that wiped out early Association gains and left Evers and fellow black 
Mississippians bruised and battered. To overcome these set-backs, Evers altered his 
approaches on the ground in a way that mirrored the Mau Mau tactic of enticing their 
enemies to fight on treacherous terrain. For Mississippi’s white supremacists, that terrain 
was the international stage, and Evers worked to ensure every strategic move by officials 
was spotlighted. If the Mau Mau could bring down the colonial system in Kenya, his 
work as a Mississippi Mau Mau could bring down white supremacy at home. As he 
sought to provoke federal intervention, it intersected with the rise of direct-action protests 
across the South.  
Chapter 5 expounds on this juncture of direct-action and Evers’ work in 
Mississippi as the movement for Black Freedom shifted in a new direction. Across the 
South, young people participated in the Freedom Rides, sit-ins, and other forms of 
disruptive protest. In Mississippi, these actions built upon the grassroots foundation Evers 
worked so tirelessly to construct and convinced him that utilizing direct-action was the 
best means to harness the militant energy of the black youth, encourage mass 
participation, compel federal intervention, and drive a wedge between various factions in 
the white power structure. In doing so, he created his own army of Mississippi Mau Mau, 
united in their desire to be a vanguard for change. By the summer of 1963, that strategy 
culminated in the entrance of James Meredith to the University of Mississippi and the 
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emergence of the Jackson movement. Yet as it picked up steam, the movement in 
Mississippi ran head-on into significant barriers that threatened to curtail its momentum 
entirely. A trade-off of sorts emerged: while federal authorities supported the passage of 
civil rights legislation, they called for mass demonstrations to end. National NAACP 
officials, concerned about the potential for increased violence, agreed to the compromise. 
Evers was dismayed, and considered leaving the NAACP altogether to form his own 
organization, but before he could come to a decision on the matter, he was assassinated. 
His legacy, however, could not be killed. He helped embolden a new generation 
to action – an army of Mississippi Mau Mau - and worked to position Mississippi at the 
center of the struggle for black liberation. Rather than being left behind in the fight for 
racial equality, Mississippi became ground zero for the movement.
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CHAPTER 1: 
 
HOLD HIGH THE WALL: ERECTING THE BARRIERS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED 
RACIAL SEPARATION IN MISSISSIPPI 
  
In the Hall of Governors, located on the first floor of the Mississippi State Capitol 
in downtown Jackson, stands a life-sized statue of former governor and state senator 
Theodore Gilmore Bilbo. Despite the short stature of the subject (Bilbo stood only five 
feet, two inches tall), the bronze figure looms large in the gallery. Constructed by 
German sculptor Fritz Behn, a native of Munich who fled to Vienna after the Nazis took 
power in the 1930s, the statue portrays Bilbo in a manner many of his former colleagues 
likely considered befitting of the deceased statesman – defiant. In a double-breasted suit, 
the bronzed Bilbo stands stern faced with his feet set in a wide stance, chest puffed 
outward, chin up, and right arm aloft as though in the act of delivering an impassioned 
speech. On April 12, 1954, almost seven years after Bilbo’s death, state officials and 
special guests gathered at the capitol to dedicate the statue. In his memorial address, 
Secretary of State Heber Ladner praised the virtues and accomplishments of his long-time 
friend, described as a man who worked for the state’s laboring class, believed in the 
preservation of “the racial integrity of the races,” and fought to “expose the treasonous 
conspiracy of those who would destroy our way of life in the United States.”1 
Colloquially known as “The Man” (a self-administered moniker, given his 
tendency to speak in third person), Bilbo was also called “the Builder,” “the number one 
spokesman for the south,” and “the little pistol-butt-scarred, piney-woods lawyer and 
                                                 
1 Heber Ladner, Memorial Address: Secretary of State: at the acceptance and unveiling of the statue of 
Theodore Gilmore Bilbo, April 12, 1954, in the Hall of Governors, General Collection, Mississippi 
Department of Archives and History, MDAH.  
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licensed Baptist preacher” who had become “a Mussolini for our most backward State.”2 
Born in October of 1877, Bilbo was raised on a small farm in Poplarville, Pearl River 
County, Mississippi. He attended local public schools, continued his studies at Peabody 
College in Nashville, Tennessee and the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, and ended 
his academic career studying law at Vanderbilt University, though he did not graduate. 
He was admitted to the Mississippi Bar in 1908 and entered state politics that same year. 
By the time of his death on August 21, 1947, Bilbo had served Mississippi as a state 
senator from 1908-1912, Lieutenant Governor from 1912-1916, Governor from 1916-
1920 and again from 1928-1932, and was elected as a Democrat to the United States 
Senate in 1934, 1940, and in 1946. A self-professed man of the people, he prided himself 
on his work to improve the health and welfare of Mississippians, including the 
establishment of charity hospitals as well as state tax and highway commissions. John 
Stennis, who was elected to Bilbo’s senate seat after his death, declared his predecessor 
“never lost the common touch, and never lost a keen sense of understanding of the 
problems of the average man,” further adding that “the poor and the downtrodden of 
Mississippi, regardless of race or creed, knew of this warm, human characteristic, and 
provided him with many opportunities to be of service.”3 
While these public works programs benefitted the state’s white inhabitants, 
Bilbo’s notoriety among Mississippi’s black community tended more toward virulent 
                                                 
2 Hilton Butler, “Bilbo – the Two-Edged Sword,” The North American Review, Vol. 232, No. 6 (December 
1931): 496. 
3 John C. Stennis, Memorial Address: at the memorial services held in the House of Representatives and 
Senate of the United States: together with remarks presented in eulogy of Theodore Gilmore Bilbo; late 
Senator of Mississippi. General Collection, B/B49u. US 80th Congress, Second Session, 1948. United 
States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1950, 56-57, 60.  
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racist than it did benevolent man of the people. An ardent segregationist and devotee to 
the concept of innate black inferiority, Bilbo exalted himself as a defender of the white 
supremacist conception of state’s rights. His rise to political prominence in Mississippi 
was built on a platform of populist reform and tyrannical race-baiting his critics referred 
to as “Bilboism.” As an orator, he possessed a keen ability to toss out witty retorts and 
was prone to spewing diatribes intended to instill fear in the hearts of white and black 
citizens. In Bilbo’s estimation, a shift toward racial equality would not only mark the 
death of Mississippi as a sovereign state in the union, but as a society. According to 
historian Steven F. Lawson, Bilbo’s anti-black tirades were virtually unmatched by his 
political peers.4  
Perhaps few black Mississippians had better first-hand knowledge of the 
terrifying and absurd nature of Bilbo’s race-baiting rants than Medgar and Charles Evers. 
When they were not yet teenagers, the two brothers began attending Bilbo’s campaign 
speeches near the Newton County Courthouse in Decatur. While most blacks avoided 
Bilbo’s political rallies, Charles and Medgar attended them for entertainment. After 
occupying seats with good sight lines to watch the speaker on the platform and the 
reactions of the crowd, Charles noted that Bilbo would “start out high-toned, but soon 
he’d be waving and sweating at the forehead, rearing and stomping, waving his arms.” 
During one speech, Bilbo noticed the two brothers sitting on the courthouse steps and 
specifically pointed his finger at them, stating “if we fail to hold high the wall of 
separation between the races, we will live to see the day when those two nigger boys 
                                                 
4 Steven F. Lawson, Black Ballots, Voting Rights in the South 1944-1969, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1976), 99. 
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there will be asking for everything that is ours by right. If you don’t keep them in their 
place,” he bellowed, “then someday they’ll be in Washington trying to represent you.” In 
response, Medgar leaned over and whispered “ain’t a bad idea,” while Charles aimed a 
wide smile at Bilbo, prompting the senator to squawk “he’s even got the nerve to grin at 
me!”5  
Bilbo’s tirades were representative of a longstanding tradition of racial 
intimidation and fear-mongering among Mississippi’s politicians. Rooted in the 
conception of whiteness as the pinnacle of the social order, the exclusionary nature of 
race relations permeated every aspect of Mississippi’s political, economic, and cultural 
institutions, powered the decision-making processes of its leaders, and garnered it a 
reputation among blacks at home and abroad as the most backward, stifling, and violent 
state in the union. It was into this oppressive society Medgar Evers was born on July 2, 
1925 in Decatur, Mississippi. Charles was older by two years and the troublemaker of the 
family’s seven children, while Medgar was considered “the saint of the Evers kids.” He 
was known for taking long contemplative walks, speaking with a soft voice, and being 
carefully attuned to the feelings of others. But Charles noted his brother’s gentle nature 
was coupled with an air of determination to “prove that this wasn’t a white man’s world – 
or if it was, we’d at least get our share of whatever there was worth getting and see that 
some other black folks could, too.” He displayed a relentless quest for knowledge and 
study of the world around him that manifested in efforts to read any available books and 
newspapers. As a result, Medgar Evers honed a sound ability to investigate problems and 
                                                 
5 Evers and Szanton, Have No Fear, 30-31; Evers-Williams with Peters, For Us, the Living, 17. 
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strategize solutions. Charles explained that Medgar “always planned what he did, always 
measured the consequences,” and “when he set his mind to something, he could be as 
cold as ice.”6  
His dogged determination, insatiable curiosity, and strategic competence proved 
valuable as Medgar Evers came of age in Mississippi. In addition, his examination of the 
surrounding world and immersion in the religious, economic, and social institutions of 
the black community influenced his understanding of the enormous challenges black 
Mississippians were up against and fostered a growing activist sensibility within him. 
Despite the inevitability of violent white responses to their actions, local and national 
networks of churches, agrarian organizations, and social clubs cultivated support systems 
and opportunities to advance black interests. In the process, they facilitated a race 
consciousness that countered the image of blacks as savages in need of the civilizing 
hands of white masters. The development of a strong black identity and capacity to 
contextualize surrounding environments informed Evers’ interest in the stories of African 
liberation. In analyzing the causes of the Mau Mau Rebellion, Evers concluded landless 
Kikuyu and disfranchised black Mississippians endured similar efforts by white 
supremacist structures to terrorize and control black bodies. At the same time, he 
understood Mississippi maintained a unique distinction as the most racially repressive 
state in the Jim Crow South. Possessing a personal understanding of Mississippi’s 
distinctiveness as a bastion of whiteness and the history of its barriers to equality was key 
                                                 
6 Given this description of his quiet demeanor, it might have seemed somewhat ironic that Medgar was 
named for his maternal great-grandfather Medgar Wright, a half Indian slave with a reputation for refusing 
to take abuse from others and causing trouble in the process. Charles Evers, Evers (New York and 
Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1971), 22-30; Evers and Szanton, Have No Fear, 8-9. 
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in convincing Evers the liberation of black Mississippians required the application of 
Mau Mau-inspired strategies to cultivate grassroots mass participation and publicize the 
state’s racial horrors on the national and international stages.  
While blacks suffered under the Jim Crow system across the South, Mississippi 
garnered a reputation for racial violence that centered it in the national imagination as the 
symbol of white supremacy. In his classic 1949 work Southern Politics in State and 
Nation, V.O. Key, Jr. highlighted Mississippi’s uniqueness, writing, “Northerners, 
provincials that they are, regard the South as one large Mississippi. Southerners, with 
their eye for distinction, place Mississippi in a class by itself.” Though “darker political 
strains” ran throughout the South, Key argued “the beginning and end of Mississippi 
politics is the Negro.”7 Racial superiority was deemed the birthright of the white 
population, commanded by their Creator to hold dominion over the race whose blackness 
equated to depravity, ignorance, and dishonesty. Any disruption of the social order 
brought about by interracial “mixing” portended the polluting of bloodlines and 
subsequent regression of civilization to a state of savagery. For the white ruling class, the 
key to upholding the principles of white supremacy was to keep blacks “in their place” by 
any means necessary - whether legal or extralegal in design or practice. In Mississippi, 
Theodore Bilbo was not an aberration. He was an example of the type of public official 
produced, cultivated, and protected by the state’s power structure, constructed upon the 
concept of white supremacy, and ruthless in its dedication to the sustainment of racial 
segregation. 
                                                 
7 V.O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), 229-230. 
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For black Mississippians, most of whom lived in a state of permanent economic 
uncertainty, survival was a foremost goal of existence. To hope that adherence to its 
discriminatory laws and customs would grant them the chance to achieve much beyond 
subsistence living was to assume the society in which they lived defined them as anything 
other than an exploitable labor force, which it did not. Those who did manage to elevate 
themselves above the poverty line were considered anomalies or marked for destruction 
by jealous whites. In Mississippi, to be black damned one to second-class status from 
birth. It also carried with it the possibility of being subject to violent harm or death 
without explanation, legitimate reason, or due process under the law. Of the fragility of 
black existence in Mississippi, historian Charles M. Payne noted “the point was that there 
did not have to be a point; Black life could be snuffed out on a whim, you could be killed 
because some ignorant white man didn’t like the color of your shirt or the way you drove 
a wagon.”8 
This oppressive reality was not the result of accidental events or the convergence 
of random sociocultural forces. The entrenchment of the Jim Crow system in Mississippi 
was a historical process borne of violence and carried out in a calculated manner by a 
white power structure resolved to maintain its socioeconomic status through control of 
the black population. In Mississippi, Neil R. McMillen argued “the color line was drawn 
in the attitudes and habits of its people, black and white, well before it was sanctioned by 
law.” Located in the lower Mississippi Valley and settled by Europeans in the 1600s, a 
bifurcated, race-based social order developed alongside a growing plantation system 
                                                 
8 Charles M. Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom 
Struggle (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), 15. 
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controlled by a small number of white planter elites. In the Natchez District, an area of 
rich loess-and-loam covered hills located on the eastern bank of the Mississippi River, the 
first cotton plantations arose in the early 1800s. Black slaves were transported from ports 
along the river to labor in the cotton fields that served as the foundation upon which the 
regional economy was built. As the plantation system expanded across the state, 
ownership of land and slaves became the defining characteristic of wealth and social 
status. By the time sectional tensions reached a boiling point and the nation descended 
into civil war in the early 1860s, Mississippi’s black population numbered around 
400,000, most of whom were enslaved.9  
In the chaotic wartime environment, many slaves fled northward toward 
approaching Union armies, while others were forced to work for Confederate officers. To 
dispense aid and supplies to such large numbers of runaways and emancipated slaves, the 
War Department established the Freedman’s Bureau in 1863. Tasked to assist blacks in 
their transformation to freed men and women, the agency not only provided food, 
clothing, and medical aid, but was also authorized to redistribute confiscated Confederate 
property to ex-slaves. Yet despite the efforts of Bureau officials, many slaves felt 
compelled to remain on their plantations when the war ended, unsure of where to go and 
lacking the skills necessary to find employment elsewhere. Others exercised their 
                                                 
9 By 1850, slaves made up 51.2% of Mississippi’s total population though they were not counted as persons 
but as the personal property of their masters. Neil R. McMillen, Dark Journey: Mississippi in the Age of 
Jim Crow (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 3; James W. Loewen and Charles 
Sallis, eds., Mississippi Conflict and Change, (New York: Pantheon House, 1974), 19, 94-95, 140. 
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newfound mobility and scattered across the countryside to locate lost family members or 
seek out the chance for a new life elsewhere.10 
Mississippi’s white population did not celebrate the emancipation of slavery. Lost 
and bewildered by war’s end, most struggled to comprehend the defeat of their military 
insurrection. Of the 78,000 white Mississippians who fought for the Confederacy, one-
third were killed or died of disease in the war. Bitter fighting and offensives by Union 
armies left farmland, towns, and railroads destroyed or in states of near ruin. Once 
prosperous plantations lapsed into various states of disrepair, food shortages loomed, 
Confederate money was rendered worthless, and theft abounded. The complete upheaval 
of the antebellum social system was also reinforced by the Union army’s confiscation and 
redistribution of Confederate lands to former slaves. Disputes over land ownership were 
commonplace, and the presence of black troops did nothing to assuage white planter fears 
that their complaints would not be heard or handled fairly. For these planters, black 
landownership represented the greatest threat to their plantation system. Historian 
Edward Royce explained “if blacks were able to secure an autonomous existence, 
planters would be denied an exploitable labor force and the system of plantation 
agriculture would collapse.11 
Because Southern wealth was constructed on a foundation of slave ownership, 
planters and poor white farmers struggled to come to grips with the reality that their value 
system had been undercut by black liberation, and the question of how to maintain 
                                                 
10 Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York: Harper and Rowe, 
1988), 68-76. 
11Loewen and Sallis, Mississippi Conflict and Change, 184; Edward Royce, The Origins of Southern 
Sharecropping (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 87. 
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economic and psychological superiority over former slaves emerged as a chief concern. 
Firmly wedded to the belief that blacks were naturally lazy and would not work unless 
compelled under some form of bondage, many whites maintained that freedmen did not 
constitute a dependable labor force and called for the ejection of blacks from the state to 
be recolonized elsewhere. The group most in favor of this plan were poorer whites who 
considered free black labor the greatest threat to their wellbeing. In his work on 
Mississippi, historian David Oshinsky explained that emancipation destroyed the dreams 
of poor white farmers to own slaves and “erased one of the two great distinctions” to 
which whites clung. “The farmer was white and free; the Negro was black – and also 
free.” Despite their enthusiastic responses to black colonization proposals, however, poor 
whites lacked the influence of the state’s larger planters and merchants who, though bitter 
at the prospect of hiring them as free men, sought to develop varying means to bring 
blacks back under white control.12   
Perhaps the greatest source of postwar anger and anxiety among white 
Mississippians revolved around the issue of interracial sexual relations. A pillar upon 
which the Southern system of slavery stood, the separation of the races was deemed 
necessary to the preservation of blood purity and, perhaps more importantly, an effective 
means of ensuring color was tied to the notion of servitude. In both the antebellum and 
postbellum eras, black men in Mississippi were deemed threats to what constituted the 
very heart and soul of southern society – white womanhood – and white men vowed to 
                                                 
12David M. Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery”: Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of Jim Crow Justice (New 
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protect it by any means necessary. This reinforced what they believed to be their God-
given right to maintain control over blacks while placing the onus for preserving the 
white race on white women. In the process, white men provided for themselves a means 
of validating their own tendencies to sexually exploit and rape black women. The irony 
of this double standard was not lost on blacks across the region, many of whom were the 
offspring or descendants of interracial unions between white men and black women.13 
Nevertheless, it provided a cultural basis for the continued economic exploitation of 
black labor. “The unspeakable horrors of ‘race degeneracy,’” McMillen explained, 
“justified the most barbarous forms of interracial violence and made the injunction 
against ‘amalgamation’ the first law of white supremacy.”14  
Determined to retain their hold over the region and their labor force, former white 
landowners worked with political allies in Washington to ensure the distribution of 
presidential pardons and reestablishment of land ownership.15 Then in November of 1865, 
seven months after Robert E. Lee signed documents of surrender in Appomattox, 
Virginia, the Mississippi legislature met to discuss “the nigger question.” Anger over the 
                                                 
13 The history of sexual exploitation and birth of interracial offspring stretched back as far as slavery 
existed in the South, and as Danielle L. McGuire pointed out in her study of black women and their 
methods of resistance in the civil rights movement, many black Southerners “shared a family history that 
involved interracial couplings ranging from tragic love to brutal rape.” Danielle L. McGuire, At the Dark 
End of the Street: Black Women, Rape, and Resistance – a New History of the Civil Rights Movement from 
Rosa Parks to the Rise of Black Power (New York: Random House, 2010), 4. 
14McMillen, Dark Journey, 14-23. In her study on the role of women in the political economy of Jim Crow 
in North Carolina, Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore expounds on Southern white men’s justification for continued 
exploitation and violence, explaining “…they realized that African American success not only meant 
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1860-1880 (New York: The Free Press, 1998), 254-256.  
  
 27 
Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, was palpable. Many within the 
legislature sought to prohibit its ratification entirely on the basis that it violated 
Mississippi’s right to govern its own people. However, legislators concerned with the 
possibility of further federal interference proposed the adoption of legal statutes that 
accepted the abolition of slavery but advocated for control of the black population 
through other means. In a statement urging the legislature to act quickly, Governor 
Benjamin Grubb Humphreys, a former general in the Army of the Confederacy, stated 
Mississippi had abolished slavery “under the pressure of Federal bayonets” and “urged on 
by the misdirected sympathies of the world.” But freedom from slavery did not mean 
racial equality would follow, and Humphreys and his colleagues in the legislature set out 
to ensure Mississippi’s laws and cultural mores would forever reinforce the doctrine of 
white supremacy.16   
In response to this call for action, the legislature crafted a series of laws known as 
the Black Codes. These statutes conferred upon former slaves the rights of property 
ownership, to sue and be sued in state courts, and to legally marry. However, they also 
required the procurement of yearly labor contracts, prohibited black ownership of 
firearms, and assigned to them specific crimes that did not apply to the white population. 
These included the crimes of “mischief,” “insulting gestures,” “cruel treatment to 
animals,” and the “vending of spirituous or intoxicating liquors.” Refusal by freedmen 
and freedwomen to comply with the Black Codes resulted in imprisonment, the length of 
which varied depending on the legal and extralegal assessment of the severity of the 
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infraction committed. Those who were not entered into labor contracts with employers by 
a specific date each year were deemed vagrants under the law and fined fifty dollars. If 
the vagrant had no way to pay the fine, he could be hired out to a white man willing to 
cover the fee. Usually, the white man in question was an old master who deducted the 
fine from the wages of the convicted man or woman. If the individual hired out to pay off 
the fine eventually did so, the cycle would repeat itself if no new work could be found.17  
The desire to tie blacks back to the land was central to construction of the Black 
Codes. In doing so, legislators not only addressed white fears of black autonomy, but also 
developed a means for white planters to adjust to the new political economy of post-
emancipation Southern society. Given the outcome of the war and the subsequent 
expansion of free labor market principles throughout the region, Mississippi’s white 
power structure erected a socioeconomic system intended to reinforce white supremacy 
by coercing ex-slaves back under the control of their former masters. While they could 
not be re-enslaved as private property, blacks often found themselves trapped in a state of 
wage slavery within the state’s growing sharecropping and tenancy structures. Under 
these systems, planters allotted plots of land to individuals or families who then 
bequeathed a certain percentage of their crops – as stipulated per a signed contract - with 
the landowner each year. While tenant farmers were at liberty to decide what or when to 
plant, sharecroppers were required to adhere to the guidelines and close supervision of 
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their employers. In Mississippi, tenant farmers and sharecroppers almost always grew 
cotton, which despite a drop in price after the war remained the region’s largest and most 
lucrative cash crop. Laborers usually fell into continuous cycles of debt, unable to break 
even at the end of each growing season.18 
To add insult to injury, local militias and urban police forces tasked with 
enforcing the Black Codes generally consisted of former Confederate veterans, many of 
whom still wore their gray uniforms and unleashed a reign of terror on blacks who had 
not signed labor contracts. Victims who looked to the legal system in the hopes it would 
dispense fair and impartial justice quickly came to the realization that local officials often 
worked hand in hand with planters to ensure an adequate labor supply and would not 
prosecute whites accused of criminally abusing blacks. Mississippi’s legislature actively 
attempted to dissuade blacks from using the courts at all by passing a statute stipulating 
that any black man or woman who brought false or malicious charges against a white 
person would be subject to fines, imprisonment, or hired out as labor. Thus, though de 
facto slavery had been abolished throughout the Southern states, in post-emancipation 
Mississippi it existed in an alternate, though eerily similar form.19 
While Mississippi whites considered the Black Codes essential to the wellbeing 
and future of their society, the laws rankled Northern Republicans. Intent on ensuring 
black male suffrage, ensuring federal authority, and breaking the back of the Southern 
plantocracy through the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the 
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United States Constitution, in 1867 the radical faction of Republicans led by Senator 
Thaddeus Stevens pushed a plan for Southern Reconstruction through Congress. Rooted 
in “the image of the small-scale competitive capitalism of the North,” Eric Foner argued 
that Radical Republicans hoped to establish the South as a “modern republic” based on 
free labor principles and equal protection under the law. What resulted was a plan that 
“combined idealism, expediency, and Northern self-interest, all in the service of a far-
reaching social revolution.” The Radical Republican Reconstruction plan divided the 
Southern states into five military districts, declared martial law, and required each state to 
ratify the two new amendments to be readmitted to the union. In response, the new state 
government in Mississippi, formed with a Republican majority, dismantled the Black 
Codes. What followed was a decade of political, cultural, and economic transformation 
defined by contrasting episodes of increased autonomy for black citizens and racially 
charged violence fueled by white resistance.20  
For the first time in the state’s history, black men registered to vote en masse, 
outnumbering white voters 60,197 to 46,636 in the 1867 election. In January of the 
following year, elected delegates (16 of whom were black) met at a constitutional 
convention in Jackson. There, they constructed a new state constitution that afforded 
black and white citizens equal rights under the law, freedom of the press, speech, petition, 
and assembly, eliminated property qualification requirements for voting, office-holding, 
and jury service, prohibited racial discrimination in public facilities, and established a 
free public education system. In 1869, James L. Alcorn, a Coahoma plantation owner and 
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Southern Republican - known as a scalawag - ran a successful campaign for governor by 
publicly declaring his desire to unite the races in a moderate fashion. A defender of the 
Reconstruction amendments, Alcorn was also known as a man who would defend the 
state from additional Radical Republican-backed federal intervention. By demonstrating 
his awareness of the difficulties faced by ex-slaves, he gained the support of Mississippi’s 
black leaders and formed a coalition within the government of scalawags and old Whigs 
who had stood against Southern secession prior to the war.  
In his analysis of this period in Mississippi politics, Vernon Lane Wharton noted 
that during the first four years of Republican control, both houses of the state legislature 
were controlled by Northern white and native Republicans who sought to meet the needs 
of their black constituents but also encouraged the growth of white membership in the 
party. Their support for black Mississippians, however, was rooted more in a Southern 
paternalist ethos than it was in a belief in black equality. Wharton added that many white 
Republicans in the legislature avoided any type of social interaction with and “were 
absolutely opposed to any real control of their party by the Negroes.” By 1873, the 
offices of lieutenant governor, secretary of state, and House speaker as well as numerous 
other public positions were held by black men, but the holding of these positions did not 
translate to real power. Their abilities to suggest, influence, and enact legislation 
beneficial to black Mississippians was hindered by a continuation of the color-line within 
the Republican Party, and anger over this certainty fueled black resentment and white 
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fears that unless more whites joined the party’s ranks, it would become a “party of 
Negroes.”21 
Predictably, many whites angry over federal intervention and the bestowal of 
citizenship rights to ex-slaves reacted to the state’s Reconstruction plan with disdain. In 
their estimation, the state’s right to govern itself without federal interference and the 
restoration of white supremacy was one in the same. To promote this, a large contingent 
of white planters and businessmen formed the Democratic White Men’s Party of 
Mississippi and denounced the new constitution as “the nefarious design of the 
Republican party in Congress to place the white men of the Southern States under the 
government control of their late slaves and degrade the Caucasian race as the inferiors of 
the African Negro,” a state of affairs described as “a crime against the civilization of the 
age, which needs only be mentioned to be scorned by all intelligent minds.” For these 
whites, the Reconstruction government in Mississippi combined all their fears about 
blacks and federal intervention into one entity to be reviled and destroyed by both 
informal and extralegal means.22  
To undercut the work of Republican legislators to endow Mississippi’s black 
population with political and economic rights, Democrats formulated campaigns to shore 
up support among white citizens that cut across party lines. Though they could not 
directly violate federal law, they preyed upon the uneasiness felt by many whites with 
regards to the 1868 constitution, arguing its existence was the work of outsiders, 
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Northern carpetbaggers, and uneducated blacks with no respect for Mississippi society. 
At the same time, white Mississippians worked to circumvent statutes that ensured blacks 
access to social spaces. While equal treatment on public transportation and in restaurants 
was protected by law, whites demanded the races be segregated or worked to ensure that 
civil rights laws remained largely unenforced. Thus, while Mississippi passed a law 
ensuring “full and equal rights” were afforded to citizens on railroads, steamboats, and in 
hotels and theaters, public pressure resulted in the continued segregation of those 
accommodations. Interracial contact in public settings saw significant decreases in this 
period, and as Reconstruction continued, the separation of the races solidified in both law 
and social custom.23 
Mississippi’s growing industrial economy also played a significant role in the 
maintenance of white supremacy throughout the Reconstruction era, as Southern 
industrialists found themselves pitted against a planter class with no love of free labor 
principles. Rather, they desired the restoration of their plantation system worked by a 
permanent black underclass. Because former slaves were tied back to the land, 
industrialists found it increasingly difficult to recruit black labor. At the same time, both 
white and black laborers not trapped in the sharecropping or tenancy systems tended 
toward employment opportunities that allowed them greater mobility than was possible 
when laboring full-time for a single firm. Industrialists found the solution for their labor 
problems in a developing convict leasing system. Due to vagrancy laws and other statutes 
designed to curb black upward mobility, Mississippi’s penal system overflowed with 
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cheap convict labor contracted out to employers who placed them in mines, mills, 
brickyards, railroad camps, and on farms. The price for convict labor was cheaper than 
hiring out free laborers, and the pool of prisoners deep. In exchange for the profits of 
their labor, employers agreed to feed, clothe, and house the prisoners, most of whom 
were separated by race. Black convicts were particularly subject to deplorable treatment, 
including beatings and whippings at the hands of their overseers.24 
 If neither formal nor informal means were not enough to convince blacks of their 
second-class status in society, whites turned to extralegal violence as a method of 
conveying this message. According to historian Philip Dray, fear of black uprisings was 
“a central motif in whites’ rationale for extralegal violence against blacks.” In cases of 
suspected revolts, slaves and white allies believed to have conspired against white 
slaveowners fell victim to lynchings. The first applications of “lethal lynch law” that 
became widespread national stories occurred in Mississippi in the summer of 1835. 
Dozens of slaves and white accomplices were hanged in Madison County for allegedly 
conspiring to incite a slave revolt on the Fourth of July. On that same day in Vicksburg a 
local militia set upon two unpopular gamblers with the intent to lynch them as 
punishment for their unscrupulous behavior. The first gambler was tied to a tree, 
whipped, and driven out of town, while the second man, having fled to a local saloon in 
the hopes of escape, was captured and hanged from the gallows with four others. After 
the lynching, Vicksburg’s town fathers issued a proclamation asserting “the revolution 
has been conducted here by the most respectable citizens, heads of families, members of 
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all classes and professions and pursuits…,” adding “none have been heard to utter a 
syllable of censure against either the act or the manner in which it was performed.’”25 
During the Reconstruction period, vigilante violence persisted despite attempts by 
state Republican officials to stop the carnage. Though federal soldiers were embedded 
throughout the South, the number of them placed in Mississippi was not enough to 
prevent the growth or actions of mobs that grew larger and bolder over time. Several 
local organizations formed with the intent of terrorizing black Mississippians back into 
subservience and destroying the Republican Party within the state. The largest and most 
notorious of these was the Ku Klux Klan, which comprised of white men from every 
region and social class in Mississippi. According to David Oshinsky, the Ku Klux Klan’s 
form of violence “was often random, spontaneous, and poorly planned,” but also “spread 
quickly and took every imaginable form.” This included attacks on black voters, 
officeholders, white and black Republicans, and teachers of black schoolchildren. Due to 
the large number of violent incidents, during Reconstruction Mississippi “led the region 
in every imaginable kind of mob atrocity.”26  
In 1870 and 1871, Congressional Republicans pushed through legislation that 
classified voting discrimination based on race and vigilantism as a crime subject to 
prosecution in federal courts. Known as the Enforcement Acts, these laws were 
specifically designed to provide freedmen and other Klan victims with federal protections 
not covered under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 
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Unsurprisingly, the laws were incredibly unpopular with both white Democrats and 
Republicans who deemed them a federal encroachment on the sovereignty of the states. 
But there was no doubt that the Enforcement Acts worked to decrease the Klan violence 
across the South. In Mississippi, almost 700 indictments were secured by United States 
Attorney G. Wiley Wells. Unfortunately, most of the convicted Klansmen were given 
suspended sentences rather than subjected to prison time. Nevertheless, while vigilante 
violence was not eliminated, the threat of federal prosecution certainly diminished the 
scope and intensity of Klan-sponsored activity by driving many of its practitioners 
underground.27  
While they provided a ray of hope for victimized black men and women across 
the South, the success of the Enforcement Acts proved short-lived. Their passage 
exacerbated the existing split within the Republican Party between advocates of extended 
federal power and reformers who deemed the laws an unconstitutional violation of state’s 
rights. Moreover, as Northern as well as Southern states continued to industrialize and 
entrepreneurs looked toward the west for economic expansion, national politics began to 
shift away from an emphasis on egalitarian ideology and towards a form of 
organizational politics anchored by government relationships with railroads and other 
nascent corporations. Because of these changes, Republican reformers modified the 
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national conversation regarding race relations in the South and allowed the Enforcement 
Acts to expire in May of 1872.28 
In the 1874 state elections, Democratic rhetoric evolved into action in Vicksburg, 
where whites were slightly outnumbered by the black population. To intimidate black 
voters into silence, whites armed themselves and marched to the courthouse to demand 
the resignation of the county’s black sheriff. Fighting broke out when a large group of 
blacks arrived to block the white mob. Hoping to quell the violence with military 
intervention, Governor Ames called on President Grant to deploy federal troops to 
Vicksburg. However, the president refused. While he was not ideologically opposed to 
the continued deployment of federal troops to Southern states to curb violence and the 
intimidation of black voters, due to Democratic labeling of the administration as a 
“military dictatorship,” Southern sympathizers in his Cabinet advising against 
intervention, and an inadequate number of soldiers available for deployment, the 
president encouraged Governor Ames to utilize inadequately supplied, inactive state 
militias to put down the violence. Unsurprisingly, the reign of terror directed at blacks 
continued largely unabated for several days. By the time the fighting ended, twenty-nine 
blacks and two whites had been killed.29 
Even if the Grant administration had stood strong in its opposition to the violence 
and intimidation directed at blacks throughout the South, beginning in 1873 a series of 
Supreme Court decisions hindered the executive branch’s ability to intervene in state 
                                                 
28 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America, 683-684. 
29 Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 178-179; Loewen and Sallis, Mississippi Conflict and Change, 157-
159; Foner, Reconstruction, 558-563. 
  
 38 
affairs by narrowing the definition of federal power. Writing for the majority in the 
Slaughter-house Cases, Justice Samuel F. Miller argued that Fourteenth Amendment 
protections only applied to rights expressly set forth by the federal government. These 
included equal access to travel on the seas and waterways, to the seat of government, and 
the right to run for office. This was followed in 1876 by the Court’s decision in U.S. v. 
Cruikshank, which overturned the convictions of three white men who had killed blacks 
during a Louisiana race riot three years prior because their indictments, brought under the 
Enforcement Act of 1870, did not specify race as the motivating factor for their actions. 
The Court went on to declare that due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment only applied to state action and that citizen violators of civil rights were to 
be tried at the local level. With these decisions under their belts, Southern Democrats 
successfully neutralized further federal attempts to safeguard Southern blacks from 
discrimination. A Civil Rights Bill, ensuring equal access to public facilities regardless of 
race, was pushed through Congress in 1875. However, Democratic control across the 
South meant that the law was rarely enforced.30 
Though Republicans managed to carry the 1874 elections, Democrats considered 
Grant’s inaction and the state government’s ineffective efforts to stop the violence a 
promising indicator of times to come. Calling themselves “redeemers,” they announced 
their intentions to implement a color-line strategy – referred to as the Mississippi Plan - 
in the 1875 state legislative election. As election day drew near, redeemers lobbied the 
white citizenry to join their cause, both through racial antagonism and fear-mongering. 
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White rule was declared of paramount importance to the growth and sustainability of 
Mississippi society, and the state’s newspapers echoed this sentiment with slogans such 
as the Yazoo City Banner’s “Mississippi is white man’s country, and by Eternal God 
we’ll rule it,” and the Handsboro Democrat’s assertion that Mississippi would be run by 
“A white man’s Government, by white men, for the benefit of white men.” Whites whose 
political opinions stood contrary to these ran the risk of being renounced in the 
newspapers and subject to economic and physical intimidation. Race riots broke out in 
towns across the state, including Yazoo City, Columbus, and Water Valley. When the 
violence ended, over two hundred black Mississippians were dead. The result of the 
election was a Democratic victory by over thirty-thousand votes. In all, they carried 62 of 
Mississippi’s 74 counties. What followed was a period of Democratic retrenchment 
maintained by an elaborate blueprint to suppress the black vote.31 
At the same time, Democrats worked diligently to buttress the economic 
foundations of white supremacy and entice capitalist investment in the region by 
portraying Mississippi as a goldmine of business opportunity. In addition to promises of 
corporate tax breaks, Southern Democrats and other “redeemers” lured Northern 
manufacturers and rail companies with the promise of cheap convict labor. To fortify 
these assurances, legislators passed new laws increasing the amount of prison time for 
specific crimes in order to exponentially grow Mississippi’s convict labor system. One 
such piece of legislation, known as the “Pig Law,” expanded the definition of grand 
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larceny to include theft of farm animals or any property over ten dollars in value. It 
carried with it a prison sentence of up to five years in a state penitentiary. Within four 
years of the law’s passage, the convict labor pool increased almost 300 percent. 
According to Christopher R. Adamson, “The black criminal population represented a 
threat to the economic supremacy of the white race, but was also a resource that could be 
easily exploited. Crime control and economic oppression,” he argued “were one and the 
same thing in the South after the Democrats seized power.”32 
In 1876, Southern Reconstruction came to an end in the wake of a contentious 
presidential election. Not since the election of 1800 had an electoral race been so close or 
controversial, and the uproar over the result once again threatened to tear the nation in 
half. The Republican candidate, Ohio Governor Rutherford B. Hayes, ran his campaign 
on a platform of sectional reconciliation and fiscal orthodoxy anchored by the defense of 
private property rights. His Democratic opponent, Samuel J. Tilden, was well connected 
to Wall Street but championed himself as a supporter of reform, highlighting examples of 
Republican corruption throughout the North. When the votes were tallied, Tilden 
emerged as winner of the popular vote and led Hayes in the electoral vote 184 to 165, 
with 20 electoral votes disputed in the states of Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina. 
Because the Constitution contained no specific provision to deal with the situation, 
fifteen members of the Republican-controlled Senate and Democrat-controlled House 
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formed an Electoral Commission. Due to a last-minute replacement of a swing vote 
congressman with Republican Justice Joseph P. Bradley, the commission leaned 8-7 in 
favor of Hayes. Outraged at having been outmaneuvered, Democrats planned to obstruct 
a final electoral vote to prevent the presidential inauguration from taking place. To avoid 
additional turmoil, Republicans agreed to a compromise in which Hayes kept the White 
House in exchange for agreeing to noninterference in Southern affairs, which included 
ordering remaining federal troops to stand down throughout the region.33 
Because of the political power shift at both the national and state levels, the end of 
Reconstruction combined with depressed economic conditions had far-reaching 
consequences for Mississippi’s black community. Despite the efforts of redeemers to 
entice Northern investment in Southern industry, the economy continued to stagnate and 
the region remained overwhelmingly rural. Democrats adhered to their promises to cut 
tax rates and state expenditures by pushing for budget cuts that reduced government 
services. The amount of money allocated to the public school system lessened to ten 
times below the national average. To bring additional funds into state coffers without 
raising taxes, the government leased out convicts to planters, merchants, and railroad 
contractors at fifty dollars per person. Small farmers and sharecroppers were hit 
particularly hard by the downturn, as falling crop prices and increased production costs 
sent them spiraling into deeper debt. By 1880, Mississippi’s per capita income was 
among the lowest nationwide. Between 1870 and 1898, cotton prices fell from twelve to 
four cents per pound.  
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Consequently, agrarian discontent surged across the South and Midwest and 
swept up black and white Mississippi farmers into the Populist Movement. Determined to 
hold government officials and moneyed interests accountable for the depressed economic 
conditions, they organized farmers’ alliances which emphasized the class-conscious 
notion that the livelihoods of white farmers were inextricably tied to those of their black 
counterparts. They also advocated for the end of convict leasing, railroad regulation, and 
the injection of more currency into circulation. Aware of the dangers any form of dissent 
against the racial status quo wrought in the absence of federal protections, black farmers 
were careful to wrap their demands in the ideology of separatist economic advancement. 
Nonetheless, Mississippi’s Democratic leadership balked at the demands and correctly 
perceived the pushback of discontented farmers of both races as threats to their grip on 
power. Democratic legislators took to the streets and newspapers to implore white voters 
not to turn the state back to the days of “Negro Domination.” By rooting their messaging 
in the language of white supremacy, Democrats managed to convince white voters not to 
abandon the “white man’s party” and doomed the agrarian-based Populist Movement to 
failure.34  
As Mississippi’s black farmers fell into endless cycles of debt, the state’s white 
power structure initiated the process of transcribing racial restrictions into the Jim Crow 
laws that ensured racial segregation and black oppression by law and social custom for 
the next eighty years. Much of the pressure to do so came from white farmers and 
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middle-class reformers, both of whom resented the granting of citizenship rights and 
suffrage to blacks in the Mississippi Constitution of 1868. A new constitutional 
convention was called in 1890, during which delegates called for the state to only count 
white citizens when determining representative apportionment or appropriations.35 Of the 
134 delegates present at the convention, 130 were Democrats who believed the issue of 
restricting black suffrage to be of paramount importance to the future of Mississippi.36  
Speaking candidly on this matter, Senator James Zachariah George remarked “our 
chief duty when we meet in Convention is to devise such measures…as will enable us to 
maintain a home government, under the control of the white people of the state.” 
Convention President S. S. Calhoon was even less circumspect, declaring “we came here 
to exclude the negro.” For convention goers, three essential issues spurred the need for 
black disfranchisement. The first concerned the nature of black suffrage itself. In the 
minds of white Mississippians, black men were not capable of understanding the notion 
of citizenship, much less exercising the rights proffered them by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Secondly, the expansion of the black population, which already 
outnumbered whites in the state, worried redeemer politicians who perceived black 
disfranchisement as the most logical means through which to maintain power. And 
finally, when the Republican Party took back control over the White House and Congress 
in the 1888 presidential election, Mississippi Democrats believed it imperative to 
formalize white rule at home lest Republicans call for additional measures to protect 
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black suffrage. To do so, they constructed voting laws that circumvented the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution through the implementation 
of voter qualifications such as poll taxes and literacy tests.37 
Violence was the preferred method of cementing black political disfranchisement 
as a foundation of post-Reconstruction politics in Mississippi. Between 1882-1890, the 
lynching of Mississippi blacks was most severe in Republican counties. Republican 
regions also had over sixty percent more lynchings than non-Republican regions.38 Those 
able to overcome the threats against their lives and property and press the issue on the 
national stage once again found themselves on the losing end of U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions regarding matters of Southern race relations. In 1896, the Court dealt a lethal 
blow to black civil rights and legitimized the practice of Jim Crow in law and custom 
with its decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, declaring the “separate but equal” segregation of 
public facilities constitutional. Two years later, in Williams v. Mississippi the Court 
upheld Mississippi’s use of poll taxes and literacy tests as nondiscriminatory voter 
qualifications so long as they were applied to all voters regardless of race. The power to 
decide whether potential voters met these qualifications was left to county registrars, who 
generally allowed whites to bypass the restrictions. As the twentieth century dawned, the 
state of race relations in Mississippi reached its lowest point since the end of the Civil 
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War. In addition to the destruction of their voting rights, black Mississippians found 
themselves forcibly excluded from political and social life.39 
In the era of Jim Crow in Mississippi, reminding blacks of “their place” was not 
only deemed the birthright of whites, but considered a necessary component of economic 
and social order. “You knew you were a nigger the very first time you rode in a car, 
couldn’t use the bathroom at the service station, and had to relieve yourself in the woods 
just off the road,” noted Charles Evers. “You knew you were a nigger the first time you 
went driving with older Negroes and they warned you to avoid the highway patrol and 
never let a white man pass you after dark because he might run you off the road or put a 
bullet through your head. You knew you were a nigger when the nicer restaurants 
wouldn’t serve you and the nicer hotels wouldn’t let you spend the night there, or even 
get a cup of coffee.” When asked to enter a white person’s house or a doctor’s office 
through the back door, told to address a white person as “sir” or “ma’am,” or warned 
never talk to a white girl for fear of being killed,” Evers reiterated “you knew you were a 
nigger.”40 In an interview he gave a year before his death, Medgar Evers claimed his first 
memory of racial violence was the lynching of a family friend for talking “sass” to a 
white woman. Following the lynching, the man’s body was left on the ground and his 
bloody clothes hung on a fence to serve as a warning to Decatur’s African-American 
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population. “Every Negro in town was supposed to get the message from those clothes,” 
he asserted, “and I can see those clothes now in my mind’s eye.”41 
Decatur, a small town with less than 3,000 inhabitants at the time of Medgar 
Evers’ birth, sat nestled in the center of Newton County in an area of Mississippi known 
as the north-central hills.42 In his work Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in 
Mississippi, John Dittmer declared this region the “geographical and cultural heart” of the 
state, comprised of “rich bottomlands along creeks and rivers” that “’give way to less 
fertile soil on the hillsides.”43 In nearby Scott County, Medgar and Charles’ paternal 
grandfather, Mike Evers, had worked as a farmer cultivating over two hundred acres 
before he lost his land because of missed tax payments. Believing better job opportunities 
could be found in the sawmill industry of Newton County, Medgar and Charles’ father 
James Evers moved his family to Decatur. There, he and his wife, Jessie Wright Evers, a 
laundress for local white families, worked to build a home and provide for their children 
as best they could in the stifling racial conditions of 1920s and 1930s Mississippi. Both 
Medgar and Charles often spoke of their father’s determination to maintain financial 
independence, working sun up to sun down as a hired laborer and contractor to save up 
enough money to purchase his own home.44  
James Evers was also known as a man not to be crossed, having come out on the 
winning side of several precarious confrontations with local whites. This was significant 
                                                 
41 Interview with Medgar Evers by Ben H. Bagdikian, 1962, in Jack Mendelsohn, The Martyrs: Sixteen 
Who Gave Their Lives for Racial Justice, (Harper and Row: New York, New York, 1966), 64. 
42 Population amount taken from the Fourteenth Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1920, Vol. 
III, Population 1920 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), reprinted in Michael Vinson 
Williams, Medgar Evers: Mississippi Martyr (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2011), 14. 
43 Dittmer, Local People, 10. 
44 Williams, Medgar Evers, 14; Evers, Have No Fear, 1-2, 17. 
  
 47 
in a town where, according to Medgar Evers, a popular Saturday night sport for whites 
was to run down blacks with their cars. The first time the Evers brothers saw their father 
stand up to a white man was as children when they accompanied him to pay his bill at the 
local sawmill commissary. The white manager, aware of James Evers’ inability to read or 
write well, charged an additional five dollars to the bill. While James Evers did not 
possess adequate reading skills, he was adept at math and quickly caught the error, 
refusing to pay the totaled amount. In response, the commissary manager accused Evers 
of concocting a lie and reached behind the counter for his pistol. Before he could retrieve 
his gun, Evers blocked his path, broke a soda bottle in half, and pointed it at the manager 
as he backed himself and his sons out of the store. Later that evening, he sat on the front 
porch of his house with a loaded .22 rifle, expecting retaliation from the manager or local 
Klan members. None came. This willingness to stand up against white discriminatory 
actions and terror tactics was of great importance to his sons. Throughout his career, 
Medgar Evers stressed the need to push through fear to achieve movement goals and 
drive resistance efforts.45  
His father was not the only role model Evers looked to for inspiration. Though 
politically voiceless, Mississippi’s black citizens did not quietly acquiesce to the 
injustices perpetrated upon them under the new state constitution. In 1879, at least six 
thousand left the state and emigrated west in the hopes of starting their lives anew. 
Known as Exodusters, these black migrants joined thousands of others fleeing the 
violence and disfranchisement of the Jim Crow South to carve out economic 
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opportunities for themselves in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Colorado.46 Those who remained 
in Mississippi worked to develop tight-knit family structures that emphasized the 
importance of self-sufficiency and group support. Networks of churches, schools, and 
social organizations encouraged black advancement through the cultivation of civic virtue 
and self-help espoused by Booker T. Washington, national black leader and president of 
Alabama’s Tuskegee Institute. Several black colleges and universities were founded by 
churches or affiliated organizations during this period including Tougaloo College, 
Jackson College (later renamed Jackson State University), and Rust College. In 1887 
Isaiah Montgomery, a former slave of the Jefferson Davis family, purchased land in the 
Delta area of the state and founded the city of Mound Bayou, Mississippi’s first all-black 
town. There, black Mississippians could freely congregate, do business, and navigate 
within the state’s hostile anti-black environment.47  
Yet despite their attempts at uplift through education and social work, racial 
violence continued to plague the black community. Terror reigned in Mississippi, and 
there was no denying that facing up to whites and challenging Jim Crow was a dangerous 
proposition. This was especially true in the era Medgar Evers came of age and had a 
profound influence on how he translated lessons from his analysis of the Mau Mau within 
the context of Mississippi’s distinct white supremacist system. The cultivation of 
grassroots mass participation required the participation of black support networks as 
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unifying and motivating entities for change. Without the means to reinforce bonds of 
black identity and self-worth, publicizing the state’s racial horrors would prove extremely 
difficult as individuals and mobs tortured blacks to maintain the unequal state of race 
relations and the actions of Mississippi’s white leadership reached towering levels of 
cruelty.48 Perhaps no Mississippi politician better exemplified this merciless tenor than 
James Kimble Vardaman, who roared onto the state political scene as a champion for the 
poor whites of Mississippi and exited decades later as one of the most famous 
demagogues to ever climb the steps of the Jackson statehouse. Born in 1861 to a 
confederate soldier and his wife in Yalobusha County, Vardaman spent the early years of 
his life with wealthy relatives in the Mississippi Delta region, home to some of the state’s 
largest plantations and its richest soil. He developed a growing disdain for Mississippi’s 
wealthy planters and their large numbers of black tenant farmers, whom he felt did 
significant damage to the livelihood of poor white farmers throughout the state. It was for 
this reason he entered Mississippi politics, vowing to tax the planters, regulate the 
railroads, aid the poor, and work to grow the state’s economy.49 
In his biography of Vardaman, William F. Holmes explained that “in the rural 
state of Mississippi there were few modes of public entertainment that equaled political 
rallies in popularity, especially those featuring colorful candidates who spoke 
enthusiastically and movingly.” And perhaps none was as colorful or terrifying as 
Vardaman. If Theodore Bilbo was “The Man,” then Vardaman was the father who beget 
a son in his political image – a white Prince Albert suit-wearing, fear-mongering, race 
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baiting, populist rhetoric-spewing haranguer. Unlike his eventual successor, Vardaman 
stood tall at six feet with broad shoulders, a dark complexion, and shoulder length hair. 
Nicknamed “The White Chief,” his demeanor was brash and cocky, but his air of self-
confidence was essential to winning over crowds of largely rural Mississippians, most of 
whom made their living in the state’s agricultural sector and proudly displayed signs at 
rallies emblazoned with the terms “Rednecks,” “Cattle,” and “Hillbillies.” To these 
“honest yeomen,” Vardaman was the champion of the common man who would rid 
Mississippi of the moneyed interests and federal interventionists intent on destroying its 
peaceful, paternalistic society from the top-down. 
The group for whom Vardaman held the greatest contempt, and who he believed 
lay at the heart of the state’s problems, was Mississippi’s black population. A virulent 
proponent of white supremacy, Vardaman believed blacks posed continuous threats to 
local communities and swore if they were not kept in a subservient position they would 
push for full equality and destroy the purity of white families in the process. In his 
speeches, Vardaman demeaned blacks as biologically inferior and praised their lower 
position in the social hierarchy. In doing so, he hearkened back to a “moonlight and 
magnolia” interpretation of the antebellum South in which slaves happily lived side-by-
side with their white masters, content to labor for them in exchange for the civilizing 
influence only whites could bestow upon their charges. This image was quickly 
juxtaposed with that of the sexually voracious free black man and ex-slave, who without 
the civilizing experience of slavery was predisposed toward raping white women and 
polluting the bloodlines of white Mississippians. Regardless of class or even religious 
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differences, Vardaman argued that black equality, and the miscegenation that would 
surely follow if such a notion ever came to fruition, was a peril that must unite all white 
Mississippians.50  
When running for governor, Vardaman not only utilized the issue of race as a 
means of unifying his white constituents, he also used it to make a name for himself on 
the national scene. In 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt invited Booker T. Washington 
to dine with him at the White House. Roosevelt was no champion of black equality, 
having at one point exclaimed that blacks belonged to a “youthful race…much closer to 
savagery than civilization in the evolutionary scale.” However, he loathed the practice of 
lynching and was an outspoken critic of the extralegal violence that plagued the South. 
Perhaps more than anything else, Roosevelt was a keen politician who, when seeking to 
revitalize the Republican Party throughout the Southern region, was all too willing to 
enlist the help and support of some of the nation’s most prominent black leaders, the 
foremost of whom was Washington.51  
Whites across the South reacted with near universal outrage to the president’s 
invitation. Editorials in some of the region’s leading newspapers skewered the president 
for his decision, swathing their condemnations in racial fears of miscegenation and 
interracial marriage. An editorial in the Richmond Times claimed Roosevelt’s invitation 
indicated blacks should “mingle freely with whites in the social circle – that white 
women may receive attentions from Negro men,” and that “it means that there is no racial 
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reason in his opinion why whites and blacks may not marry and intermarry, why the 
Anglo-Saxon may not mix Negro blood with his blood.” The Memphis Scimitar declared 
that Roosevelt’s decision to let “a nigger dine at the White House” was “the most 
damnable outrage which has ever been perpetrated by any citizen of the United States,” 
adding that “any nigger who happens to have a little more than the average amount of 
intelligence granted by the Creator of his race, and cash enough to pay the tailor and the 
barber, and the perfumer for scents enough to take away the nigger smell, has perfect 
right to be received by the daughter of the white man among the guests in the parlor of 
his home.”52 
Throughout his 1903 gubernatorial campaign, Vardaman positioned himself as the 
state’s foremost champion of white supremacy and enemy of Roosevelt. In addition to 
voicing his disgust regarding Washington’s invite to the White House, Vardaman referred 
to the president as a “coon-flavored miscegenationist” for supporting Minnie M. Cox, a 
black woman who ran the Indianola, Mississippi post office. Though she had a good 
reputation with both black and white patrons, Vardaman took advantage of deteriorating 
racial conditions in Indianola when he campaigned there, declaring “we are not going to 
let niggers hold office in Mississippi!” Cox’s employment, Vardaman argued, was 
nothing more than the result of a “Yankee conspiracy” by “nigger-loving” Republicans to 
undermine the Southern way of life. If elected governor, he promised to handle “the coon 
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problem,” by ridding Mississippi of black education as well as fighting to repeal the 
Fifteenth Amendment and the Declaration of Independence, the latter of which Vardaman 
declared “did not apply to wild animals and niggers.” Cox offered to resign her position 
as postmaster, but Roosevelt refused her resignation, choosing to close the post office 
instead. Fearful for her life, Cox fled town shortly afterward. Indianola whites, who duly 
acknowledged they had pushed for Cox’s ouster because of her race, blamed Roosevelt 
for inflaming racial hostility and damaging the town’s economy and public image.53  
While Roosevelt was a popular target for Vardaman, his most histrionic rants 
concerned the rape of white women by “black fiends,” a crime he believed rated above all 
others. In need of a singular issue to unite divided voters struggling in the aftermath of a 
nationwide economic depression, Vardaman focused on the defense of white womanhood 
and the evils of social equality. Of this approach, David Oshinsky noted “Vardaman 
knew that white fears about social equality grew stronger in rough economic times, and 
he sensed that for poor white men, the ability to protect one’s wife and daughter from the 
‘black beast’ had become a vital substitute – a compensation of sorts – for the inability to 
shield them from the ravages of hunger and debt.” By extoling the virtues of white 
womanhood and demonizing black men as menacing threats to Mississippi society, 
Vardaman exploited the fear of race degeneracy for his political benefit. At the same 
time, he rendered an air of legitimacy to the notion of racial regression, a turn of the 
century theory that held emancipation had eliminated the civilizing influence of slavery 
from Southern blacks and rendered them a race of criminals. The popularity of 
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Vardaman’s message and his election as governor made clear that most white 
Mississippians agreed with the assessment that black men and women lay at the root of 
the state’s socioeconomic problems. They were an enemy to be protected from and 
controlled at all costs. “Not since the 1870s,” Oshinsky declared, “had a political 
campaign in Mississippi been mired in so much hate.” 54 
Given the popularity of Vardaman’s race-baiting vitriol, incidents of mob 
violence and lynchings during the first three decades of the twentieth century increased to 
some of the highest levels in Mississippi history. Between 1901-1910, 166 known 
lynchings occurred in Mississippi. 153 victims were black males, 104 of whom were 
lynched for the crimes of attempted murder, murder, rape, or attempted rape. Of 
Mississippi’s 82 counties, one or more lynchings occurred in all but 27, the highest 
number of which took place in Kemper County, located along the Mississippi-Alabama 
border. There, the number of victims reached 13. Over the next two decades (1911-1930), 
142 individuals fell victim to Mississippi lynch mobs. 127 of those victims were black 
men, 91 of whom were lynched for attempted murder, murder, rape, or attempted rape. 
These crimes constituted the most heinous of offenses, whether proven or merely 
assumed, and white mobs did not care to differentiate between the possibilities. If a white 
woman accused a black man of rape, it was all the proof most white men needed to take 
matters into their own hands. Even the act of looking at a white woman or speaking out 
of turn could result in death. On March 22, 1914, a black man named Elliott Brown was 
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shot to death by a mob in Bolivar County upon accusation he had written an insulting 
note to a white woman.55  
Vardaman himself proudly condoned the lynching of black men, particularly for 
the crime of rape, despite the small number of such assaults occurring. “If I were a 
private citizen,” he once noted, “I would head the mob to string the brute up, and I 
haven’t much respect for a white man who wouldn’t.”56 But Mississippi lynch mobs did 
not stop at carrying out their extralegal forms of justice for the suspected or proven 
crimes of black on white murder or sexual assault. Rather, they also utilized the act of 
lynching as a means of silencing black Mississippians who dared speak out against racial 
discrimination or in favor of equal rights. Notable lynchings for these actions during the 
first three decades of the twentieth century included the beating of Rachel Moore in 
Rankin County for attempting to incite “race hatred,” and Edward McDowell, who was 
beaten and shot in Pike County on September 19, 1921. While the details of McDowell’s 
supposed crime are unknown, according to what little information is available, he had “a 
reputation for being impudent to white people.” In some cases, mobs attacked random 
men and women to make an example of them and remind the black population of their 
place in society. Such was the case of a black man lynched on July 2, 1919 in Perry 
County for “discussing a recent lynching,” a crime for which he was shot, burned, and 
hanged. No record of his name exists.57  
                                                 
55 Jan Hillegas, New Mississippi Inc., “Preliminary List of Mississippi Lynchings.” General Collection, 
MDAH. 
56 Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery,” 91. 
57 Jan Hillegas, New Mississippi Inc., “Preliminary List of Mississippi Lynchings,” General Collection, 
MDAH. 
  
 56 
Perhaps the most appalling form of extralegal violence that exploded in popularity 
over the first three decades of the twentieth century was the “spectacle lynching.” 
Sometimes described as “negro barbeques,” these were gala occasions, often published 
days in advance by local newspapers, in which entire communities were invited to 
witness the torture and death of the victim. In some instances, food would be provided for 
the onlookers, adding to the picnic atmosphere of the occasion. The victims, most of 
whom were black men, were slowly tortured for hours by mobs of men wielding weapons 
such as knives, guns, hot irons, and blow torches. In cases where the victim’s supposed 
crime was rape, he was usually castrated. It was also customary to allow the father of the 
white accuser to strike the first blow. Once the victim was dead, it was common for 
attendees to collect body parts including fingers, toes, and teeth as souvenirs.58 In her 
study of spectacle lynchings, Amy Louise Wood explained that across the South, such 
horrific scenes united white citizens across class, gender, and geographic lines and 
reinforced the core beliefs of white supremacist ideology. What is more, the spectacle 
aspect of lynchings provided for the crowds a sense of community togetherness. “In this 
respect,” Wood explained, “spectators did not watch or consume a lynching so much as 
they witnessed it – that is, they beheld or experienced it with active engagement.”59  
A spectacle lynching occurred in Vicksburg, Mississippi on May 14, 1918 when 
Lloyd Clay, a twenty-two-year-old black man, was arrested for attempted rape of a white 
woman.  He was taken to a city jail to await identification, but once there his victim 
                                                 
58 McMillen, Dark Journey, 233-234. 
59 Amy Louise Wood, Lynching and Spectacle: Witnessing Racial Violence in America, 1890-1940, 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 9-11. 
  
 57 
failed to identify him in a line-up. Outside, a crowd of angry whites gathered and 
increased in number throughout the day. By nightfall, agitated and determined to see 
Clay punished, the crowd stormed the building and dragged the prisoner out into the 
street. There they stripped him, covered him in oil, hanged him from a tree, set him 
alight, and fired bullets into his body. After he was declared dead, Clay’s body was cut 
down and the pieces divided up among members of the crowd as mementos. Across the 
state, these types of spectacle lynchings continued over the course of the 1920s. In New 
Albany, Mississippi in September of 1925 a black timber-cutter was tied to a stake and 
burned to death for the alleged rape of a white woman. A thousand men, women, and 
children attended his execution. Another spectacle lynching occurred in Macon, 
Mississippi on May 27, 1927. Thirty-two-year-old Dan Anderson, charged with the 
murder of a white farmer, was apprehended by local law enforcement officials and driven 
across the county line to Alabama. There he was turned over to a mob of five-hundred 
persons including prominent city leaders, physicians, and clergymen. After conducting a 
short ceremony to mark the hand-over, the mob tied Anderson to a tree and shot him over 
two-hundred times.60  
In a study of lynching in America by the Southern Commission on Interracial 
Cooperation in June of 1930, Arthur Franklin Raper, Research and Field Secretary for the 
organization wrote “the toll of the mob reckons not alone the victims but the lynchers 
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themselves and the economic, social, and cultural meaning of their lawlessness.”61 In 
Mississippi, which led the nation in mob violence and lynching deaths over the first three 
decades of the twentieth century, those words rang out as dreadfully true from both social 
and economic standpoints. Despite constituting over fifty percent of the state population, 
the political and social systems deprived black Mississippians of upward economic 
mobility or a public voice. After experiencing a small, temporary upward spike in the size 
and worth of their holdings, black landownership steadily decreased as the number of 
black tenant farmers increased, largely due to a declining agricultural economy and the 
efforts of white planters to restrict black mobility and trap them in the sharecropping 
system through the passage of discriminatory property restrictions and the utilization of 
extralegal violence. In the Delta, disproportionate landownership and economic disparity 
remained the most extreme. By 1934, a federal study of land tenure revealed blacks 
constituted seventy-four percent of that region’s population but owned only 2.3 percent 
of the farms in operation.62  
Not even natural disasters were immune from intersection with white supremacist 
ideology, violence, and the economic disfranchisement of black laborers. In 1909, when 
the dreaded boll weevil invaded the plantations of the lower Mississippi Delta, the 
region’s large cotton planters rejected recommendations by the Mississippi Department 
of Agriculture to diversify their crops and grow less cotton. Instead, they worked to 
eliminate or suppress all state-sponsored, public discussions regarding the destructive 
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power of the weevil. The reasoning for this manipulation, according to historian James C. 
Giesen, was rooted in the desire of the planters to maintain their grip over the black labor 
force for fear they might flee the state for work in other agricultural regions. If outright 
manipulation and active attempts to keep information from tenants failed to offset a mass 
exodus during natural disasters, white planters utilized threats and extralegal violence to 
frighten tenants into acquiescence. This was a particularly common tactic employed two 
decades after the weevil invasion when the Mississippi River flooded. According to 
Giesen, forcing laborers onto levees rather than allowing them to leave was “more clearly 
and insidiously about protecting their investment in labor, rather than motivated by an 
environmental ethos.”63 
While extralegal violence in Mississippi primarily targeted the black population, 
it also had detrimental socioeconomic impacts on whites. In the post-Reconstruction era, 
property tax rates increased under the guise of redeemer leadership across the lower 
South, largely to offset financial downturns caused by the depression of the 1870s 
without abandoning the doctrine of white supremacy. Michael R. Hyman’s study of 
taxation and public policy in Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi revealed state 
governments imposed new series of high taxes specifically intended to target black 
property owners and negatively impact their debt-to-credit ratios. However, because so 
few blacks in the region owned property, white property owners took the brunt of the 
financial hit. They also suffered greatly from the exemptions doled out by the Redeemer 
governments to large manufacturers and railroads, which heaped a disproportionate 
                                                 
63 James C. Giesen, “The Truth about the Boll Weevil,”: The Nature of Planter Power in the Mississippi 
Delta, Environmental History, Vol. 14, No. 4 (October 2009): 691-695, 699. 
  
 60 
amount of the state tax burden on the white laboring class. To deflect anger over these 
economic conditions and defend their taxation policies, planters and policymakers 
employed racialized language as a rallying issue, warning that a loss of economic and 
social control over the black laboring classes would result in societal degradation.64 
Thus, in exchange for disproportionate levels of wealth concentrated among a tiny 
percentage of the state’s white population, white Mississippians received constant 
affirmations of their racial supremacy and the opportunity to exercise their frustrations 
and fears through the systematic torture and disfranchisement of the black population. 
For white men in particular, the directive to protect the purity of white womanhood was 
passed down through generations like a birthright, offering them the chance to assert 
what Amy Louise Wood has referred to her in study of spectacle lynchings as an 
“idealized sense of manliness.” In the process, they domesticated the violence by 
indicating such events were socially acceptable moments in which all white men, women, 
and children could participate.65 Lynching in Mississippi was a cornerstone of economic, 
cultural, and social life. 
But lynching was not confined to Mississippi, or even to South, and an increase in 
its numbers alongside the rise of race riots sweeping the nation in the 1920s placed the 
issue of extralegal violence front and center in American political discourse. In the 
aftermath of World War I, economic instability and large-scale demographic shifts 
increased racial tensions nationwide. In the hopes of eradicating social problems through 
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the application of science and reason, progressive reformers argued for justice with 
regards to mob violence and lynching. Among the solutions proposed was the 
establishment of federal antilynching legislation to punish the extralegal act as a federal 
crime and afford equal protection under the law to victims across the nation. For both 
black and white Mississippians, the proposed antilynching bill served as a clarion call to 
eradicate the practice, but differences in approach and application of antilynching rhetoric 
signaled the tangled duplicity of white supremacy within the state. Whereas black 
Mississippians hoped passage of the legislation would serve as a stepping stone toward 
racial equality, white Mississippians utilized demands for the elimination of lynching to 
defend and reinforce their desire to handle race relations at the state level. In the process, 
these efforts highlighted both the strength of Mississippi’s white supremacist system and 
the chink in its armor: federal intervention in state affairs.  
Since the 1890s, antilynching advocates had fought back with publicity 
campaigns that concentrated on the high number of lynchings and the “lynching for rape” 
discourse that permeated Southern white society. Frederick Douglass, former slave and 
famous advocate for the causes of abolition and racial equality, published multiple 
pamphlets highlighting Southern white rationales for lynching. These included claims 
that vigilante violence prevented “Negro domination” in politics and was paramount to 
the protection of white womanhood. Following the demise of the slave system, Douglass 
dismantled the “myth of black criminality,” noting white women had been left alone with 
black slaves when white men left to fight for the Confederacy. Rather, the assertion that 
black men were iniquitous by nature served as justification for their continued 
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subjugation in the post-emancipation era. In his article “Lynch Law in the South,” 
published in the North American Review, he underscored the blatant hypocrisy of 
Southerners. “How can the South hope to teach the negro the sacredness of human life 
while it cheapens it and profanes it by the atrocities of mob law? The morality of the 
negro,” he maintained, “will reach no higher point than the morality and religion that 
surround him.”66  
Ida B. Wells-Barnett, a black investigative journalist and suffragist born in Holly 
Springs, Mississippi, launched her own antilynching campaign in 1892 with a pamphlet 
titled Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All Its Phases. Filled with detailed accounts from 
newspapers across the nation, Wells-Barnett used her pulpit as a journalist to identify the 
Southern practice of lynching as a means of protecting the virtue of white womanhood, a 
concept she argued was predicated on lies borne of Southern white male desires to restore 
their manhood taken by the emancipation of slavery and granting of citizenship rights to 
blacks during Reconstruction. In her autobiography, she noted “the more I studied the 
situation, the more I was convinced that the Southerner had never gotten over his 
resentment that the Negro was no longer his plaything, his servant, his source of income.” 
To justify their desires to keep blacks in their place, Southern white men branded black 
men as rapists lusting after white women. Just as Douglass had highlighted the 
hypocrisies inherent in Southern lynch law, so too did Wells-Barnett. “I also found” she 
claimed, “that what the white man of the South practiced as all right for himself, he 
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assumed to be unthinkable in white women.” This included raping or engaging in secret 
relationships with black women. “Whenever they did so and were found out” she 
continued, “the cry of rape was raised, and the lowest element of the white South was 
turned loose to wreak its fiendish cruelty on those too weak to help themselves.”67  
In his study of the demise of lynching in the twentieth century, Ashraf H.A. 
Rushdy argued that “the lynching-for-rape discourse became an almost unassailable 
constellation of ideas that worked to motivate lynchers, derail their critics, and assign 
particular roles to every segment of society.” To expose and destroy this discourse, 
female antilynching activists not only felt compelled to identify the ways in which 
Southern white men engaged in and condemned rape, but also placed the blame for the 
act on black women. Dating back to the earliest days of slavery in America, white men 
had declared themselves victims of the lascivious nature of black women, who like their 
black male counterparts were accused of being insatiable creatures. That sense of 
victimization was then turned on its face and utilized as a means of asserting white racial 
dominance. When they raped black women, white men exonerated themselves through 
the assessment that their actions civilized the lesser race. In her 1894 pamphlet A Red 
Record, Wells-Barnett laid bare such double-standards when she noted “true chivalry 
respects all womanhood, and no one who reads the record, as it is written in the faces of 
the million mulattoes of the South, will for a minute conceive that the southern white man 
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had a very chivalrous regard for the honor due the women of his own race or respect for 
the womanhood which circumstances placed in his power.”68 
Despite the efforts of Douglass, Wells, and others who spoke out against mob 
violence and lynchings, however, the extralegal killings continued to occur at high rates 
across the South. In the aftermath of World War I, the number of incidents increased due 
to the departure of blacks from the region. The prospect of losing their cheap labor force, 
combined with the existence of black soldiers they believed harbored dangerous notions 
about racial equality influenced by their experiences abroad, incensed Southern whites. 
On account of the escalating violence, other activists and organizations joined the crusade 
against lynching. Black newspapers with national readerships including the Chicago 
Defender and Pittsburgh Courier condemned lynching as acts of terror meant to reinforce 
the doctrine of white supremacy and destroy black progress. Black intellectuals and 
artists also joined in the outcry, inspired by the transformative tenor of the Harlem 
Renaissance to utilize their mediums for social justice. But the foremost organization 
leading the crusade against lynching was the NAACP. Since its inception in 1909, it had 
served as a leading organization advocating for black civil rights in America, highlighting 
and seeking to eliminate racial oppression within the national political, economic, and 
social climate. Comprised of dedicated, resolute individuals determined to change the 
nature of race relations and protect African American citizens in the exercise of their 
rights, the organization set its sights on the passage of federal antilynching legislation.  
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These organizational efforts to bring attention to lynching and classify it as a 
federal crime gained traction by 1922, when the Association threw its support behind a 
bill proposed by Congressman Leonidas C. Dyer, a Republican from Missouri who 
represented a district comprised of a large black population. After a bitter debate on the 
floor of the House, the bill passed by a vote of 231 to 119. But the bill was suppressed in 
the Senate by John K. Shields of Tennessee, who filibustered to kill the measure. In 1924, 
the Dyer bill was reintroduced before Congress but defeated by a coalition of Southern 
and Western congressmen who had previously worked together to pass a contentious 
anti-Japanese immigration bill. Frustrating though the Dyer bill’s demise had been, its 
public defeat, alongside the increased exposure of lynching by antilynching activists, 
organizations, and networks, shone a bright light on the South and forced it to openly 
grapple with the issue of extralegal violence on the national stage. In the process, it 
reinforced long held white fears of federal intervention into Southern state affairs. In 
Mississippi, that fear resulted in public appeals by leading members of the white power 
structure to end extralegal violence or risk federal interference into their “way of life.”69 
In 1925, the Mississippi Bar Association organized a campaign to “condemn mob 
violence and call on officers to do their sworn duty." Numerous public officials, leaders 
of the Bar Association, and other prominent citizens took part, denouncing lynching as 
the state’s “blackest blot” and agreeing that the practice “constitutes a challenge to our 
citizenship, our civilization, and our Christianity.” As part of its campaign, the 
organization distributed booklets to the public containing breakdowns of lynching 
                                                 
69 Robert William Dubay, “Mississippi and the proposed federal anti-lynching bills of 1937-1938,” 
Southern Quarterly 7 (October 1968): 74-75. 
  
 66 
statistics, tips for how law enforcement officials, attorneys, judges, and the courts could 
ensure the safety and fair treatment of the accused, and a special section titled “Rape Not 
the Usual Cause” in which it was argued that three-fourths of all Mississippi lynchings 
from 1921-1924 were driven by mob reaction to “some other offense than a crime against 
our womenhood.” The Association’s condemnation of lynching as a social and moral 
problem was also coupled with demands that eradication of the evil practice be left to the 
state of Mississippi. In his words on the matter, Congressman B.G. Lowrey argued that 
“lynching is not right. It is murder indeed of the most horrible kind, when a mob takes the 
life of an innocent being” and promised to do all he could to “strengthen the arm of the 
law in Mississippi and to drive lynching out.” However, he also noted that “this is a State 
problem, not a Federal problem,” adding “I shall do all in my power to keep the Federal 
government out of a sphere in which it has no business.”70  
In this period, many Southern white women also became vocal advocates against 
lynching. With its roots in a growing movement for interracial cooperation and suffrage, 
their crusade to eliminate lynching arose out of the laity rights and faith-based interracial 
outreach movements within the Southern Methodist Church, Commission on Interracial 
Cooperation (CIC), and the white and black divisions of the Young Women’s Christian 
Association (YMCA). Drawing from their experiences within those networks, 
antilynching advocates formed the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of 
Lynching (ASWPL) in 1930. In her study of the life and career of ASWPL founder Jessie 
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Daniel Ames, Jacquelyn Dowd Hall explained that “the goals of the organization were 
ambitious indeed: it proposed to use the moral and social leverage of organized women to 
prevent lynchings in the rural and small-town South.” In a broader sense “it hoped to 
create a new climate of opinion by challenging the association between racial violence 
and sexual attitudes.” In Mississippi, ASWPL members called on church bodies and 
organizing conventions to sign pledge against lynching, but their advocacy fell short of 
supporting the passage of federal antilynching legislation, preferring instead to categorize 
the problem of lynching as a state issue.71  
By the time New York Representative Hamilton Fish – with the backing of the 
NAACP - introduced another federal antilynching bill in the House of Representatives in 
1937, the number of recorded lynchings in Mississippi had dropped precipitously. When 
asked about this decline, Sociologist Arthur Raper attributed it to the work of Ames and 
other activist organizations to publicize the hypocrisy of Southern white rationales for 
mob violence.72 Yet while the zenith of lynching had passed in Mississippi, it did not 
disappear entirely. Most importantly, the white supremacist framework it stood upon 
remained firmly entrenched. Just as Dyer’s bill had fallen to defeat by a southern 
filibuster, Fish’s effort met the same demise. By publicly decrying extralegal violence in 
the face of federal interference, white officials across the South bolstered their authority 
to handle race relations at the state level. As young Medgar Evers sat atop the Decatur 
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courthouse steps and listened to Theodore Bilbo bellow on about the dangers of Negro 
equality, the outlook for black Mississippians remained bleak. Yet its uniquely 
destructive horrors offered up lessons for Evers on what it would take to dismantle 
Mississippi’s white supremacist system: the application of tactics intended to stab at the 
chink in the state government’s armor by forcing federal intervention in matters of race 
relations. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
 
VIEWING HOME THROUGH FOREIGN EYES: BECOMING A MAU 
MAU IN MISSISSIPPI 
  
On April 8, 1953, Ransley Thacker, a First Class Magistrate in the High Court of 
Kenya, read aloud his decision in the trial of Jomo Kenyatta, president of the moderate 
nationalist Kenya African Union (KAU) and accused leader of a conspiracy against the 
colonial government. The verdict, handed down fifty-eight days into the trial, asserted 
Kenyatta was guilty of heading a violent insurrection commonly known as “Mau Mau.” 
In his concluding statement, Thacker claimed Kenyatta had thrust his people “back to a 
state that shows little humanity,” persuading them to “murder, burn, and commit 
atrocities.” In response to the verdict, Kenyatta stood and calmly stated that while the 
Europeans and loyalists to the British colonial cause emphasized that his trial was fair, he 
did not believe that was the case. Furthermore, in reference to the work he had done in 
the KAU, he avowed “what we have done and shall continue to do is to demand rights for 
the African people as human beings so that they shall enjoy the same facilities as other 
people.”1 
Kenyatta’s statement concerning the prejudiced nature of his hearing was not 
without warrant, because the outcome of the trial had been a foregone conclusion. In 
October 1952, in response to a mounting crisis of violence and murder carried out by 
militant Kenyan nationalists on Africans loyal to the central government and a handful of 
white settlers, Governor Evelyn Baring declared an official State of Emergency. By doing 
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so, he was able to request military aid from British army regiments to track down and 
arrest any leaders of the African political associations believed to be behind the uprising. 
Though Kenyatta was one of several senior KAU officials taken into custody, 
misunderstanding and false accusations surrounding the nature of the uprising led to 
allegations he was its principal organizer. To validate his call for Emergency powers and 
as a way of placating white settler fears, Baring was determined to conduct a show trial. 
Thus, despite Kenyatta’s moderate position within the Kiambaa Parliament and his 
efforts to speak out against militant violence, his trial was conceived with the purpose of 
showing “the watching world how Kenya’s colonial government proposed to deal with 
the menace of Mau Mau.”2 
The Mau Mau uprising occurred in Kenya from 1952-1956. Though debates raged 
among participants and observers as to whether the uprising was a centralized 
independence movement or a more dispersed, tribalist insurrection, both agreed the 
bloody conflict was rooted in the policies of white supremacy that permeated the Kenyan 
colonial economy and political system. As violence escalated, British authorities became 
increasingly alarmed as large numbers of Kenyans took up arms and participated in 
militant unrest against the colonial government. Newspapers reported stories of 
horrifying slaughters, descriptions of ostensibly mystical tribal rituals, and attempts to 
shed light on the history of race relations within the British colony.  In the United States, 
the militant nationalists labeled Mau Mau were referred to in the New York Herald-
Tribune as barbarians, intent on driving the white man out of Kenya by “spreading fear, 
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destruction, and death throughout the land.”3 Kenyatta was of particular interest to 
journalists covering the story, not only because of his conviction but also because British 
authorities made concerted efforts to create a propaganda campaign of their own, 
demonizing and labeling him a blood-thirsty terrorist. Kenyatta was also not immune 
from allegations of communist influence serving as the reasoning behind his apparent 
leadership of the Mau Maus, as was evidenced by a New York Times article titled 
“Soviet-Trained Mau Mau Terrorist is Sentenced to 7 Years’ Hard Labor,” which 
described Kenyatta as a “Moscow-educated tribal leader…guilty of organizing the 
dreaded Mau Mau secret society, which aims to throw the white man out of Kenya.”4  
Not all American newspaper coverage of Kenyatta painted him in such a 
censorious light, nor was the Mau Mau uprising always interpreted as a communist-
influenced terrorist rebellion aimed at overthrowing British colonial authorities. 
Journalists working for African-American newspapers in the 1950s provided nuanced 
coverage of the conflict emphasizing the political, economic, and social complexities 
involved. They also offered balanced, extensive exposés on suspected Mau Mau leaders, 
including Kenyatta. Because of this coverage, many African Americans viewed the Mau 
Mau uprising as a legitimate liberation struggle, even if no consensus was reached 
regarding the justification of violent rebellion as a political tool. Of this assessment, 
historian James Meriwether explained the Mau Mau embedded itself into the collective 
consciousness of black America as a “potent symbol of black resistance against both 
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white supremacy and the established civil rights leadership.” At the same time, it served 
as a crucial lynchpin in the long-standing debate over the use of nonviolence versus 
strategies of armed resistance for liberation. 5  
Established civil rights organizations, including the NAACP, primarily fought 
against white supremacy through political lobbying and legal challenges in the judicial 
system, battling the forces of segregation in public education and voter discrimination in 
the courts. Militant black leaders preferred to promote the use of violence as a strategy 
against racial discrimination, and at times used the Mau Mau as a successful example of 
such an approach. Perhaps the most famous example of this occurred in 1964 when 
Malcolm X spoke at a Harlem rally benefitting the Mississippi Freedom Democratic 
Party. Proclaiming that Kenyans were going about achieving independence the “right 
way,” he declared a Mau Mau-type response was needed in Alabama, Georgia, Harlem, 
and in Mississippi. “A black man has the right to do whatever is necessary to get his 
freedom,” he stated, adding “we will never get it by nonviolence. If the language is a 
shotgun, get a shotgun. But don’t waste time talking the wrong language.”6  
For Medgar Evers, determining what constituted the right language with which to 
fight for freedom was crucial to his future in Mississippi. In Kenya, he discovered a 
system of racial caste and oppression similar to the one at home and developed a 
profound admiration for Kenyatta as a strong leader justifiably seeking the liberation of 
his people. Evers was also impressed by the violent nature of the Mau Mau response and 
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the attention it brought to the injustices perpetrated against Africans in the British 
colonial system. Given the suffocating culture of white supremacy in Mississippi, Evers 
considered creating his Mau Mau-style army of poor black sharecroppers to kill whites in 
retaliation for white-on-black violence and bring attention to the systematic oppression 
suffered by the state’s black population. Yet his proposed campaign of guerilla warfare 
and violent retribution never came to pass. Instead, Evers chose to join the NAACP and 
work full time as a Field Secretary carrying out the Association’s campaigns for 
desegregation and voting rights in Mississippi. However, to assume Evers abandoned his 
dream of leading a local, militant rebellion in exchange for the nonviolent tactics of the 
NAACP oversimplifies the nature and intent of his actions. From his examination of the 
Kenya uprising, Evers identified successful elements of the Mau Mau struggle - including 
the means through which it drew worldwide attention and relied on mass participation at 
the local level – and employed the logistical capacity of the NAACP to put them into 
practice. In doing so, Evers transformed the definition of Mau Mau to fit the specifics of 
the fight for racial equality in Mississippi.7  
Established as a British Protectorate at the turn of the century and later formed as 
a colony after World War I, Kenya was quickly opened to development and British settler 
immigration. In 1896, the construction of the Uganda Railway began as a means of 
introducing Christian missionaries to East Africa and transporting supplies and troops 
toward the coast in case of invasions by European imperialist competitors. Citing cheap 
land and abundant labor sources, British authorities encouraged enterprising and 
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adventurous citizens to pull up stakes at home in England and settle in Kenya. By 
enticing white settlers to relocate to the colony, it was hoped agricultural production 
would develop in its interior regions.8 But justifications for settlement were not only 
inherent in the language of economic or religious necessity, they also included calls for 
British citizens to take up the “civilizing mission.” Simply put, Caroline Elkins explained 
in her study of the Mau Mau uprising that “according to their own line of reasoning, the 
British were not actually stealing African land or exploiting local labor but were instead 
self-appointed trustees for the hapless ‘natives,’ who had not yet reached a point on the 
evolutionary scale to develop or make responsible decisions on their own.” This, she 
explained “was cultural imperialism par excellence. This was the ‘White Man’s 
Burden.”9 
Over the course of the early to mid-twentieth century, a multitude of white settlers 
accepted the government’s challenge and flooded into the territory seeking cheap land 
and opportunities to break free of the constraints of the class system in Britain. 
Thousands of the native African peoples, including the largest – the Kikuyu tribe – were 
summarily displaced from their lands and homes. In their place came ambitious British 
aristocrats seeking to establish a foothold in Africa to “re-create the seigniorial lifestyle 
in the highlands of Kenya that had been increasingly difficult to maintain at home.” 
Intent on bringing a “civilizing influence” to the native African populations and their 
beliefs in white racial superiority, Elkins maintained that these new aristocrats shared an 
                                                 
8 Wunyabari O. Maloba, Mau Mau and Kenya: An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 24. 
9 Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 5, 7. 
  
 75 
“ambition to create a plantocracy modeled on the American South.”10 Landless and 
without legal recourse, many of the Kikuyu were forced to leave their land in the central 
highlands and take up residences as squatters on white settler farms or relocate to African 
land “reserves.” Other Kikuyu moved to urban centers to seek employment in low wage 
jobs. Thousands ended up living in tent cities outside the walls of Nairobi, where abject 
poverty and crime were the mainstays of existence. By the early 1950s, 40,000 thousand 
whites maintained political, social, and economic power over 5 million Africans in 
Kenya.11  
 Many Kenyans, however, refused to accept the discriminatory practices of the white 
minority and attempted to work within the channels of the provincial system to articulate 
grievances and demand redress from the government. To some extent, this was supported 
by colonial authorities, who deemed the introduction of Kenyans into political life a 
means of civilizing them. In the early 1920s, a younger generation of Kikuyu, educated in 
missionary schools, took the first steps of political representation by forming their own 
organization, the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA). Focused on the growing land 
problem and lack of educational opportunities, the Association claimed ten thousand 
members at the peak of its popularity. Among them was Jomo Kenyatta, who eventually 
rose to the rank of KCA Secretary. Inspired by the opportunity to call for reform, the 
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KCA also reinforced ethnic bonds of personhood and cultural identity by defending the 
Kikuyu cultural practice of female circumcision, considered savage by colonial 
authorities and missionaries alike. This placed the organization in the crosshairs of 
government officials obsessed with protecting their civilizing mission. In 1940, they 
labeled the KCA subversive and banned it entirely. Nevertheless, its existence served as a 
crucial building block in the construction of a broader sense of African cultural 
nationalism taking hold in Kenya.12 
In the aftermath of World War II, the rise of the KAU marked the first attempt by 
an African political organization to extend its influence in Kenya beyond regional 
concerns. A sense of militancy had arisen during the war and centered in the cities, where 
many landless Kikuyu worked as urban laborers. Under the leadership of a moderate 
political elite drawn from the former KCA, the KAU incorporated trade unionists, 
landless squatters, and members of other African ethnic groups into its organization. 
When fighting fascist forces in the war, Kikuyu soldiers witnessed British imperialist 
hypocrisy first-hand. Though they had placed their lives on the line for the empire, they 
returned home to continued oppression and a new awareness of nationalist movements 
around the globe. Squeezed to the economic margins, these ex-soldiers formed a militant 
faction in the KAU and advocated armed rebellion by urban and rural Kikuyu against 
colonial authorities and Africans loyal to the British government. To reinforce their 
bonds of ethnic and cultural identity, solidify their allegiance to their cause, and organize 
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grassroots support, the young militants radicalized the traditional Kikuyu practice of 
oathing and the Mau Mau movement was born.13  
Kenyatta, one of the moderate nationalists, was elected president of the KAU on 
June 1, 1947. Preferring to advocate a political platform predicated on the rights of 
Kenyans to fair land practices, he worked tirelessly to prevent the militant faction of the 
party from accumulating a powerful hold over the landless Africans in the colony. But as 
oathing ceremonies that pledged unity and demands for freedom spread among Kikuyu 
masses in the reserves, Kenyatta’s efforts to appeal for change through traditional 
government processes failed. Colonial officials had little interest in altering their 
oppressive land policies anyway, and as Mau Mau grew they deemed it a major threat to 
the colony’s stability. By the time the violent attacks on loyal Africans and white settlers 
began, Kenyatta found himself fighting a losing battle against British authorities, 
militants in his own party, and in the court of public opinion, where he was blamed for 
inciting and leading the rebellion. After his conviction by the colonial court, Kenyatta 
spent the next seven years in prison while a bloody war raged between the militant 
Kikuyu faction and the British and African loyalist troops.14  
As the Mau Mau uprising broke out in late 1951, Evers was finishing up his last 
semester at Alcorn Agricultural & Mechanical College in Lorman, Mississippi, where he 
was pursuing a degree in business administration and entertaining thoughts of becoming a 
lawyer. It was there he met his future wife, Myrlie Beasley. Not long after they first met, 
he declared that she would someday be mother of his children. Much like Kenyatta, Evers 
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possessed a ‘no nonsense’ style and assertiveness, and Myrlie noted that when meeting 
Medgar for the first time “there was something about the way he spoke, the way he 
carried himself, in his politeness, that made him stand out even from the others I met that 
day.” There was also a maturity about him that registered immediately and an “air of 
having a goal and knowing precisely how to reach it” which further heightened her 
interest. On campus, Evers commanded attention with his words and actions. A natural 
leader, he served as editor of the campus newspaper and college yearbook, president of 
his junior class, vice president of the Student Forum, and was a member of the campus 
choir, debate team, and a star halfback on the football squad. According to historian 
Michael Vinson Williams, Evers was also “never content with just learning what 
professors taught from the text, nor was he willing to allow them to remain campus-
fixated while the community suffered.”15 
Although he had always been a studious child, Evers’ decision to attend college 
was not only rooted in his thirst for knowledge, but a hunger for action. That same hunger 
enticed him to enlist in the United States Army during World War II along with his 
brother Charles. During his time as an enlisted infantryman, Medgar served in the Red 
Ball Express and spent considerable time in England and France. According to Myrlie, 
his time in the army had a profound influence on his determination to continue his 
education, particularly after he was inspired to do so by one of his lieutenants. His 
experience also had a profound effect on Evers’ intolerance toward the system of white 
oppression in Mississippi. Just as colonized Africans fought under the control of 
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imperialist authority, Medgar and Charles Evers served in segregated units with white 
officers.  Given Medgar’s experiences growing up in the racist stronghold of Mississippi, 
this experience met the standards of discrimination he was used to and placed them in a 
precarious position within an ever-changing international arena. As a soldier of color, he 
was treated as a second-class citizen by the army, yet during his deployment in Europe, 
was treated as an equal by the liberated populations he came across, including a French 
family with whose daughter he enjoyed a brief romance. Having served as a liberator and 
defender of American democracy in Europe, Evers, along with thousands of other 
African-American servicemen, returned home more determined than ever to change the 
system of race relations in America.16 
In the escalating Cold War environment, Medgar and Charles Evers made their 
first attempt to directly challenge Mississippi’s white supremacist system when they tried 
to register to vote in 1946. Together with three friends, they marched down to the 
Decatur County courthouse, the same building where as children they had listened to 
Governor Bilbo excoriate them as dangerous foes. When they arrived, they were met by 
the circuit clerk who implored them to return home without registering. The Evers 
brothers and their friends refused. Of this moment, Charles recalled “I kept thinking 
about crawling around in that mud in New Guinea, fighting for my country. Now I was 
going to be counted as a man.” Eventually, the circuit clerk gave in to their demands and 
allowed them to register. However, when the men returned on Election Day to cast their 
ballots, they were met by a crowd of over two-hundred men armed with shotguns, pistols, 
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and other weapons. The Evers brothers were also armed. Charles recalled carrying a 
switchblade knife and a .38 pistol in his pocket. Once inside the courthouse, a standoff 
ensued. 
Medgar and Charles made attempts to cast their ballots and were repulsed by a 
group of twenty armed men, including two who according to Charles “shoved shotguns 
under our ribs.” Aware that they were grossly outnumbered and that law enforcement 
inside the courthouse refused to protect them, the brothers agreed to leave the building. 
Once outside, they were verbally assaulted by armed men who followed them down the 
street, leaning out their car windows and threatening the lives of any black man or 
woman who intended to vote. That night, Charles and Medgar armed themselves and 
waited for the men who had threatened them to appear, just as their father had done years 
before when he waited for night riders after his quarrel with the white store owner. No 
one came. Nonetheless, both men learned valuable lessons from their failed attempt. 
Tearing down Mississippi’s white supremacist barriers required extensive organization 
and contingency plans. There was power in numbers and no amount of violence white 
Mississippians would not dole out to maintain their power. “Liberating Mississippi from 
the Great White Fathers,” Charles explained, “would be a lot tougher than liberating 
Europe from the Nazis.”17 
For the remainder of his time at Alcorn, Medgar Evers turned his attention toward 
a future legal career. In his estimation, acquiring a keen knowledge of Mississippi’s 
system and understanding its specificities was a key step toward challenging its racist 
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barriers. Remembered by his fellow Alcorn classmates as a serious student, this plan 
corresponded to his calculating personality and love of education. But law school would 
cost money, and Evers needed a good job to start on the right foot in his career and 
marriage. After graduation, he took advantage of an opportunity from Dr. T.R.M. 
Howard, who offered Evers a job with the Magnolia Mutual Insurance Company. The 
company was considered one of the best places of employment for Alcorn graduates in 
Mississippi and provided its employees with steady paychecks. Howard, one of the most 
wealthy and prominent African Americans in the Mississippi Delta, was also outspoken 
on the issue of racial discrimination. In addition to founding Magnolia Mutual Insurance, 
he served as a founding member of the Regional Council of Negro Leadership (RCNL), 
the most powerful organization advocating for black business power in Mississippi. For 
Evers, a position selling insurance to black Mississippians guaranteed him a job that did 
not depend upon the graciousness of whites, provided him with firsthand knowledge of 
the oppressed conditions black sharecroppers endured in the Delta, and allowed him to 
network with African American business and community leaders in the RCNL.18 
Established in 1951, the RCNL was created as a black version of the Delta 
Council, the Mississippi Delta region’s all-white chamber of commerce. In his 
promotions, Howard framed the RCNL as an organization set out to “harness the talents 
of proven leaders in business, the professions, education, and the church,” with a goal of 
“reach[ing] the masses through the chosen leaders of the masses.” Its primary platform 
emphasized white and black business cooperation and “greater black representation in the 
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leading economic and political agencies such as the Mississippi Farm Bureau.” At the 
same time, Howard also utilized the organization to push for equal accommodations in 
education and voter registration. By focusing on the problem of starved black children 
deprived of an education on par with white children, Howard highlighted the hypocrisy of 
the white politicians who praised the doctrine of separate-but-equal but refused to enforce 
it across Mississippi. According to historians David Beito and Linda Royster Beito, 
Howard’s philosophy for improvement in Mississippi race relations owed its 
organizational design to Booker T. Washington’s philosophy of racial uplift, while his 
emphasis on utilizing the abilities of black community leaders to reach the masses 
incorporated a dose of W.E.B. DuBois’s doctrine of the talented tenth.19 
After he was hired by Howard, Evers and Myrlie, who had married a few days 
prior, moved to Mound Bayou, Mississippi. There, in the town that made its name for 
having an almost all African American population, Evers went to work selling insurance 
policies to black customers in the Delta.20 His experiences significantly influenced the 
way he interpreted the situation for blacks in Mississippi. In Mound Bayou, Evers came 
face to face with a level of black impoverishment and disfranchisement that shocked him 
despite having been born and raised in the state. As an insurance salesman, Evers was 
required to sell life insurance policies door to door that brought him to the shacks of poor 
black sharecroppers. When he arrived home, he was desperate to tell his wife stories of 
his travels and describe the terrible conditions of the sharecroppers’ homes. He told her 
“of children without shoes, without proper clothing; of adults with nothing to eat; of 
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unsanitary conditions no self-respecting farmer would permit in his pigpen.” Their sense 
of indifference, whether it was real or somewhat exaggerated by Evers, caused him 
further dissatisfaction. Yet “his anger was not really with them,” Myrlie Evers added, 
“for he returned to them again and again with gifts and help. His anger was with his own 
frustration at not being able to change it all.”21 
Evers’ experiences with the Magnolia Mutual Insurance Company, as well as his 
developing professional relationship with Howard, had a deep and profound effect on his 
conception of how substantial white supremacist barriers against black progress were in 
Mississippi. While his childhood was not without its difficulties, his parents had worked 
hard to make sure the family was never destitute. Evers often confessed to his wife that 
the level of hopelessness and deprivation he had seen in the Delta sharecroppers’ shacks 
was beyond his comprehension. Historian Charles M. Payne noted Evers’ experiences 
working for the insurance company served as a new kind of education and exacerbated 
the anger already within him. These observations also informed his comparisons between 
the oppressive conditions faced by black Delta sharecroppers and the aggrieved, landless 
Kikuyu in Kenya. Though each faced distinctive systems of governance, both groups 
existed within a global system of white supremacy in which the exploitation and control 
of black bodies served as the foundation of economic and political power. In establishing 
relationships with poor black sharecroppers, Evers earned their trust, gleaned valuable 
information about how Mississippi’s white power structure maintained power over its 
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Delta inhabitants, and began formulating a framework of action that would ultimately 
become transnational in scope.22  
At the same time, Evers’ professional relationship with Howard provided him the 
opportunity to begin actively opposing the established system of white supremacy 
through work with the RCNL. In 1951, Evers joined the organization and was quickly 
appointed its program director. In much the same way the KAU functioned in Kenya, the 
RCNL’s program of racial uplift sought to hold the white power structure accountable for 
its failures to provide equal accommodations and fairness between the races. This did not 
mean, however, the organization was accepting of racial segregation. Just as the KAU 
intended to give voice to people silenced through government policies, the RCNL aimed 
to provide those opportunities for Mississippi’s black population. Its work served to 
embolden blacks to stand up and be recognized for the contributions to Mississippi 
society and demand full access to the political system. As program director, Evers played 
a central role in reinforcing a sense of self-worth among its members and learned 
important lessons about leadership, grassroots organizing, and promotion.23  
It was also through the RCNL that Evers established lasting relationships with 
individuals who would prove critical assets, and at times detriments, to the success of his 
civil rights work in Mississippi. This included Amzie Moore and Aaron Henry, both 
fellow veterans and local activists who openly opposed the racial status quo. Moore 
hailed from a plantation in the Delta county of Grenada and settled in the town of 
Cleveland, Mississippi. There, he put his entrepreneurial spirit to good use and opened a 
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combination service station and restaurant that catered to customers of both races. Henry, 
a pharmacist from the Delta town of Clarksdale, had been fortunate to grow up within a 
slightly more progressive black community than existed in most other areas of the state. 
For this reason, he attended one of Mississippi’s few all-black high schools and was 
introduced at an early age to the prospect of enacting change through community action. 
While very different in personality, the two men shared a common desire to stir the local 
black community to action that deeply resonated with Evers. They were also active 
members of the NAACP, which until he joined the RCNL, Evers knew little about.24  
That he was unfamiliar with the NAACP until he joined the RCNL seems, on its 
face, a curious circumstance, especially given his interest in voter registration following 
his return to Mississippi after the war. Since its inception in 1909, the NAACP had 
served as the foremost organization advocating for black civil rights in America, 
highlighting and seeking to eliminate racial oppression within the national political, 
economic, and social climate. Comprised of dedicated, resolute individuals determined to 
change the nature of race relations and protect African American citizens in the exercise 
of their rights, the organization tackled white supremacy in all its forms at both state and 
federal levels. However, the NAACP’s own operational trajectory, coupled with the 
horrifyingly oppressive nature of Mississippi’s white supremacist system, minimized the 
scope and impact of the organization in the pre-war period. Its connection with the RCNL 
opened much-needed avenues to black Mississippians worried about associating with an 
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Association dedicated to dismantling white supremacy. According to David Bieto and 
Linda Royster Beito, the RCNL “acted as a kind of advanced guard for the NAACP” in 
that it encouraged blacks to risk openly associating with the Association.25 
In the first several decades of its existence, the NAACP declared its primary 
organizational directive was the fight to eliminate racially motivated mob violence - most 
often in the form of lynching - throughout the nation. The broad campaign against 
vigilante mob violence was intended to bring about an end to the use of terror tactics as 
the primary means of forcing African Americans to remain in positions of socioeconomic 
subservience. By calling attention to the horrors and realities of such violence, the 
Association also hoped its campaign could be used to foster support among white and 
black Americans for extensive reforms in the areas of education, employment, housing, 
and voting. For these reasons, the NAACP dedicated enormous amounts of funding and 
manpower to publicizing the horrors of lynching throughout the nation, lobbying 
government leaders to sponsor and pass federal antilynching legislation, and calling on 
elected officials and American citizens to put an end to vigilante mob violence and 
uphold the rights of African Americans as full citizens under the protection of the law.26  
Initially, the earliest attempts by the NAACP to bring the issue of mob violence to 
the forefront of national debate came in its formation of organizational anti-lynching 
rallies, marches, and the publication of informational pamphlets citing lynching statistics. 
However, while this approach was successful in calling attention to the reality that 
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lynching was a foremost stain on the American sociocultural fabric, it was not until 
World War I that the NAACP’s approach to the issue underwent significant 
transformation. With the onset of American participation in the conflict, W.E.B. Du Bois, 
who served as both editor of the Association magazine Crisis and Director of Publicity 
and Research, encouraged African Americans to “close ranks,” support the war effort, 
and “set aside their special grievances” in light of the gravity of the conflict and the 
horrific implications of German “military despotism,” arguing “that which the German 
power represents today spells death to the aspirations of Negroes and the darker races for 
equality, freedom, and democracy.”27 In response to this July 1918 directive, scores of 
African Americans joined the armed forces, supported war bond drives, and temporarily 
put aside their resentment over racial injustices. However, the move to “close ranks” did 
not stem the tide of racial violence, as lynchings and race riots occurred in record 
numbers into the early post-war years (in 1919 alone, twenty-five race riots and seventy-
six lynchings of African Americans occurred in the United States). Black soldiers became 
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common targets, inciting the hatred of fellow white serviceman and other Americans 
determined to remind blacks of their second-class status in society.28 
Incensed by the reality that “closing ranks” had not resulted in the alleviation of 
racial discrimination in the armed forces or the domestic sphere, black Americans found 
themselves facing a post-war world in which, despite their having taken part in the fight 
to “save the world for democracy,” they remained second-class citizens. Within the ranks 
of the NAACP, the increase in wartime racial violence served as a catalyst for the 
organization to strengthen its stand against lynching and transform the means through 
which it operated at national and local levels. In 1916, James Weldon Johnson was hired 
as a field secretary for the purposes of establishing, organizing, and supervising local 
Association branches. In order to move forward and succeed in bringing about an end to 
white supremacy and mob violence, Johnson, who four years later went on to become the 
organization’s first black Executive Secretary, argued that the NAACP needed a strong 
network of branches which the Association could utilize for information collection, 
membership drives, and other organizational initiatives. 
 Johnson’s appointment as a field secretary was followed up two years later by the 
hiring of Walter F. White as Assistant Executive Secretary. Born and raised in Georgia, 
White was encouraged by Johnson to join the NAACP after meeting the field secretary in 
Atlanta. With a light complexion and blue eyes, White became an asset to the 
organization as an investigator of Southern lynchings because of his ability to pass as a 
white journalist, and later as Executive Secretary. Both men, having experienced first-
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hand the horrors of mob violence, took to their work with great determination and 
diligence, spearheading the campaign for a federal antilynching law and encouraging the 
growth of the organization through fundraising efforts, membership drives, and 
nationwide publicity campaigns.29  
By the 1920s, the NAACP expanded its campaign against lynching to include the 
creation of a separate legal defense fund, needed by the Association to cover the cost of 
legal expenses incurred in the defense of black citizens charged with violating the 
cultural, legal, and extralegal mores and regulations throughout the nation, particularly in 
the South. In addition, the fund was also expanded to cover the cost of the organization’s 
campaign to end the white primary in Texas, publicize widespread voter 
disfranchisement, and fight against segregated education. Through the recruitment of 
bright young lawyers to the NAACP legal defense staff and the decision to expand the 
organization’s directive against white supremacy and mob violence to an inclusion of 
efforts to push for an end to discrimination in voting and education, the Association 
hoped to use litigation as a tool for further recruiting black members and financial 
support throughout the South.30 As a result, by the onset of World War II, the NAACP 
had established itself as the leading organization fighting for civil rights in all walks of 
American life.  
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Part and parcel of a renewed determination for change was the rise of wartime 
campaigns among African Americans calling for an end to fascism abroad and racism at 
home. The most prominent - the Double V Campaign - arose in response to a race riots 
and white attacks on black servicemen across the nation. Many African Americans, 
including leading members of the NAACP, threw off speculation they would once again 
“close ranks” and set aside their “special grievances” as the conflict raged across the 
continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa. In addition to the growing instances of violence 
directed at black citizens and servicemen during wartime, the rhetoric and concept 
fueling the Double V was further bolstered by the promises of the Atlantic Charter, 
utilized by President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 
that “committed the Allied Powers to improving the quality of life for the world’s 
inhabitants, and promised a peace that would secure for all peoples the Four Freedoms, 
especially freedom from fear and want,” NAACP leaders declared that a fight to ensure 
democracy abroad must also include a fight to ensure the same principles at home.31 
Initially brought to the attention of the NAACP and African Americans through 
press coverage of West African groups by George Padmore in 1942, who demanded that 
“Churchill clarify the meaning of the Atlantic Charter for Nigeria,” the NAACP picked 
up on the fight to lobby Roosevelt “on the importance of the charter’s application to all 
peoples.” Specifically, Walter White tied the fight against colonialism to the fight for 
freedom at home in America, arguing the Atlantic Charter “would be hypocritical if 
confined to those of white race, but if applied to all, it could have an important effect 
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upon peoples of color throughout the world and on American domestic racial politics.”32 
In order to expand on its demand for self-determination for peoples of color around the 
world, The NAACP brought W.E.B. Du Bois back into the administrative fold as the 
Director of Special Research in 1944. Tasked with guiding the Association on 
anticolonial issues and “fight for the emancipation of the world,” he immediately set out 
to revive its sponsorship of the Pan-African Congress. Scheduled to meet in 1945, the 
Pan-African Congress called together black intellectual and political leaders from around 
the world to discuss the future of people of color in Africa and the Caribbean and 
declared for their right to rule themselves. Within the NAACP, bitter disagreements over 
tactics to achieve those ends converged with the egos of Du Bois and White that 
threatened to muddle the Association’s efforts moving forward. But as the war raged on, 
the NAACP publicly positioned itself as an organization viewing the quest for black 
liberation at home through a transnational framework.33 
At home, African Americans actively spoke out against racism in all walks of life. 
On the fronts and on stateside military bases, black servicemen wrote to family members, 
friends, and black newspapers of their desire to return home to a land without Jim Crow. 
At the same time, African Americans in the labor industry threatened to march, one 
hundred thousand strong, in Washington D.C. to protest employment discrimination in 
the defense industries.34 As a result of its participation in the fight to ensure democracy 
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abroad and end racism at home, the NAACP grew in popularity and gained never-before-
seen levels of support from African Americans, even throughout the most oppressive 
regions of the South. Thus, when Medgar Evers returned to Mississippi in 1946, 
following his service in the United States army, the NAACP was experiencing a boom in 
popularity within the state. In the summer of 1952, when Myrlie Evers noted that her 
husband’s anger with the white supremacist system reached its peak and his work with 
the RCNL entered him into the activist fold, he joined the NAACP. It was to be the 
beginning of a career with the organization that would place him firmly in the center of 
the political and social fight against segregation in Mississippi until his death ten years 
later.  
By 1953, black membership had risen to 1,600 from 377 in 1940, and black voter 
registration, which served as a primary NAACP directive, also increased from 2,000 in 
1940 to around 20,000 by 1953. In addition to the new sense of assertiveness among 
African-Americans following the war, David Beito and Linda Royster Beito argued that 
its association with the RCNL spurred the growth of the Mississippi NAACP. “During 
the 1940s,” they argued, “many blacks had avoided identification with the NAACP out of 
fear of angering whites, many of whom considered it a communist front.” While it mainly 
functioned as an organization that facilitated autonomous committees and sponsored 
public rallies, however, it also emboldened blacks to take the risk of open participation in 
the NAACP. 35 Moore and Henry were particularly zealous about conducting NAACP 
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membership drives, and together with Evers worked whatever avenues were available to 
spread word of the organization’s directives. 
L.C. Dorsey, a social worker born on a cotton plantation in Washington County 
who joined the Mississippi movement in the 1960s, recalled hearing Moore speak at her 
church in the early 1950s. To disguise his intentions from suspicious whites, Moore 
traveled around the state with a barbershop quartet and scheduled concerts in local black 
churches. Dorsey noted “there would always really be some singing,” but when Moore 
visited he also spoke to the congregation about the NAACP and the work of its members 
across the state.36 Moore’s strategy, though stealth in design, was flamboyant in its aims 
and exemplified a key lesson about grassroots organizing. Just as sacred oaths played 
vital roles in reinforcing connections that elicited trust, fostered unity, and inspired action 
among the Kikuyu in Kenya, blacks in Mississippi reinforced those bonds through 
collective celebrations and prayer. The utilization of singing as a grassroots tool and 
instrument for overcoming fears was best explained by Unita Blackwell, a local 
movement participant from Mayersville, Mississippi. “Singing brought the people in and 
held us together,” she noted. “We’d preach freedom and then we’d sing freedom, and 
everybody got it.”37 The freedom Moore preached and sang about included campaigns 
against segregated public facilities. In 1953, the RCNL launched a campaign concerned 
with enforcing the “equal” aspect of the separate but equal mandate. The black 
community was encouraged to boycott gas stations that would not allow black patrons to 
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use the restrooms. The slogan “DON’T BUY GAS WHERE WE CAN’T USE THE 
WASHROOM” was printed on over fifty thousand bumper stickers and handed out by 
Evers, Henry, Moore, Howard, and other RCNL members. At the same time, the men 
worked to construct programs to educate black Mississippians about basic voter 
registration procedures and conduct membership campaigns for the NAACP.38  
Yet while these campaigns represented important steps in the development of a 
sustained movement in Mississippi, low voter registration and widespread economic 
disfranchisement of black Mississippians remained the norm. In addition, the return of 
armed forces veterans to the state also resulted in an upswing in racial violence aimed at 
black serviceman, many of whom were determined to exercise the right to vote, just as 
Medgar and Charles Evers had done. One example occurred on June 12, 1946, when Etoy 
Fletcher, a decorated black army veteran recently returned home from a twenty-three-
month deployment in the South Pacific, entered the office of the Rankin County Circuit 
Clerk in the small town of Brandon, Mississippi, located a few miles outside of Jackson, 
with the intent to register to vote in the state’s upcoming primary election. Upon entrance 
to the courthouse, Fletcher was directed to speak to an official responsible for veterans’ 
affairs, who promptly relayed to him a stern message that he would not be allowed to 
register because of his race. As he exited the building, Fletcher was abducted by a 
handful of white men, taken out to the woods, and beaten with a steel cable. Afterwards, 
his assailants drove Fletcher back into town and warned him any further attempts to vote 
would result in his death. A signed affidavit detailing Fletcher’s experience was then 
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forwarded to the NAACP and released to the public by the national office in New York. 
When questioned about the affair by reporters, the circuit clerk and sheriff in Brandon 
denied any knowledge of the incident.39  
Ten days after the attack on Fletcher, Senator Theodore G. Bilbo, up for 
reelection to the United States Senate at age sixty-nine, spoke to a crowd of enthusiastic 
campaign supporters in the town of Laurel. His speech contained an anti-Negro tirade 
concerning the upcoming primary election in which black Mississippians, several of 
whom were military veterans, were determined to vote. Aware of the challenge to the 
state’s system of white supremacy the prospect of African-American votes presented, as 
well as his own senate seat, Bilbo issued a passionate plea to the crowd before him, 
calling on every “red-blooded Anglo-Saxon man in Mississippi to resort to any means to 
keep hundreds of Negroes from the polls in the July 2nd primary,” adding that “if you 
don’t know what that means, you are just not up on your persuasive measures.” His 
incendiary remarks, which were also carried over local radio to listeners throughout the 
region, came on the heels of the public release of a letter five days earlier that Bilbo had 
addressed to his campaign opponents. In it, he explicitly declared that “thousands of 
Negroes, especially Negro soldiers who are exempt from paying poll taxes are registering 
or attempting to register” and “should not be permitted to do.” Furthermore, he warned 
his opponents that “any straddling or dodging or equivocation on this important 
issue...must necessarily be construed as a desire on your part not only to secure the Negro 
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vote…but an open avowal of Negro voting and Negro control of the political life of our 
state.”40 
Because of his very public encouragement of black voter intimidation in the 1946 
campaign, Bilbo was brought up on charges of voter fraud before the U.S. Senate 
Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures. The Committee was chaired by Allen 
Ellender of Louisiana, who shared the same feelings of disdain for outside agitation into 
Southern affairs.41 The charges of voter intimidation were brought against Bilbo by the 
local chapter of the National Progressive Voters League, organized by secretary of the 
Jackson branch of the NAACP in 1944.42 In response, Bilbo made sure to connect any 
efforts to contest his reelection with the NAACP and demonize the organization at any 
opportunity. As part of his defense, Bilbo utilized the growing Cold War-inspired 
hysteria among white Southerners regarding the threat of communism.43 In a similar 
fashion to the attacks on Kenyatta, Bilbo publicly blamed “communist-inspired” elements 
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in Mississippi for any attempts to oust him from power. His main enemy was the 
NAACP, which he argued plotted with the communist party to bring about his political 
demise. Additionally, he claimed that the reasoning behind his prosecution lay in his 
“conviction and ideologies which are opposed to the great objectives of the all-out Negro 
groups and communist groups of America.”44 Despite his obvious guilt, the committee 
divided along partisan political lines. Democratic members voted to acquit Bilbo of any 
wrongdoing, while Republicans voted to convict him. However, the Republican-
controlled Senate refused to seat Bilbo, leading to a filibuster by Ellender. It might have 
droned on endlessly if not for Bilbo’s failing health eventually breaking the stalemate. He 
soon returned home to Mississippi where he died a few months later of mouth cancer.45  
Despite his death, Bilbo’s entrenchment and the Senate’s power to protect his 
efforts to suppress the black vote reinforced how difficult it was to break through the 
walls of white supremacy in Mississippi. Because of this, the National Office of the 
NAACP tended to place Mississippi low on the list of states it targeted in its national 
campaigns. Historian John Dittmer noted “the New York national NAACP office…gave 
low priority to work in Mississippi, believing that change must first come to the border 
states before the Deep South could be breached. National officials visited the state during 
the Depression years, but the organization’s work in Mississippi consisted mainly of 
limited solicitation of memberships.”46 Though a target of criticism, the NAACP’s policy 
to first focus on breaking through in the border states was not without some degree of 
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strategic merit. The nature of economic disfranchisement in Mississippi was so severe, a 
large majority of black citizens lived in abject poverty in rural areas. Just as the Kikuyu’s 
loss of land in the face of colonial policies drove them from their ancestral homes and 
locked them into a system of peonage, black sharecroppers in Mississippi remained 
trapped in a system that tied them to the land for the benefit of white landowners. The 
size of the overwhelmingly poor, rural black population highlighted the efficacy of the 
white power structure. To break through its barriers required organizational approaches 
focused on cultivating relationships between people of all economic backgrounds as the 
foundation for solidarity and collective action. 
One of the individuals who understood this was Ella Baker. As a full-time 
assistant field secretary for the NAACP, she traveled the country to speak at fundraisers, 
launch membership drives, and interact with organization members. In the process, she 
gravitated to groups of black Southerners who were not organized, in the hopes that she 
could enlist their help to expand the base of the Association.47 In a March 1941 letter to 
Assistant Secretary Roy Wilkins from Birmingham, Alabama, Baker relayed that she had 
spent the morning with a local pastor and NAACP member visiting “barber shops, filling 
stations, grocery stores, and housewives.”48 In another letter to Wilkins written during a 
trip to Florida, Baker mentioned that as a way of “increasing the Crisis circulation and 
bolstering my campaign efforts,” she purported to visit “some of the pool-rooms, boot 
black parlors, bars and grilles” and “secure individual memberships if possible”, and in a 
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letter to Wilkins from Montgomery, Alabama, Baker relayed that she expected to get “at 
least fifty new memberships” from the local branch of the International Longshoreman’s 
Association.49 After visiting branches throughout the South, Baker also kept up a steady 
stream of correspondence with branch presidents and other leaders, in addition to 
providing long and detailed briefs over the state of each individual branch to Wilkins and 
others in the national office.  
Baker was not the only field secretary spending large amounts of time on the 
road. In 1945, Leroy E. Carter of Atlanta, Georgia, joined the national staff as an assistant 
field secretary. For the first few months of his employment, he served as an assistant to 
field secretary Daisy Lampkin, traveling throughout the Midwest and parts of the upper 
East Coast. As a native Southerner, Carter’s understanding of the realities of racial 
oppression within the deep South was evident, particularly when he utilized the phrase “a 
bit of Mississippi” to describe the degree of intimidation faced by black workers in the 
mining town of Brownsville, Pennsylvania.50 His travels in Mississippi reinforced the 
dire state of the Association there. In January of 1942, he visited twenty-two branches. In 
Greenwood, he reported “no success in organizing branch – leaders afraid,” while in 
Gulfport, he noted that the branch was becoming extinct. In Vicksburg, he declared that 
the branch leadership was “very poor.” However, in some areas of the state, his reports 
were more promising. In Greenville, he noted that local black citizens were enthusiastic 
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about the branch meeting, held elections, and launched a voter and membership 
campaign, and in Natchez, located in the Mississippi Delta county that neighbored the 
town of Greenwood, he announced the local branch was closing in on reaching its goal of 
two-hundred members.51  
Another field secretary who traveled extensively through Mississippi was 
Madison S. Jones, who in 1942 wrote a lengthy memorandum to Walter White about his 
trip through the state. In Shibuta, Mississippi, Jones reported a conversation he had with a 
local NAACP member, who had declared the Shibuta branch as inactive for several 
years. Jones also relayed to White the story of the “Shibuta Affair,” in which two 
fourteen-year-old boys, Ernest Green and Charlie Lang, were lynched after being spotted 
by white passersby while playing with a thirteen-year-old white girl and falsely accused 
of rape. According to the cousin of one of the boys who spoke with Jones about the 
incident, Green and Lang were “emasculated, then pliers were taken and pieces of flesh 
were torn from their bodies. One boy was made to open his mouth and a screw driver was 
pushed down his throat so that the end of it protruded through the side of his neck.” 
Following the lynching, Jones continued, “the white people came to their families and 
told them that they were through with them, you may have them.” The families of the 
boys, it was noted, said “we don’t want them either and the county had to bury them.” 
Finally, Jones concluded, even with two months having passed since the lynching, there 
remained a sense of “terror and fear” in nearby Meridian, Mississippi.52 
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In light of the high probability for violence and intimidation, it was oftentimes 
difficult for field secretaries to properly grasp which solutions would work for certain 
branches and not for others. However, in the mind of Ella Baker, the foremost solution 
was to hire more field secretaries and build up working branches to facilitate the growth 
of the Association in the most dangerous, deepest regions in the South. In an October 
1945 memo to Walter White, Baker, by then the Director of Branches, unleashed her 
thoughts regarding the overall health and status of the branch system. “I am still worried 
about our branch structure,” she explained, “and every trip out into the field increases this 
fear.” In an age where “the people are organization-conscious,” she maintained, “we are 
in a competition not only with forces which are opposed to our program, but also with 
forces that seem to be following our program. I am not as much interested in the 
preservation of the NAACP as an organization as such as much as I am interested in 
keeping the NAACP with its full force and effect because I believe that it is the only 
organization that can do the job that must be done.” The organization could not survive, 
she asserted, “unless there is the firmest foundation built up by our working branches in 
addition the National Office.” The way to do so, she concluded, was to set up a Regional 
Office in Atlanta, one in the Midwest, and put more field workers in the field.”53 
Over the course of the next decade, the NAACP sought to sponsor more 
leadership conferences, conduct workshops for local organizers, and establish regional 
offices that enhanced the lines of communication between the various branches 
throughout the South. However, on account of her growing disillusion with the direction 
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of the organization, Baker left the NAACP in 1946. Her direct manner of speaking and 
no-nonsense personality was considered abrasive by some of her colleagues, including 
Walter White. Moreover, Barbra Ransby argued “the view that common people were 
capable of identifying the problems they faced and learning how to address them was 
shared by some of Baker’s NAACP colleagues, but not all,” resulted in growing 
disagreements between Baker and other members of the national staff.54  Regardless, 
Baker’s presence within the organization continued to echo long after she had left to 
pursue other means of community organizing, and her warnings reverberated against the 
Association’s walls. While the NAACP had won essential legal victories and gained 
support and publicity in doing so, many local branches, particular in the deep South, 
continued to falter under the yoke of unyielding racial oppression. Thus, despite the 
successful membership drives of a few local branches, in 1952 when Evers joined the 
NAACP in the hopes that it would serve as the vehicle to best push for black equality and 
an end to white supremacy in Mississippi, the organization at the state level was 
constantly under attack and struggling to keep its head above water. 
Around the time, Evers first caught wind of the stories of violence and rebellion 
coming out of Kenya, which piqued his interest and influenced the ways he analyzed the 
problem of racial oppression in Mississippi. In his autobiography, Evers’ brother Charles 
noted that earlier that year, both men began to hear reports over the shortwave radio and 
read newspaper articles about Kenyatta and the Mau Maus. Inspired by the stories of 
violence against the whites of Kenya and the image of Kenyatta that the journalists 
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painted, Medgar Evers became obsessed with Kenyatta, the Mau Maus, and the idea of 
violent reprisal as a means to fight back against the system of white supremacy in 
Mississippi. “We learned all we could about Kenyatta,” Charles Evers explained. 
“Fearless, they all said Kenyatta was fearless…[he] always seemed to be in jail, or 
threatened with detention. But whites didn’t scare him. He vowed to press on until Kenya 
was free. That inspired Medgar and me so much. We wanted to free our people.”55 Yet 
while both the Evers brothers’ harbored ideas about freeing Mississippi’s black 
population from the shackles of white oppression, the local mainstream newspapers were 
certainly not painting Kenyatta and the Mau Maus as freedom fighters.  
In fact, from the time the British declared an official state of emergency in Kenya 
in October 1952 until the trial and conviction of Kenyatta the following April, the local 
paper of record for Mississippi, the Jackson Clarion-Ledger, printed no more than a 
handful of articles on Africa in its daily editions. The first article relating to the Mau Mau 
uprising printed in the Clarion-Ledger was found in the January 26, 1953 issue, almost 
three full months after the official State of Emergency began. The reasoning behind its 
inclusion can most likely be found in the subject matter of the article - the brutal murder 
of the Ruck family - British colonists who were violently hacked to death by local 
Kikuyu loyal to the Mau Mau cause. The Rucks, according to David Anderson, 
“represented everything that Kenya’s Europeans held dear. Both were good looking, 
sociable and popular, playing an active part in settler society.” Additionally, their six-
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year-old son, murdered alongside his parents, had been a familiar face playing games 
among the children of the Kikuyu workers who labored for the Rucks. The triple murder, 
which caused a sensation throughout the western world, was, according to David 
Anderson, “the definitive moment of the war for the white highlanders [of Kenya].”56  
The murders were also, according to the subject of the AP article reprinted in the 
Clarion-Ledger, the work of terrorists.57 What was even more horrifying, at least in the 
minds of white settlers in Kenya and their allies throughout the western world, was that 
the murders had been perpetrated upon white settlers – “typical of ‘the very best type of 
settler’ that Kenya had hoped to attract in the post-war years” – by Kenyans who had 
stepped far beyond their boundaries, both literally and figuratively.58  
That the coverage afforded to the Mau Maus in the Clarion-Ledger focused 
mainly on black on white violence throughout Kenya was most likely related to the fact 
that much of the information about the Mau Maus and their violent acts was based on 
misconceptions about the nature of the uprising fed by the British colonial government to 
reporters and rehashed in newspaper articles throughout the western world. In addition, 
the Clarion-Ledger was not only the paper of record for Mississippi, it also openly 
advocated for white supremacy in its editorials and emphasized to its readers that most 
“race agitators” in the Mississippi were outsiders with communist connections. Thus, 
when the news of violent acts such as the Ruck murder came sweeping out of Kenya, it 
was just the type of negative, horrifying story of native black on white savagery the 
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Clarion-Ledger often associated with African anti-colonial movements. In addition, what 
also did not help the case of the Mau Maus, insofar as their newspaper coverage in the 
Clarion-Ledger was concerned, was also that the high rate of fatalities perpetrated by the 
Mau Mau on Kikuyu loyal to the British government fostered an image that the Mau Mau 
were bloodthirsty villains, driven by mysterious rituals, who not only murdered their 
innocent white protectors, but their own people as well. 
The Greenville Delta-Democrat Times, a smaller paper printed in the Delta region 
and run by editor Hodding Carter II, printed a few articles about the uprising in its early 
months. Among the white newspaper editors in Mississippi, Carter was perhaps seen as 
the state’s most liberal white editor. A bit of a risk-taker, as well as an avowed 
progressive on matters of race relations, Carter used his newspaper to speak out against 
lynchings and other forms of extralegal violence in Mississippi, in addition to speaking 
out against the powerful Mississippi Senator Bilbo. According to his daughter, Carter’s 
guiding principle “was that a newspaper should cover the news of the community in a 
way that represents the entire community while opposing what undermines the 
community.”59 However, despite Carter’s determination to speak out against injustices 
perpetrated against the African American community in Mississippi, his criticisms of the 
system of white supremacy only went so far. While he opposed white on black violence, 
he stood in opposition to a federal anti-lynching bill, and while he advocated for better 
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education of black children, he did not come out in support of integration, but rather a 
system of equal, yet segregated, schools.60  
In his autobiography, Charles Evers noted he and Medgar read a few articles on 
Kenyatta in the Greenville paper, yet much like the articles printed in the Clarion-Ledger, 
the coverage was similar in tone and labeled the Mau Maus a terrorist group. On October 
21, 1952, the Delta-Democrat Times printed a UP story that described Kenyatta as the 
“western-educated leader of the 100,000-strong Kenya African Union believed the front 
organization for the anti-white Mau Mau,” whose main announced aim was the driving 
out of the white man from Kenya for good.61  Two days later, a follow up article off the 
UP wire was printed on the situation, detailing the murder of one of the loyalist Kikuyu 
chiefs by “Mau Mau terrorists wielding long knives” which they used to hack their victim 
to death.62 While the article’s publication was significant given that the story was not 
focused on black on white violence, it still contained no discussion of the specific 
grievances of the Mau Maus or the history of the Kikuyu in Kenya.  
One local black newspaper that did provide more widespread analysis of the 
Kenya uprising, and that both the Evers brothers read often, was the Jackson Advocate. 
The largest African American newspaper in Mississippi, it provided more extensive 
coverage of decolonization efforts in Africa than any of the white, mainstream 
Mississippi dailies. Published in Jackson, Mississippi, the Jackson Advocate had a history 
                                                 
60 Dittmer, Local People, 67. 
61 “86 Prominent Negroes Nabbed As Roundup of Terrorists Starts, Secret Group Blamed For Crimes,” 
Greenville Delta-Democrat Times, October 21, 1952. 
62 “Police Rush to Kenya Forest After Terrorists Kill Leader,” Greenville Delta-Democrat Times, October 
23, 1952. 
  
 107 
of openly advocating for black voting rights. For this reason, it was considered “radical” 
by many of its critics.63 Its editor, Percy Greene, who had been born in Jackson, was one 
of the state’s leading voting rights and equalized education activists throughout the 1940s 
and early 1950s, campaigning for Harry Truman in the black community during the 
contentious election of 1948, in which Southern democrats, known as the Dixiecrats, split 
from the Democratic Party and nominated their own candidate, Strom Thurmond, on the 
failed bid for the presidency. In light of the success of his campaign for Truman, Greene 
established the Mississippi State Democratic Association (MSDA), serving as its first 
president. Alongside the NAACP and the Progressive Voters’ League, the MSDA 
worked throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s to register black voters throughout the 
state.64 
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Perhaps because of the Jackson Advocate’s support for an end to the unequal 
system of white supremacy in Mississippi, it came as no surprise to the Evers’ brothers 
that the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, in which an ethnic group held down because of 
their race and fighting back against their white oppressors, received extensive coverage. 
Whatever Greene’s specific thoughts on the matter, the Jackson Advocate provided its 
readers with the most detailed and balanced coverage of the Kenyan conflict of any 
newspaper in the state. Beginning with the British declaration of emergency in October 
1952, the Jackson Advocate devoted ample space to the stories coming out of Kenya 
from the Associated Negro Press. In particular, news items on Kenyatta and the nature of 
the Mau Mau uprising were more focused on the demands of the Mau Mau participants 
and the history of white oppression in the colony than were the articles printed in 
Mississippi’s mainstream dailies. Even in the earliest months of the uprising the Jackson 
Advocate contained several stories that detailed the development of the militant Mau Mau 
movement, the history of the more moderate African rights organizations in Kenya, and 
of the oppressive nature of the British colonial state.65 Kenyatta himself was also given 
more extensive coverage than in the mainstream dailies, particularly around the time of 
his trial in April 1953. In the majority of the articles on the man who came to be known 
as “Burning Spear,” Kenyatta was portrayed as an enlightened, educated leader whose 
direction of the Mau Maus he publicly disputed. Nevertheless, whether he was quoted as 
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claiming never to have incited the violence or not, the news articles and editorials about 
the uprising seemed to designate him as the most probable leader of the movement. 66 
In his memoir, Charles Evers also noted that in addition to the local black papers, 
he and Medgar also read numerous articles about the Mau Maus and Kenyatta in larger, 
more nationally distributed African-American dailies, in which the conflict received the 
most positive coverage despite some politically conservative comments made by a few 
editorialists in their columns. Throughout the post-World War II period, the African-
American press devoted ample attention to goings on throughout Africa, particularly as 
anti-colonial tensions mounted, driven by declarations of self-determination among the 
native populations of the continent. In direct opposition to much of what was written 
about the Kenyan uprising in the mainstream American newspapers, including the 
Mississippi dailies, national black papers such as the Pittsburgh Courier, Atlanta Daily 
World and the Chicago Defender made concerted efforts to provide detailed breakdowns 
of the complex cultural, economic, and political issues at the root of Kenya’s colonial 
system, often zeroing in on land alienation as the primary catalyst that set the conflict in 
motion. In addition, each newspaper was highly critical of the British handling of the 
conflict, which included the actions taken by the British military (and loyal African 
regiments) and the treatment and conviction of Kenyatta. Yet while categorizing the 
rebellious Kikuyu as a racially oppressed group fighting for independence and self-
determination, more than a few sensationalized accounts of Mau Mau rituals and violence 
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also found their way into these newspapers, particularly during the first few years of the 
conflict. Thus, while grievances of the Kikuyu and their willingness to engage in 
rebellion were afforded ample coverage, misconceptions about the nature of the Mau 
Maus as anti-white savages, who mercilessly murdered British colonists and their fellow 
tribesman, also remained. 
In much the same manner as the Jackson Advocate, the Pittsburgh Courier 
contained pieces that provided information on the conditions of black Africans in Kenya, 
their grievances with the colonial government, and the quality of the Mau Mau rebel 
forces. In addition, the majority of the articles and editorials made explicit reference to 
the Kenya conflict as one of white racial persecution that had fostered rebellion.67  Still 
others labeled the uprising as an all-out war, fought between the forces of Great Britain 
and the Mau Mau freedom fighters intent on gaining their independence. In one article, 
correspondent Cecil Gregory quoted a British official as having said that the Mau Mau 
fighters were much like the guerilla forces “of Greece and Ethiopia during World War II, 
who fought the British troops.” The Mau Mau forces, in Gregory’s estimation, were not 
“unorganized gangs.” Rather, they were adept fighters who carried out “systematically 
planned” assaults “with quite astonishing skill.”68 In another piece, written by London 
correspondent George Padmore, Kenyatta was described as an African nationalist, whose 
                                                 
67 Bankole Timothy, “African Scribe Blames Kenya’s War on Whites’ Race Persecution,” Pittsburgh 
Courier, June 6, 1953.  
68 Cecil Gregory, “21 Reported Slain in Pitched Battle,” Pittsburgh Courier, April 11, 1953. 
  
 111 
desire to throw off the mantle of British colonialism and restore Kenya for the Africans 
was reminiscent of the philosophy of Marcus Garvey.69  
Perhaps the most extensive discussion of the Mau Mau uprising was found in the 
columns of two of the Pittsburgh Courier’s editorialists, Horace Cayton and J.A. Rogers. 
In a series of columns, Cayton described the conflict as one in which the grounds for 
discontent were legitimate, based on the white settlers’ primary goal of exploiting the 
Africans politically and economically. He also lambasted newspapers around the nation 
for printing pieces that argued the reasons for the uprising were psychological in nature. 
Cayton stated that the newspapers claimed that the uprising stemmed “from the 
frustrations of a savage people neither mentally nor economically able to adjust itself to 
the swift pace of civilization.’” The real reasons for the uprising, according to Cayton, 
were instead due to the structure of the British colonial system. “The Africans of Kenya,” 
he explained “find that the English settlers have taken over their country, relegated them 
to bottom of the social, economic and political heap, have isolated them from the 
mainstream of the life of the area, dominated them politically and have made no real 
effort to introduce them into Western European life.” Thus, the Mau Mau uprising was 
the result of a boiling over of frustrations into violence, which according to Cayton was 
both unfortunate but, given the situation, not completely unexpected.70 
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J.A. Rogers, a Courier columnist and historian of African Affairs, produced a 
four-part series about the Mau Mau uprisings, called “Murder in Kenya!” that 
deconstructed the situation from a number of angles and allowed readers to draw 
similarities between the white supremacist system of the South and that of Kenya. In 
these pieces, he criticized the Kenyan system of white supremacy and ridiculed the white 
settlers, whom he described as “more voracious than the Boers of South Africa” and who 
“don’t give a damn about home government.” This was best illustrated by the white 
settlers’ threat to kidnap the Governor following the passage of a 1923 act that ruled that 
the collective interest of the native Africans was to be taken into greater account than the 
interests of the settlers themselves.71 The fourth and last article in Rogers’ series focused 
on Kenyatta, whom he had met personally. Described as the “reputed head” of the Mau 
Mau, Rogers noted that the man regarded as “public enemy [number one]” was “heavily 
built, and of a pleasing, but guarded manner.” He depicted Kenyatta as intelligent, 
nationalistic, and determined in his quest for change in Kenya. He also mentioned, 
though only briefly, that he found Kenyatta “deeply interested in the American Negro.”72  
Not all the Pittsburgh Courier’s columns on the uprising were as sympathetic to 
the Mau Maus, however. The newspaper’s associate editor, George Schuyler, a fervent 
anti-communist, labeled the “Mau Mau Society” as a “link in the chain of ‘subversive’ 
native nationalist organizations from Cairo to Cape Town.”73 In addition, he was also one 
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of the Pittsburgh Courier’s most outspoken critics of the means in which the Mau Mau’s 
perpetrated violence against Africans loyal to the British cause. It was this “Mau Mau 
willingness to kill Africans who collaborated with colonists [which] most affronted 
Schuyler,” James Meriwether argues, adding that Schuyler’s “sympathy for the alleged 
black collaborators grew at least in part out of his own sense of embattlement at home,” 
in which he felt that open criticism of African-American leaders within the black 
community was detrimental to solving problems brought about by white on black 
oppression.74 While Schuyler’s conservatism often placed him at odds with African-
American civil rights activists throughout the South, his concerns about the violence 
supposedly perpetrated by Mau Mau on their fellow Kikuyu tribesmen were shared by 
many other black readers and echoed throughout the pages of other major black dailies.  
In the pages of the Atlanta Daily World, much of the initial coverage focused on 
breaking down the complex economic and social problems that lay at the root of the Mau 
Mau uprising. In addition, coverage of Kenyatta’s role in the conflict not only focused on 
his conviction in a Kenyan court for supposedly leading the uprising, but also lambasted 
the way he was portrayed in the white press. In one such article, written in the wake of 
Kenyatta’s arrest, the author, who was working as a U.N. correspondent, wrote in a piece 
special to the Atlanta Daily World, “with particular reference to Mr. Kenyatta, a Kenyan 
educator…the white news services pictured him as a spear-carrying African bent on the 
massacre of all the white Europeans. Little attempt,” the author continued “was made in 
the news stories emanating from Nairobi, to give the Africans’ side of the story.” Despite 
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not having determined how best to describe the Mau Mau, noting that “it was considered” 
to be a loosely organized group of local gangs angered over land alienation, the author 
continued that the European settlers “embarked on a campaign of misrepresentation by 
grossly exaggerating the extent of crime and subversive activities.”75  At the same time, 
as the Mau Mau conflict escalated, the Atlanta Daily World also ran stories about the 
Mau Mau growing in strength and power, threatening the very lives of all 30,000 white 
residents of Kenya.76 Over the remainder of the decade, aside from providing background 
information about issues that directly led to the conflict, the Atlanta Daily World’s 
coverage of the Mau Mau uprising focused on both the escalating violence perpetrated by 
the Mau Mau against loyalist Kikuyu, and the violence perpetrated against the Mau Mau 
by the British colonial government.77 
The articles printed about Kenya in the Chicago Defender also followed a similar 
course, providing ample coverage for editorials and features detailing the oppressive 
nature of colonial Kenya society. In addition, readers wrote in to express their displeasure 
at the ways in which the British sought to put down the uprising. In particular, the action 
of the British colonial government to further punish suspected members of the Mau Mau 
by seizing their cattle two months after the official State of Emergency was declared, was 
excoriated in a letter to the editor published in the December 6, 1952 edition. In it, the 
author stated that “power to levy punishment for whole native communities has been 
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given to Kenya officials by the British. So help us, they’ll be sorry.”78 However, as the 
uprising continued and the violence escalated, images of the Mau Mau as violent anti-
white savages were spread across the pages of the Chicago Defender, particularly in 
features written by Pulitzer Prize-winning white journalist Malcolm Johnson, who 
claimed that the Mau Mau were anti-Christian and determined to “drive out whites or kill 
them to achieve black supremacy.”79 Following a particularly bloody incident in March 
1953, which historians have come to term the Lari Massacre, in which over 100 Kikuyu 
loyal to the British colonial government were slaughtered by suspected Mau Mau, reports 
of Mau Mau savagery only increased.80  
The Chicago Defender’s coverage of Kenyatta was not as sensationalized as that 
of the coverage of the Mau Maus in general. In articles written about his arrest and 
detention, readers were reminded that no clear connections could be made that directly 
determined Kenyatta had organized and led the Mau Maus before his arrest. In fact, one 
article noted that Kenyatta’s “detention without trial was symbolic of the authorities’ 
inability to gather any evidence against the supposed ringleaders of the Mau Mau.” 
Furthermore, the article also described Kenyatta as a proud, dignified man who 
commanded respect. In reference to his walk from his jail cell to the courtroom in which 
he was being tried, a reporter noted that Kenyatta “marched with his head erect and his 
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arms swinging, his little beard pointing forward. He wore his yellow corduroy jacket like 
a uniform,” adding that “he walked as though he was parading before an army of 
cheering Kikuyus.”81 In another article, the words of the prosecutor from Kenyatta’s trial 
were reported, in which he described Kenyatta as “an exceptionally traveled, widely 
educated African, who has had the advantage of contact with a great many people of 
standing both here and in Europe.”82 In addition to these descriptions of Kenyatta, in an 
article by Roi Ottley, who interviewed Kenyatta multiple times over the course of his 
incarceration, also noted, in much the same way that J.A. Rogers had in his features in the 
Pittsburgh Courier, that Kenyatta had an affinity for African-Americans on account of a 
love for his race.83 
 In reading these accounts in the papers, Medgar Evers drew inspiration from the Mau 
Mau uprising and Kenyatta’s determination to push for racial equality despite his 
imprisonment. In Kenya, he saw an oppressive environment predicated on the control and 
exploitation of black bodies by a white supremacist colonial system that left the landless 
Kikuyu with little recourse but to resist. Within that conceptualization, the violence 
perpetrated by the Mau Mau was justifiable, though not necessarily celebrated. Evers was 
not a man obsessed with the need for sadistic revenge, but his experiences as a black man 
in Mississippi led him to recognize the importance of armed resistance as an instrument 
of change. In rising against the provincial government, the Mau Mau shone a much-
needed spotlight on the horrors of British imperialism and forced the world to take notice. 
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Unlike the savages they were made out to be in the coverage of mainstream white 
newspapers, the efforts of black reporters and newspapers to produce nuanced 
examinations of the Mau Mau and Kenyatta and place them in proper historical context 
played a key role in his decision to form his own militant movement at home in 
Mississippi. 
Charles explained that he and Medgar wondered, “why not cross the line?” Why 
not “create a Mau Mau in Mississippi? Each time whites killed a Negro, why not drive to 
another town, find a bad sheriff or cop, and kill him in a secret hit-and-run raid?”  They 
believed that in doing so, they would “teach righteousness to whites.”84 In her memoir, 
Myrlie Evers described her husband’s idea as a dream of “striking under cover of 
darkness, punishing the crimes of whites against Negroes, setting itself up as a sort of 
black vigilante army, writing a new law of an eye for an eye over the brooding flat land 
of the Delta…”85 Yet the idea of the Mississippi Mau Maus was more than simply one of 
retaliatory violence for local race-related crimes. In planning to advance his own militant, 
anti-white movement, Medgar Evers tapped into traditions of resistance that crossed 
national boundaries and enveloped the notions of self-reliance and freedom from white 
oppression. The establishment of a guerilla war was intended to draw international 
attention to the plight of blacks at home. Just as the world could not look away from 
Kenya in the wake of Mau Mau, neither would it be able to continue ignoring the horrors 
of Mississippi. Myrlie Evers echoed this when she explained the fact that newspapers 
throughout the South “were reporting the deeds of [Kenyatta’s] Mau Mau army at all 
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could only be interpreted to mean that he was succeeding at least in calling the attention 
of the world to that oppression.” In creating his own Mississippi Mau Mau army, Medgar 
Evers hoped to do the same.86 
Yet despite his initial enthusiasm for the proposal, over time Medgar Evers 
backed away from his plans for a violent Mississippi Mau Mau rebellion. From a 
logistical standpoint, the odds of successfully engaging in a clandestine war against the 
full power of the state and armed white vigilante groups were low, just as they were in 
Kenya. Historian Charles Payne confirmed that deduction in his analysis of Evers.  “He 
thought long and hard about the idea of Negroes engaging in guerilla warfare in the 
Delta,” Payne concluded, “not because he had any hope of winning, but because he 
thought such a campaign might focus the attention of the rest of the country on the 
injustice in Mississippi. Without that attention, he saw little possibility of change.”87 
From a personal standpoint, Myrlie also noted that while her husband was not a deeply 
religious man, he struggled with the idea of perpetrating the slaughter of whites from a 
moral standpoint. Nevertheless, Myrlie Evers maintained that in his analysis of the 
situation, Medgar Evers solidified himself “as a man of action, a man who saw the 
beginnings of solutions in taking a stand.”88  
In the years that followed, Evers’ work indicated he took the lessons he learned 
from his analysis of the Mau Mau and applied them in a different manner than he initially 
intended. Rather than raising an army to kill whites, he crafted strategies to organize the 
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black citizens of Mississippi into a Mau Mau force united by experience and solidarity 
and motivated to utilize mass participation to compel federal intervention. From the 
coverage of the Kenya uprising, Evers realized the significance of mass participation at 
the local level and the means through which it could positively motivate the movement 
participants in Mississippi. While he eventually came to abhor the violence perpetrated 
by the Mau Maus on their community leaders loyal to the British government, Evers 
found in Kenyatta an example of an educated, determined leader who sought to unite his 
people under a banner of racial pride and resolute objectives. In Mississippi Evers saw 
the need for a form of mass action in which class divisions within the black community 
were replaced by a sense of racial collectivity and determination to alter the oppressive 
system under which they lived at all costs.  
At the same time, Evers realized the potential of mass participation on the local 
level in terms of publicity. Seemingly aware of the backlash that a massive publicity 
campaign surrounding a mass movement would imply for the South, particularly in a 
period of time when the NAACP was involved in publicizing the negative consequences 
the image of American racial oppression was having on the worldwide community, Evers 
collaborated with the National Office to select cases of discrimination in Mississippi that 
the organization broadcasted on the national and international stage.  This strategy was 
tremendously significant, for while the Southern states were, in a collective sense, the 
undisputable location of the America’s most repressive system of white supremacy, 
Mississippi was ground zero.  Thus, in working to produce results on the local level, 
whether through voter registration drives, school desegregation campaigns, or the crusade 
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to end economic reprisal and violent white repression, Evers served as a crucial 
component in the NAACP’s national campaign to focus domestic and international 
attention on the American South.  
Over the course of his NAACP career, Evers continued to pay attention to the 
movements of Kenyatta, considering him a personal hero. His continued respect for the 
imprisoned Kenyan leader was also evidenced by his decision to name his first son 
Darrell Kenyatta Evers in 1953. While his work with the NAACP was just beginning, 
Evers’ determination to bring about change, and his hope to facilitate the growth of a 
solidified African-American community in Mississippi, would have a profound impact on 
the fight to end white supremacy in the coming years. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
 
A NEW DAY FOR THE NEGRO? MISSISSIPPI RESPONDS TO BROWN 
 
The morning of May 17, 1954 started off as a relatively ordinary one in Jackson, 
accented by magnolia trees in full bloom and seasonably warm weather. But by late 
afternoon, any atmosphere of banality in the city – whether real or imagined – was 
shattered when wire services broke the news that the nine justices of the United States 
Supreme Court had ruled in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka that the doctrine of 
“separate but equal” in education was unconstitutional. Speaking for a unanimous Court, 
Chief Justice Earl Warren announced that separate educational facilities based on race 
were “inherently unequal” and deprived black students of “the equal protection of the 
laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”1 Standing in the crowded chamber to 
hear the opinion read was Thurgood Marshall, Chief Counsel for the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Education Fund and a primary architect of the legal strategy to challenge the 
Jim Crow educational system. Overjoyed by the victory, he yelled “we hit the jackpot!” 
to fellow attorneys George Hayes and James Nabrit as they descended the steps of the 
Supreme Court building. At the bottom, they posed together for a celebratory photograph. 
Standing with their arms around one another and wearing resplendent smiles on their 
faces, Marshall would later recall he felt “so happy, I was numb.”2 
The Brown decision made its way across the nation like a lightning bolt, 
illuminating even the darkest corners of the segregated South and instilling hope in 
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millions of African-Americans that the back of Jim Crow had been broken. The suit, part 
of a large-scale, full-frontal attack by the NAACP on the separate-but-equal doctrine 
legitimized by the Supreme Court’s 1896 ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson, had been brought 
before federal judges in the summer of 1951. The named plaintiff, Oliver Brown of 
Topeka, Kansas, was the father of third grader Linda Brown, who despite living seven 
blocks from her neighborhood’s all-white school, was forced to attend an all-black school 
over twenty blocks away. The federal judges ruled in favor of the Topeka school district, 
but in June of 1952 the Supreme Court agreed to hear the NAACP’s appeal. Arguments 
began in December of that year and lasted through the spring of 1954. Before the Court, 
Marshall and his team of NAACP attorneys highlighted the ways racial segregation 
inflicted devastating psychological damage on black students and violated the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  It was an all-or-nothing legal strategy, 
and one that set the stage for the attacks on segregation in other facets of American life 
that would soon follow.3 
In the aftermath of the victory, full texts of the Court’s decision were made 
available to the public in the nation’s largest mainstream and African-American dailies, 
and the suit was celebrated as a monumental victory for the NAACP. At the 
organization’s New York City headquarters, board members and other officials gathered 
to cheer the ruling and speak with the press. Said to be “riding on a cloud” of happiness, 
Assistant NAACP Secretary Roy Wilkins chose to defer to the words of Marshall, noting 
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“this is a day for the lawyers.” Marshall, who had immediately returned to New York 
City after the Court had adjourned, noted “as we understand it, there is no possibility of 
getting around the Constitution now.” Yet for all the celebration and commotion that 
followed the ruling, a judicial victory had not always been certain. Nor was the war 
against Jim Crow won. Marshall’s excitement over the result did not cloud his 
understanding of the battles that lay ahead. When asked how long it might take for the 
entire country to have “Jim Crow-free” schools, he predicted “around five years.” 
Marshall was right to be cautious. The journey to challenge segregated education in the 
hallowed halls of the Supreme Court had been lengthy and complicated. He expected no 
less with regards to the question of an appropriate remedy, which the Court scheduled for 
reargument in April of 1955.4  
In Mississippi, reaction to Brown was swift, but mixed. Though few publicly 
celebrated the decision, initial responses from whites varied. Assorted states of confusion 
and calls for a wait-and-see approach eventually gave way to righteous anger. These 
reactions were no more visible than in the pages of the state’s mainstream newspapers. In 
the Jackson Clarion-Ledger, the Court’s decision was referred to as “a black day of 
tragedy for the South, and for both races.” The front page of the May 18th edition of the 
Jackson Daily News read “Blood on the Marble Steps” and warned its readers that 
violence would surely follow any attempts to desegregate Mississippi’s schools. Fred 
Sullens, editor of the Jackson News, referred to the Brown decision as “the worst thing 
that has happened to the South since carpetbaggers and scalawags took charge.” He 
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believed race mixing in schools would lead to miscegenation and mixed marriages, which 
would ultimately result in “the mongrelization of the human race.” Others argued that the 
decision might take years to enforce across Mississippi, if it was ever enforced at all. In a 
May 21, 1954 editorial in the Hattiesburg American, Andrew Harmon encouraged the 
people of Mississippi to stand together to retain segregation in schools, adding “no power 
on earth can compel more than a million people to do something that is against the law of 
God and nature.”5 
Reactions to the ruling by the state’s leading politicians ran hand in hand with the 
various appraisals in the press. In an initial effort to downplay the significance of Brown, 
Governor Hugh L. White declared he was saddened by the ruling, but hopeful legal 
maneuvers might be used by the state to block or circumvent orders for desegregation. 
Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland was less equivocal in his reaction. In a Senate 
speech ten days after the Court’s decision was announced, he argued that the justices had 
been “indoctrinated and brainwashed by Left-wing pressure groups,” that the Court had 
no power to “control or direct” the actions of state governors, and that the South would 
retain segregation. Mississippi’s other senator, John Stennis, chose to adopt a more 
balanced approach that emphasized the Court’s systematic inability to force 
implementation of its rulings, arguing that “plenty of time” existed for state officials to 
“seek a solution” to the issue.6   
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Among Mississippi’s African-American population, reactions were predictably 
positive, though given the continuous, overarching air of fear facilitated by the white 
supremacist system, they tempered their public reactions accordingly. Nevertheless, a 
sense of excitement permeated black communities across the state, and like so many 
others, Medgar Evers was caught up in that atmosphere. According to his wife Myrlie, he 
“listened with intense concentration” to radio news reports about Brown and “talked 
about what he thought it might mean.” Specifically, Evers saw in the end of segregated 
education “a new day for the Negro.” In his estimation, education – specifically, a grasp 
of history and news of the world around them – would open the eyes of black 
Mississippians to the reality that “no people were ever given their freedom without a 
struggle…and a struggle means sacrifices.” The Brown decision seemed to cement in his 
mind that the winds of change were finally stripping down the walls of Jim Crow, and the 
first prominent role he would play in their destruction would be via the NAACP’s fight 
for integrated education across the state. The “man searching for a weapon” had finally 
found what he was seeking.7  
The need for a weapon to battle Mississippi’s racially segregated school system 
was an apt metaphor, because the state’s white supremacist structure refused to go down 
without a fight on the issue. Armed with an arsenal of legislative obstruction, fear-
mongering, and violence, whites from the halls of the Jackson statehouse to the furthest 
corners of the state organized a campaign of “massive resistance” that spilled over into 
every aspect of political, economic, and cultural life. To that end, Brown signaled the 
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beginning of an era of upheaval that arose out of Mississippi’s violent past, threatened to 
turn the state on its head, and pushed it front and center onto a world stage beset by Cold 
War pressures. In such an unstable environment, the stakes could not have been higher as 
Evers, with the lessons of the Mau Mau firmly embedded in his consciousness, worked to 
enact change in Mississippi from within the NAACP’s organizational constructs. In the 
process, he emerged as the primary leader of the Mississippi movement for black 
equality. At the same time, he found himself facing a level of reactionary oppression in 
the aftermath of Brown that, when analyzed within the transnational framework he had 
formulated, reflected the efforts of the British to maintain white rule in Kenya. At risk 
was the very foundation of Mississippi society – white supremacy – and for most of the 
state’s white citizenry, contemplating a world where blacks had equal rights was 
unfathomable.  
Despite any surprise they registered publicly, leading officials of Mississippi’s 
white power structure were not blindsided by the Brown decision. They had followed the 
suit closely since the Court announced it would hear the case in June of 1952. In the early 
months of 1953, lawmakers in the Jackson statehouse set to work crafting legislation to 
cut the NAACP off at the knees and sway the Court to uphold the doctrine of separate-
but-equal set forth in Plessy. In an effort to undercut the argument that racially segregated 
education was inherently unequal and thus, unconstitutional, the Mississippi state 
legislature proposed a program to provide equalization of school and transportation 
facilities for black students and equal salaries for white and black schoolteachers.8 At a 
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dedication service for a newly constructed Negro consolidated high school in May 1953, 
Governor White praised the state’s proposed education equalization program, noting that 
“the people in Mississippi will work out their own problems regardless of the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision on segregation in schools.” In addition, he ensured the crowd 
that Mississippi’s white citizens were extremely willing to work to improve educational 
standards for both races, but also asserted “Negroes of this state must accept a share of 
the responsibility for educating their own children.”9 
The irony of Governor White’s statements was not lost on local and national 
NAACP leaders, particularly given the legislative and administrative roadblocks that had 
been put in place over the years to prevent black Mississippians from obtaining levels of 
education on par with the state’s white population. Two months before White’s speech to 
the crowd at the consolidated high school, a special legislative committee on education 
appointed by the governor to study the conditions of Mississippi’s schools reported a 
“shocking” contrast in the expenditures, facilities, and services allotted to white and black 
students. In Jackson and Meridian, the state’s two largest cities, the average amount of 
money spent on white students was double and triple that spent on the cities’ black 
children, respectively. In Mississippi’s rural areas, the difference in expenditures was 
even greater. In Madison County, located north of Jackson, the committee reported an 
average of $300 spent for every white student, while black students were given just $46. 
In addition to their findings, the committee also issued a dire prediction for the school 
system if it continued to follow the status quo, stating that within two years “all existing 
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facilities for Negro schools now afforded would be exhausted and immediate expansion 
would have to follow if the state is to maintain a dual system of education.”10 
None of this surprised NAACP leaders in Mississippi, whom had first initiated a 
battle against the state’s segregated public education system five years earlier. In 1948, a 
black teacher named Gladys Noel Bates worked with the Association to file suit in a U.S. 
District Court demanding equal pay for herself as well as all other black teachers and 
administrators in Jackson. A science teacher, Bates was a graduate of Tougaloo College 
and a member of the Mississippi Voters League. Her father, A.J. Noel, served as a local 
NAACP leader and was also active in the Voters League and the Mississippi Teachers 
Association, the latter of which invited Thurgood Marshall to speak at a secret meeting 
held in Jackson in 1947. At the meeting, members of the Teachers Association, hoping to 
challenge the local school board’s discriminatory policies toward black teachers, asked 
Marshall for advice on how to proceed. In his reply, Marshall was clear. Not only would 
a potential suit need a plaintiff willing to risk his or her employment and livelihood, but 
the endeavor would also require a significant amount of money. Given the stifling racial 
climate in Mississippi, neither prospect was assured. However, in the months that 
followed, the Association worked to collect over five thousand dollars for the suit by 
raising teachers’ dues by one dollar, and Gladys Bates agreed to serve as plaintiff.   
Almost immediately after the suit was filed, Bates and her husband John, also a 
teacher, were fired from their positions by the Jackson school board. The couple received 
numerous threats of physical harm, lost their home when it was burned to the ground, and 
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were placed on a blacklist. When John finally found work with the black YMCA in 
Jackson, the job was rescinded after the white YMCA threatened to cut off funding. 
Subsequent job opportunities in the states of Tennessee and Kentucky also fell through 
once potential employers received damaging letters of recommendation from the Jackson 
school board. Eventually, John Bates managed to find work at a box factory, while 
Gladys found employment as assistant to the executive secretary of the Mississippi 
Teachers Association. For the next three years, the case made its way through the local 
courts, with the NAACP providing legal counsel by Association attorneys Constance 
Baker Motley and Robert Carter. When the suit was first filed, the Jackson school board 
declared that Bates had no standing to challenge their pay system since she was no longer 
an employee. In response, Robert Jess Brown, another local Jackson teacher, joined the 
case as an additional plaintiff and was also fired. Eventually, Bates and Brown lost the 
case after a Mississippi District Court Judge ruled that they had not utilized the proper 
administrative chain of command at the local and state levels to seek redress for their 
complaints.11  
Though the NAACP’s suit had not been successful, Mississippi’s leading 
politicians realized that if real attempts to address financial inequalities were not met by 
the state, the segregated school system was vulnerable to collapse. Mississippi’s 
legislature quickly responded with a directive to allocate funds for teacher salary 
equalization. When Governor White took office in 1952, he took things one large step 
further. Based on a formula created by South Carolina Governor James Byrnes, White 
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proposed an education equalization program to attack the underfunding issues head on. 
Predictably, the NAACP denounced the proposal as a discriminatory, unachievable pipe 
dream. Walter White, who visited Jackson in April of 1953 to show support for the 
NAACP’s programs in Mississippi, criticized the equalization program as financially 
unfeasible, arguing the burden on taxpayers would prove overwhelming. More 
importantly, he declared that even if the program passed and was implemented, the 
NAACP would continue to bring lawsuits and fight against the system of white 
supremacy in Mississippi until the educational system was fully integrated.12  
Yet while White was firm in his remarks, the reality was that Mississippi’s black 
population did not hold homogenous views on the issue of opposing segregation in 
schools. Though small, a group of black educators, many of whom worked as 
administrators in all-black schools, believed they were better served by the segregated 
educational system. In his assessment of the situation, John Dittmer explained “the 
segregated environment had provided them both with a livelihood and with status in the 
community.” Moreover, the Mississippi legislature’s move to raise the salary of black 
teachers, and the incentive of working in new school buildings constructed as part of the 
proposed education equalization plan, was enough to convince them that remaining 
within the segregated system was preferable to upsetting the status quo. As Evers would 
come to learn over the course of his activist career with the NAACP, these kinds of 
internal squabbles – often driven by the exacerbation of class distinctions – could be just 
as damaging to the success of the movement as the white supremacist forces hell bent on 
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destroying it from the outside. While they enjoyed slightly higher degrees of financial 
independence than average black Mississippians, members of the black middle class were 
subject to various forms of harassment designed to pressure them into silence.13 
This was not distinct to Mississippi, or even the Jim Crow South. The Mau Mau 
offered important lessons about the significance of class distinction in a racially 
oppressive system and its threat to black unity. In Kenya, colonial policies and customs 
constructed the concept of social classes where none had existed and exploited them as a 
means of dividing the population against itself. Ultimately, those divisions turned bloody 
when the Mau Mau took up arms against the colonial-appointed loyalist chiefs and other 
loyalists to the government as well white settlers. But in defying that system, the Mau 
Mau challenged its false conceptions of value and replaced them with a unifying message 
of collective action and cultural solidarity that resonated with blacks around the world.14 
In Mississippi, officials utilized a similar carrot-and-stick approach with its separate-but-
equal doctrine, dividing black society between the larger segment of rural poor and a 
smaller, mostly urban middle class of professionals and entrepreneurs. As Evers’ 
experiences in the RCNL and NAACP indicated, finding ways to encourage middle class 
participation in the movement would be paramount to its success.  
 This need on cultivating relationships between people of all economic backgrounds as 
the foundation for solidarity and collective action was especially evident in the work 
Evers did his first year as an NAACP volunteer. While still employed full-time with the 
Magnolia Mutual Life Insurance Company, he organized membership drives in the Delta 
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that resulted in the revival of defunct NAACP chapters (including one in Mound Bayou) 
as well as the birth of new ones. According to Myrlie, one of the first chapters created 
due to her husband’s efforts was in Shelby, Mississippi. Located in the far western 
portion of the Delta, Shelby resided in Bolivar County, where at least fifteen reported 
lynchings had occurred over the span of fifty years. Another chapter Evers worked to 
open in this period was in the Bolivar County town of Cleveland. There, he worked side-
by-side with Amzie Moore, who hailed from nearby Grenada County. Together, they 
increased membership in Cleveland to 439 people, making it the second largest NAACP 
chapter in the state of Mississippi. In addition to his work with the NAACP, Evers’ 
participation with the RCNL also continued. As program director, he worked alongside 
RCNL secretary and fellow NAACP member Aaron Henry to encourage black voter 
registration. In Henry’s estimation, the RCNL’s voter registration drives were most 
successful in the areas of the state with the most complacent white communities, but 
these were few and far between. While Evers’ work with both organizations brought him 
into the activist fold as a significant foot soldier in the battle against white supremacy, 
victories were piecemeal at best.15 
Inspired by his successes in enlisting Delta blacks to join the NAACP, yet 
plagued by a desire to force change on a broader scale, Evers set his sights on attending 
law school at the University of Mississippi. While he had contemplated the idea of 
becoming a lawyer prior to that point in time, his wife Myrlie explained that it was at a 
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late 1953 meeting of the NAACP in Mound Bayou where her husband was struck by the 
inspiration to immediately strike at the heart of white supremacy and better position 
himself to continue that fight statewide. At the meeting, Columbus branch President E.J. 
Stringer “spoke of the importance of an attempt to desegregate the University of 
Mississippi.” Though she noted that when Medgar first told her of his plan she thought he 
had lost his mind, she also explained that given “the pattern of school desegregation suits 
was by then quite clear, and almost without exception initial breakthroughs in each state 
had been made at state universities, usually at the graduate school level,” her husband’s 
decision to apply at Ole Miss “was really a conservative start.”16  
Indeed, by the 1950s, the NAACP had spearheaded a crusade against segregated 
education for two decades. From its inception, the organization had fought against 
segregation and racial violence in all of its forms, but a comprehensive campaign against 
school segregation began developing in 1933 when Charles Hamilton Houston joined the 
NAACP’s legal committee as special counsel. As former Dean of the Howard University 
School of Law, Houston had a reputation as a hardworking, brilliant lawyer who had 
turned the school on its head and crafted it into a world-class legal institution. Under his 
instruction, the NAACP modified its litigation efforts by placing heavy emphasis on 
education. In a 1935 speech to the National Bar Association convention, Houston argued 
that inferior education deprived young black men and women from acquiring the tools 
needed to fight for defense of their rights. With the goal of destroying the racist 
limitations placed on black students across the nation, Houston and the organization’s 
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team of lawyers crafted a three-tiered strategy against segregated education. The first step 
emphasized suits seeking the desegregation of professional and graduate schools. Next 
were suits aimed at forcing the equalization of salaries for black and white teachers. The 
third step included filing suits against elementary and secondary schools on account of 
inequalities in their physical facilities. Marshall, a former student of Houston’s and first 
in his Howard law class, joined the legal committee in 1936.17  
The first of the NAACP’s suits against segregation in professional and graduate 
schools to reach the federal appellate court was brought on behalf of Lloyd L. Gaines, a 
black man who had been denied entrance to the University of Missouri law school. 
Though Missouri’s segregation statutes were not applicable to colleges, the University of 
Missouri had no specific admissions criteria that dealt with the issue of race, and the 
university board had received a letter from the dean of the law school arguing that 
denying an application on the basis of race was unconstitutional, the board rejected the 
application. Instead, they offered to pay Gaines’ tuition if he agreed to attend law school 
out of state. Gaines rejected the offer, and the NAACP filed suit against the university 
registrar. The Missouri Supreme Court ruled against Gaines, and after working its way 
through an appeal process, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada came before the United 
States Supreme Court in 1938. Writing for Court, Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes held 
that Missouri could not deny blacks the opportunity to gain in-state legal educations, but 
cited Plessy in holding that states could operate segregated institutions as long as they 
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were equal facilities. Missouri then established a black law school at Lincoln University 
in Jefferson City.18 
While the Gaines decision did nothing to end the doctrine of separate but equal, it 
placed pressure on the states to provide equal educational facilities for its black 
population. Houston and the NAACP legal team, armed with knowledge of the vast 
disparity in educational funding across the South, set out to use that as a central argument 
in its legal campaign against segregation. A case update published by the NAACP’s 
official magazine, The Crisis, declared the decision “reaffirms and re-emphasizes the 
previous opinions of the Supreme Court that separation is legal only when it provides 
equality between the two races,” and that it was “regarded by the NAACP and other 
observers as opening the way for legal action to compel equalization of school funds, 
teachers salaries, equipment, and high school and elementary training.” However, suits 
against universities and professional schools dragged on slowly over the next decade, 
often on account of overworked staff unable to properly conduct all the litigation required 
and problems securing willing plaintiffs. In the early 1940s, the organization had more 
luck filing actions for salary equalization, the most important of which took place in 
Little Rock, Arkansas. In February of 1942, a group of black teachers brought suit against 
the board of directors and Superintendent of the Little Rock Special School District 
alleging its salary scale was disproportionate according to race. Initially, a federal judge 
ruled in favor of the school district, finding that the teachers were paid according to a 
merit scale, but the NAACP appealed on the basis that the school district had not 
                                                 
18 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights, 148-
149. 
  
 136 
provided evidence the merit scale was not discriminatory. In June of 1945, the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and teacher salaries in Little 
Rock were equalized the following year.19 
Glacially-paced as the campaign against segregated education seemed at that 
time, the NAACP’s outlook was given a considerable boost when the United States 
emerged victorious from World War II. As the Iron Curtain descended across Eastern 
Europe and the world’s two superpowers vied to establish and maintain spheres of 
influence, the issue of American race relations took on a greater degree of international 
importance than ever before. While throughout its organizational existence the NAACP 
had implored the United States to live up to its egalitarian ideals and sought international 
support for its antidiscrimination campaigns, the emergence of the Cold War resulted in 
the development of a new sociopolitical mentality that linked the eradication of racial 
discrimination at home to the success of American foreign policy overseas. In her 
analysis of race relations in the Cold War era, Mary L. Dudziak explained that “efforts to 
promote civil rights within the United States were consistent with and important to the 
more central U.S. mission of fighting world communism,” adding that “the need to 
address international criticism gave the federal government an incentive to promote 
social change at home.”  
An emphasis on racial egalitarianism as a foreign policy directive was of 
particular significance to the presidential administration of Harry Truman. Though the 
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president’s personal opinions on the issue of racial equality were somewhat murky, his 
record on matters of civil rights policy was less obscure. In 1945, he had worked to keep 
the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) alive. Created by President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt in 1941, it originated under Executive Order 8802, which banned racial 
discrimination in the national defense industry. The move by Roosevelt was in direct 
response to pressures from civil rights activists such as Asa Philip Randolph, president of 
the black labor union the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, and leaders of the 
NAACP, including Walter White, who threatened to sponsor and carry out a 50,000 
strong march on Washington by African Americans unless the defense industry and 
United States armed forces were desegregated. The FEPC had been intended to serve as a 
watchdog over government agencies and defense contractors, but lack of congressional 
support hindered its chances of remaining in existence in the final years of the war. 20  
In the emerging Cold War environment, the issue of civil rights and foreign policy 
became further intertwined in the lead up to the 1948 presidential election. His 
presidential advisors warned Truman that the election could not be secured without 
African-American support, and potential opponents, including former Vice-President 
Henry Wallace, advocated a brand of racial liberalism that could wrest away a large 
segment of the black vote. Aware that an opportunity to play a significant role in shaping 
the president’s policy platform had presented itself, NAACP leadership utilized its own 
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analysis of black voting power to exert pressure on Truman to push for an end to racial 
discrimination in federal agencies as well as throw his support behind anti-lynching, anti-
poll tax, and desegregation measures. Hoping to secure the organization’s support, and 
paying close attention to how his decisions on civil rights were playing internationally, 
Truman addressed the NAACP on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial on June 28, 1947. In 
an editorial published by the New York Amsterdam News two weeks beforehand, the 
NAACP rally was deemed “the single greatest effort of the Association in its 38 years of 
existence,” and highlighted the occasion as an opportunity to not only grow membership 
rolls, but for the President to place himself on the international stage as an advocate for 
black equality. “In his fight for democracy in far-off Greece, Hungary, Turkey, Italy, 
France, Korea, China, and elsewhere” it read, “Mr. Truman certainly cannot afford to 
ignore the crimes against democracy and humanity being committed against the nation’s 
13,000,000 Negro citizens, and the limitation which has been placed upon the freedom, 
liberty, and self-respect of the American Negro by the immoral laws, customs and 
practices of the states of the American Union.”21 
In his speech on the day of the rally, Truman focused on the importance of action 
on matters of civil rights policy and called attention to human rights all members of a 
democratic society should possess, including the right to a decent home, a worthwhile 
job, an education, adequate medical care, and unrestricted access to the ballot. He also 
praised the work of international organizations such as the newly established United 
Nations, whose Commission on Human Rights was in the process of drafting an 
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International Bill of Rights, of which the NAACP was actively hoping to influence, and 
of a Presidential Advisory Committee on Civil Rights, which he had appointed the 
previous year and had been “surveying our civil rights difficulties and needs for several 
months.”22 In October, the Advisory Committee released its official report, To Secure 
These Rights, which laid out thirty-four recommendations for civil rights reforms, 
including the passage of federal antilynching legislation, the elimination of the poll tax 
and other voting prerequisites, the creation of a permanent FEPC, and the dismantling of 
the separate but equal doctrine in public life. This included the issue of opportunity in 
education, of which the Commission concluded that efforts to maintain “separate, but 
truly equal, school systems” was both impossible and “in serious conflict with patterns of 
democratic life.”23  
In response to the report, Truman presented a package of civil rights legislation to 
Congress in February of 1948, which included antilynching and anti-poll tax directives as 
well as the permanent establishment of the FEPC. In a speech he gave promoting the 
package, the President declared “if we wish to inspire the peoples of the world whose 
freedom is in jeopardy, if we wish to restore hope to those who have already lost their 
civil liberties, if we wish to fulfill the promise that is ours, we must correct the remaining 
imperfections in our practice of democracy,” adding to the argument that, while “our 
democracy is not perfect…it offers a fuller, freer, happier life to our people than any 
totalitarian nation has ever offered.” The response of Southern Democrats to the speech 
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and civil rights legislation was one of predictable, collective outrage. In the election that 
followed, Southern conservatives split from the Democratic Party to form the States’ 
Rights Democratic Party and nominated Senator Strom Thurmond as their candidate. 
Despite the fracture of the party, Truman carried both the popular and electoral vote in 
the November election.24  
The presidential term that followed directly intersected with the rise of 
McCarthyism and the hysteria generated by the rooting out of suspected communists 
from all walks of life, including the federal government. The pressure to cleanse itself of 
suspected “reds” in its ranks also plagued the NAACP. Its leadership, including Du Bois, 
White, and Wilkins, became embroiled in a bitter battle with one another over the 
direction of the organization, with Wilkins leading the fight to purge it of suspected 
communists and Du Bois struggling to redirect the Association to focus on forcing the 
Truman administration to enact its pledge to uphold human rights for all citizens at home. 
Ultimately, White and Wilkins emerged victorious in the conflict when Du Bois resigned 
his position as Director of Special Research in disgust. His frustrations seemed 
warranted. Despite its moves to introduce civil rights legislation to Congress during the 
election, in the years that followed, the President’s administration failed to ensure enough 
support for the package. While the FEPC was maintained, it was done so through 
executive order, and any attempts to pass antilynching and anti-poll tax measures broke 
down.25 Frustration within the halls of the NAACP was mounting despite public efforts to 
rally its members to action, including a call for “Negro citizens…to stop wishing and 
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hoping and start doing the necessary hard work on the grass roots level,” in a February, 
1949 Crisis article written by the Association’s Director of Public Relations, Henry Lee 
Moon.26  
A renewed call for its members to work harder to establish new branches and fill 
membership rolls was of utmost importance. Though his reelection had cooled his efforts 
to push for continuous action on civil rights, persistent criticism of the United States’ 
record of race relations remained a foreign policy concern for Truman. Thus, his 
administration began to actively involve itself in the NAACP’s efforts to eliminate 
inequality in education through the court system, bypassing Congress in the process. The 
cultural environment it fostered had profound influences on the mindset of the Justices of 
the Supreme Court and the decision of the NAACP to push for a direct attack on 
segregation. 
 This change to the cultural environment was no better illustrated than in 1950, 
when the NAACP scored important victories in two graduate school suits brought before 
the Supreme Court. Both cases intended to directly challenge the ability of a state to 
provide equalized educational facilities for its black and white students. The first suit was 
brought on behalf of Heman Marion Sweatt, a black postal worker who was denied 
entrance to the University of Texas Law School on racial grounds. After the NAACP 
filed suit, Texas judges requested that the university provide Sweatt with a legal 
education in a facility of equal quality. When the facility turned out to be four rooms in 
the bottom of an Austin office building, Thurgood Marshall filed an appeal. The second 
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suit concerned the graduate school at the University of Oklahoma. There, George 
McLaurin, a black public school teacher with a master’s degree, applied to a doctoral 
program. Unlike the Texas case, McLaurin was admitted to the university. However, he 
was barred from sitting in classrooms with other white students, and was instead forced 
to listen to lectures from the hallway and study at a separate “colored” desk in the library. 
In each suit, NAACP lawyers argued that regardless of funding, separating students based 
on race resulted in an unequal learning environment detrimental to black students. 
Hoping that intervention might lead to the dismantling of separate but equal as 
was originally set out in Plessy, the Justice Department filed amicus curiae briefs in both 
cases, urging the Court to consider the repercussions a ruling in favor of maintaining 
segregation would have on American foreign policy. Bluntly put, it warned “if the 
imprimatur of constitutionality should be put on such a denial of equality, one would 
expect the foes of democracy to exploit such an action for their own purposes.” At the 
same time, according to Michael J. Klarman, the influences on the Supreme Court 
Justices were as cultural as they were political. By 1950, the military was in the process 
of being desegregated via executive order, the Court contained its first black law clerk, 
“who had authored a memo to [Justice] Frankfurter urging that Plessy be overruled,” and 
even major league baseball had been desegregated for three years by that point. In short, 
the Justices’ analysis of its civil rights cases was, in some way, shape, or form, 
consistently shaped by the overarching Cold War imperative.27  
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On June 5, 1950, the Court handed down decisions in both cases. Writing for the 
unanimous Court, Chief Justice Fred Vinson held in Sweatt v. Painter that the decision by 
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals be reversed given that the separate law school was not 
“substantially equal” to that of the University of Texas, which under the protections 
afforded Sweatt by the Fourteenth Amendment, was required to admit him.28 In 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, Vinson again wrote for a unanimous majority. 
Siding with NAACP assistant counsel Robert L. Carter, who argued the case alongside 
other members of the organization’s legal defense team, the Court held that “the 
restrictions imposed upon appellant impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in 
discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his 
profession.”29 Though both cases were clear victories for the NAACP, the Justices did 
not go so far as to overturn Plessy. As Thurgood Marshall clearly understood, making the 
leap from desegregating higher education, which concerned adult students of whom small 
percentages were black, to grade school education, which involved children and cut 
across class lines, would surely elicit fiercer opposition.30 
Nonetheless, the victories in the Sweatt and McLaurin suits were clear indicators 
that the once rigid walls of segregation in education were weakening. Houston’s legal 
strategy, expertly crafted and put into practice by Marshall and the NAACP’s legal 
defense team, was paying dividends, albeit slowly. Though he was aware of the 
limitations of the Court’s decisions, Marshall felt the time was finally right to begin a 
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direct attack on segregation. This was both due to its acquisition of legal victories 
through the Courts, and the NAACP’s growth throughout the post-World War II period. 
Over the course of the 1930s and 1940s, the NAACP increased its membership rolls to 
over 450,000 members, resulting in an upsurge of financial donations and an expanded 
budget. As victories mounted and its membership increased, so too did the pressure by 
those individuals on the organization to push for a full-scale attack on Jim Crow 
throughout the South. Of this development, Tushnet explained “it thus made sense to 
design the litigation program to satisfy the NAACP membership as well as liberal 
supporters of the NAACP’s general goals.” To aim lower than the all-out destruction of 
segregation in primary and secondary education was out of the question. Thus, in August 
of 1951, the NAACP filed suit against the Board of Education in Topeka, Kansas.31 
When Medgar Evers joined the organization the following year, the Brown suit 
was in the process of making its way on appeal to the Supreme Court. Given his decision 
to try and integrate the University of Mississippi Law School in the aftermath of Sweatt 
and McLaurin, Myrlie’s description of her husband’s effort as a “conservative start,” in 
the context of the Association’s recent victories, was accurate. However, in Mississippi 
there was nothing conservative about a black man trying to integrate its most prestigious 
and lily-white institution of higher education. Rather, the decision seemed to jolt the 
entire state when it was announced in January of 1954. The news made headlines in The 
Jackson Advocate, the Jackson Daily News, and in the Ole Miss campus newspaper, the 
Mississippian. Based on the tone of the articles and reactions from Ole Miss students, the 
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move by Evers was considered unsurprising given the recent change in the cultural 
climate regarding segregation in education across the South. Though they were not 
necessarily excited about the prospect of attending law school with a black man, many of 
the students reacted with resignation to the notion such a situation would eventually come 
to pass. Evers’ bravery and decision to work toward the cause of desegregation via the 
NAACP also caught the attention of his friends and acquaintances outside of Mississippi, 
many of who wrote him to offer their support. In one letter, written ten days after he had 
submitted his application to Ole Miss, B.J. George, a black attorney from Shreveport, 
Louisiana, wrote Evers to let him know he admired his spunk, and reminded him that “all 
the Negroes in the South are pulling for you – the NAACP shall fight this case to the 
end…hold your head up, please sir.”32  
Ole Miss officials were not so easily swayed, especially when they learned Evers 
would be represented by Thurgood Marshall in any legal matters pertaining to his 
application. What followed was almost a full year of efforts by the university’s board to 
move slowly, obfuscate, and circumvent Evers attempt to enroll in almost every way 
possible, sans outright violence. In what can best be described as an obsessive 
preoccupation with rooting out NAACP activity, Evers was called before the State Board 
of Trustees of the Institutions of Higher Learning in August 1954 and asked if he had 
been prompted by the civil rights organization to submit his application. Aware that this 
line of questioning was inevitable, and in an effort to cut off the State Board and 
university administrators at the pass should they try to trip him up in the application 
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process, Evers assured them that the decision to apply had been his alone, and also lined 
up the required recommendation letters by two local white citizens who had known him 
for at least ten years and could vouch for his good moral character. In response, the 
educational officials, terrified of the precedent it would set if Evers was accepted, set 
forth on a campaign to completely alter the admissions process, not only of Ole Miss, but 
of all state-supported institutions of higher education. University officials rejected the 
two recommendation letters on an invented technicality. According to them, the two 
white men who had written the letters had not lived in the same county as Evers for the 
two years prior to his application submission, thus invalidating their effectiveness. This 
was followed by an alteration to the recommendation process entirely. From then on, 
applicants were required to provide five letters vouching for their moral standing by 
alumni of the institutions to which they were applying. 33  
Of the decision, Myrlie Evers asserted “no one in the state of Mississippi, black or 
white, misunderstood the sophistry of the board’s explanation. It was precisely the sort of 
explanation Mississippians, black and white, had been trained to expect.” 34  
Nevertheless, it greatly angered Medgar Evers, especially because he had acquired the 
recommendations of two prominent white men. At the same time, Evers continued his 
work with the NAACP, participating in an effort to drive across the Delta and photograph 
the decrepit conditions of the region’s black schools. It was during one of those 
investigatory journeys that, according to his fellow Association member Thomas H. 
Moore, Evers experienced his first encounter with one of Mississippi’s white officials. 
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Walter Sillers, Jr. was the speaker of the Mississippi House of Representatives, the owner 
of a large Delta plantation, and a Dixiecrat. In a meeting with Evers and Moore regarding 
the equalization of the school system, Sillers promised the construction of new school 
buildings. He kept his back to the men the entire time, never once making eye contact. 
The entire episode humiliated Evers and intensified his resolve to dismantle the white 
power structure despite his ongoing failed attempts to integrate the University of 
Mississippi.35  
When the Supreme Court overturned the doctrine of separate-but-equal in Brown, 
the NAACP planned to utilize it as the catalyst for campaigns to desegregate primary and 
secondary schools across the South. In order to facilitate those campaigns at the state 
level, Thurgood Marshall and other Association leaders, including Director of Branches, 
Gloster Current, argued the time was ripe for the creation of paid staff positions in several 
southern states including Florida, North Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas. On 
Mississippi in particular, NAACP regional secretary Ruby Hurley submitted a report to 
the Association board of directors in May of 1953 highlighting the work of the local 
branches, the continued plight of the black population, and the need for more concerted 
action throughout the state. In several communities, she professed “we found…that the 
minds of Negroes are almost completely enslaved” and that “they move the way they 
think the white man wants them to move.” Of Governor White’s education equalization 
program, she explained that it had received backing from the Mississippi State Teachers 
Association, that it resulted in widespread misunderstandings regarding the Bates case, 
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and that efforts by whites to label the NAACP as communist had also taken a severe toll 
on the ability of the organization to make more headway in the state. “The NAACP has a 
terrific education job to do in the state of Mississippi,” she concluded, both to offset the 
problems she had listed, and “to show the worth of the NAACP,” a national organization 
with more power and greater resources than local organizations such as the RCNL.36 
Given his mental fortitude, bravery in his fight to desegregate the University of 
Mississippi, Association recruiting efforts, amiable nature, and ability to connect with the 
poorest segments of Mississippi’s black population, Evers was considered the ideal 
candidate for the position of Mississippi’s field secretary by local branch officials. Of his 
keen ability to understand people and understand struggle, Aaron Henry explained “it’s 
empathy and understanding of plights of people and also understanding that the janitor is 
just as important as the president of the bank. That kind of mellow transition a lot of 
people can’t make, but I think Medgar understood.” In a state where the majority of its 
black population lived below the poverty line, often tied to the land by substantial debt in 
addition to the thousands of other humiliations and discriminatory offenses they suffered, 
finding a leader who could communicate with and drive the entirety of the black 
community to action was crucial. In addition to his activist colleagues in Mississippi, 
Evers was also the first choice of NAACP regional secretary Ruby Hurley and Director 
of Branches Gloster Current. In a memo to Roy Wilkins regarding the position written on 
November 19, 1954, Current recommended Evers and declared him to be the most 
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qualified and impressive candidate. Five days later, Evers was confirmed as the NAACP 
Assistant Field Secretary for Mississippi.37 
A myriad of public announcements followed, including official press releases sent 
out over the wires. His appointment was covered in major black newspapers including the 
Chicago Defender and the Atlanta Daily World, as well as in the pages of the Crisis. 
Along with Evers, Edwin C. Washington, Jr., a post office workers and graduate of 
Prairie View A&M in Texas, was also appointed assistant field secretary for the 
Southwest region. The NAACP described the two field secretary positions as direct 
outgrowths of the new campaigns by local branches to secure compliance with the 
Court’s decision in Brown. When speaking about the creation of the new positions, 
Gloster Current explained the appointments were made to aid the NAACP in carrying out 
“a greatly expanded program of community action to implement the Supreme Court’s 
decision on the local level.”38 
With the full support of the Association behind him and its resources at his 
disposal, Evers was eager to get to work. The first step involved a move to Jackson, 
which Medgar and Myrlie embarked upon after he flew to New York City to complete a 
ten-day orientation. There was little time to settle into their new home, however, as 
leadership expected Evers to have the Mississippi state office up and running by January 
23rd. Despite the short period of time available to him, Evers managed to open the office 
                                                 
37 Aaron Henry, interviewed by John Jones and John Dittmer, April 22, 1981, Oral Histories, MDAH; 
Williams, Medgar Evers, 82. 
38 “Along the NAACP Battlefront,” The Crisis, Vol. 62, No. 1 (January 1955): 38-39; “NAACP Appoints 
Two to Help with Southern School Compliance,” Atlanta Daily World, December 11, 1954; “NAACP To 
Spend Million a Year For Desegregation,” Chicago Defender, December 18, 1954. 
  
 150 
and put everything in place for an opening ceremony celebrating the NAACP’s 
availability to the public. Press releases were sent out advertising the ceremony, and 
high-ranking Mississippi political officials, including Governor White and Jackson mayor 
Allen Thompson, were invited. Gloster Current traveled down from the National Office 
to commemorate the occasion. Given the recent victory handed down in Brown, it was no 
surprise that Current’s remarks highlighted the Association’s continued determination to 
protect black voting rights and its newest efforts to eradicate segregation in all areas of 
public life. In particular, he zeroed in on the governor’s school equalization program and 
other threats to circumvent the Court’s ruling, noting that both the black and “thinking 
white citizens” of the state “will not sit idly by while misguided politicians destroy the 
state.”39 
Yet while Current was confident in his delivery, rhetoric alone could not bring 
down Mississippi’s deeply entrenched system of white supremacy. Consistent and 
comprehensive action was required of the NAACP to break through the state’s racially 
oppressive barriers, and as Evers prepared to implement school desegregation and bolster 
voter registration campaigns on the ground, Mississippi’s white officials and many of its 
white citizens moved to obstruct any progress through the use of violence, financial 
pressure, and efforts to divide the black community down class lines. As pro-segregation, 
anti-NAACP hysteria advanced across the state, Evers also took on a central role in 
reporting acts of white on black violence and economic reprisal to the National Office in 
order to publicize the horrors of Mississippi racism on both the national and international 
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stage. The danger in doing so was great, and Evers armed himself with weapons should 
the need to use them in self-defense ever arise. While he chose not to openly advocate 
violence as per NAACP policy, neither did he shy away from the idea of protecting his 
family or friends if the opportunity presented itself.  
As a freedom fighter in a hostile environment, Evers could not afford to be ill-
prepared for any potentially violent situation that might arise. Ingrained in his psyche 
since childhood, the tradition of armed resistance and his desire for militant action, 
coupled with the new internationalist outlook cultivated during his time in the military 
and reinforced by his study of the situation in Kenya, resulted in the development of an 
activist style that according to Charles Payne, was “more aggressive than was customary 
for the NAACP.”40 Ruby Hurley, who frequently traveled with Evers on investigatory 
treks across the Delta disguised as sharecroppers, referred to him as “anything but 
nonviolent,” adding “he always wanted to go at it in Mau Mau fashion.” Over the course 
of his career as field secretary, Evers struggled to balance this more aggressive style with 
the Association’s directives, though he came to firmly believe that nonviolence was the 
most effective means of securing the NAACP’s long term goals. Nonetheless, the 
intensification of white-on-black repression that followed in the wake of Brown placed 
Evers in both a precarious and fortuitous position that would require him to grow into a 
militant Mississippi Mau Mau: able to think on his feet, arouse the masses, and devise 
new ground strategies to fit changing circumstances.41 
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For its part, Mississippi’s white power structure took Evers’ field secretary 
appointment seriously, at least insofar as it indicated the NAACP was making a full-
fledged effort to push for racial equality throughout the state. In light of his ongoing 
attempt to desegregate the Ole Miss School of Law, and feeling compelled to act in 
response to the Court’s decision in Brown, a small group of concerned white citizens met 
in the town of Indianola, Mississippi in July of 1954 and formed the Indianola Citizens’ 
Council. Led by Robert “Tut” Patterson, the manager of a cotton compress and a former 
army paratrooper, the group consisted of the town’s mayor, city attorney, and other 
prominent businessmen and professionals. Indianola, which sat on the banks of the Indian 
Bayou in Sunflower County, was situated in the heart of the Delta and dotted with large 
cotton plantations. There, blacks made up almost two-thirds of the population but 
accounted for only .03 percent of registered voters. According to Neil R. McMillen, who 
studied the birth and growth of the Indianola Citizen’s Council, the town was “in most 
respects a natural birthplace for a white supremacy movement.”42 
Patterson had been moved to call the Indianola meeting after reading the 
transcript of a speech given by Mississippi Circuit Judge Thomas Pickens Brady titled 
“Black Monday.” The speech, which had been originally addressed to the Greenwood 
chapter of the Sons of the American Revolution, was a rancorous jeremiad against the 
Supreme Court, filled with racialized language excoriating the lack of judicial precedent 
in the Brown decision, blaming societal upheaval on the intrusion of the NAACP and 
other “communist organizations,” and reaffirming the sovereignty of states. Black 
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Monday, he asserted, “could be our Gettysburg also,” if Mississippians did not take a 
stand against the “sociological Supreme Court” and those pushing to implement 
desegregation in public life. His proposed solutions to the crisis included calling for the 
popular election of Supreme Court Justices, a youth program intended to educate about 
the evils of communism and its infiltration into American society, and, of last resort – a 
complete shutdown of the public school system. Above all, he called for Mississippi 
citizens to form local citizens organizations intended to serve as the first line of defense 
against the forces seeking to destroy white supremacy.43 
In response to Brady’s call for organized resistance, Patterson had answered. The 
first issue on the docket at the Indianola meeting concerned the identity of the council 
itself. Upon careful deliberation, it was decided the organization would exist as a 
grassroots group, comprised of all the white citizens of the town, intended to stimulate 
community action from within to counteract the NAACP and other civil rights 
organizations at work in Mississippi. Formally labeled “the Indianola Plan,” news of the 
council’s framework spread to other communities, who in turn created their own 
councils. However, unlike violent organizations like the Ku Klux Klan, who generated 
negative publicity for the state, the councils were firmly dedicated to seeking a more 
“respectable means of defending white supremacy.” In describing the nature of the 
Councils, Charles Payne stated that they “[pursued] the agenda of the Klan with the 
demeanor of the Rotary.” Their methods of resistance were primarily economic in nature, 
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intended to financially squeeze black Mississippians involved or suspected of 
involvement with the NAACP and place them in dire fiscal straights.44 
As a means of exacting support for their existence, the councils capitalized on the 
Southern anti-communist hysteria laid out in Brady’s diatribe and denounced the NAACP 
as a subversive organization intent on destroying the Southern way of life.45 Council 
literature, passed around each city and town as part of each council’s membership drives, 
was particularly inflammatory. In a pamphlet titled “The Eight Ifs…and Your Answer!” 
passed out by the Jackson Citizens’ Council, white citizens were asked to consider eight 
questions. These included whether the reader believed there could be no compromise on 
the matter of segregation, if integration would lead to miscegenation and the eventual 
destruction of the white race, if they realized that “either Communistic influences or 
economic pressure groups stand behind every effort to invade States’ Rights and force 
integration and miscegenation on the people of the South,” if they believed in states’ 
rights, and if they realized that “indifference, apathy, and the inclination of some to 
accept desegregation was ‘inevitable’…are our greatest enemies.” If they could answer 
yes to any or all of those questions, the Jackson Citizens’ Council was for them.46  
In the halls of the Mississippi statehouse, legislators set to work devising new 
strategies to offset the NAACP’s desegregation and voter registration campaigns as they 
waited, alongside everyone else in the nation, on the Supreme Court’s decision on 
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implementing Brown. Several new amendments to the Mississippi Constitution were 
introduced including one that provided registrars with unlimited discretion in determining 
whether potential black registrants had successfully interpreted any section of the state 
constitution and a “statement of the duties and obligations of citizenship.” In early 
January of 1955, the legislature called a special session in order to insert an additional 
amendment directly intended to offset school desegregation efforts by giving the 
legislature power to abolish the public school system outright. At the same time, it also 
proposed a new “surtax” plan, which consisted of a sales tax increase intended to fund the 
school equalization program. The Legal Education Advisory Committee, created by 
Governor White as part of his initial equalization proposal, had returned cost estimates 
for the program in the 1955-1956 school year. In total, the cost stood at $38,200.00, 
which is the equivalent, in 2013, of nearly one-third of a billion dollars.47  
In response to the legislature’s actions, the NAACP’s Mississippi State Board of 
Directors, with Evers’ full support, adopted two policies that were then sent out via news 
release. The first policy was a pledged “all-out attack on the vicious piece of 
undemocratic legislation” of which the board declared it would not rest “until it is 
stricken from the books.” The second condemned “the policies of various newspapers to 
continuously attack Negro citizens in a derogatory manner,” to which the board requested 
“Negroes and other citizens…seek subscriptions from newspapers that are fairer to all 
citizens.” The Association’s protests did nothing to curtail the passage of the legislation, 
as it passed in a special election in November of 1954. But by keeping up a steady stream 
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of publicity and pressure, the NAACP sent a strong message it would not back down in 
its fight for equality. 48 
The NAACP’s efforts to battle against the legislature’s attempts to further 
disfranchise black voters and advocate for school desegregation placed its leaders in an 
even more prominent spotlight, as the newly formed citizens’ councils took aim at the 
Association. Not even one month after officially becoming field secretary and opening up 
the state office in Jackson, Evers was inundated with news and complaints of threats and 
economic pressure on local NAACP members. This included Gus Courts, president of the 
Belzoni branch and a prominent grocer, who was denied credit by the local bank unless 
he agreed to step down as president of his chapter.49 According to Linda and David Beito, 
Belzoni, located in Humphreys County on the Yazoo River, was considered a “hotbed of 
intimidation by the Citizens’ Councils,” and that “white merchants had circulated a 
blacklist of ninety-four registered black voters.” While white discontent with black 
progress had always been present in Belzoni, moderate successes by the RCNL and 
NAACP to register black voters, particularly in the aftermath of Brown, resulted in 
additional crackdowns.50 
Amzie Moore was another prominent target. Always deemed a problematic rabble 
rouser and civil rights “agitator,” Moore began facing financial difficulties in early 1954 
he took out a bank loan to build his filling station and restaurant complex in Cleveland, 
Mississippi. However, when local whites asked him to place a “colored only” sign over 
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the store, he refused. They then accused him of organizing a boycott of local businesses, 
and denied him further bank loans as well as called in the mortgage on his home. At the 
same time Moore was struggling to pay his debts, several black farmers in the counties of 
Holmes and Bolivar petitioned the NAACP state office for aid. In a series of sworn 
affidavits given in December of 1954, the farmers complained that in the aftermath of a 
severe drought that had struck the area they were unable to procure emergency funds and 
loans from the Farmers Home Administration, a federal agency under the management of 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture.51 Evers, along with each of the complainants, 
suspected that the refusal of disaster funds and loans was the result of an economic 
squeeze, directed by the local citizens’ council, on those who were believed to hold 
memberships in the NAACP. Evers, along with Rev. E.J. Johnson of Yazoo City, who 
both desired to get the National Office involved in the situation, forwarded the affidavits 
to New York and contacted Roy Wilkins about the matter.52 
Wilkins, who had high hopes for Evers, conferred with him on the matter and 
agreed that a solution was needed to aid the individuals being squeezed by the councils. 
What emerged out of the discussion was the establishment of a loan program through the 
Tri-State Bank of Memphis, a black-owned bank. Working with both the National Office 
and with T.R.M. Howard, who served as a board member of the Tri-State Bank, Evers 
                                                 
51 Affidavit of Dan Smith of Holmes County, Mississippi, notarized by Preston Holmes, December 28, 
1954; Affidavit of Rev. James Hargrove of Holmes County, Mississippi, notarized by Preston Holmes; 
December 28, 1954; Affidavit of Mrs. Annie Ward of Holmes County, Mississippi, notarized by C.V. 
Thurmond, December 29, 1954; Affidavit of Amzie Moore of Bolivar County, Mississippi, notarized by 
Preston Holmes, December 29, 1954; Affidavit of Cato Sample of Holmes County, notarized by C.V. 
Thurmond, date unknown, all located in Subgroup 1, Series 2, Box 2, Folder 8, NAACP Field Secretary 
Files, Medgar and Myrlie Evers Collection, MDAH. 
52 Roy Wilkins to Rev. E.J. Johnson, January 19, 1955, Subgroup 1, Series 2, Box 2, Folder 8, NAACP 
Field Secretary Files, Medgar and Myrlie Evers Collection, MDAH. 
  
 158 
was able to facilitate an opportunity for economic relief. In the meantime, the NAACP set 
about sending dozens of press releases in which it requested that black businesses, 
professional organizations, and organized labor associations place their funds into the 
bank. Within a few months, the fund had grown to over $250,000.53 Organizations that 
participated included branches of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, United 
Automobile Workers, the African Methodist Episcopal Church, as well as countless 
numbers of insurance companies, fraternal societies, and professional organizations.54   
At the same time, Gloster B. Current, the NAACP Director of Branches, 
requested that Evers produce further documentation of economic reprisals in order to 
serve as the basis for an investigation into the citizens’ councils and their possible 
connections to the Farmers Home Administration. The NAACP then released another 
press release in January 1955, announcing that Roy Wilkins had submitted the affidavits 
and Current’s report on the situation to the White House with an urgent request for 
“prompt action.”55 Over the next several months, Evers worked with Clarence Mitchell 
and others in the NAACP Washington Bureau to secure information for use by the 
NAACP’s Legal Defense Division. In the pages of the February 1955 edition of the 
Crisis, the success of the project was celebrated. Dr. John E. Walker, president of the Tri-
State Bank, assured readers that the funds put in the bank were given to victims of 
economic reprisal in Mississippi and that he promised to “give special attention to the 
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applications from Negro homeowners, farmers, business, and professional men who have 
been denied credit because of their views.”56 
Evers was pleased with the success of the Association’s efforts, particularly given 
how voraciously the citizens’ councils had attacked their targets. Yet in the process of 
working hand in hand with Wilkins, their professional relationship suffered occasional 
communication problems that stemmed from their vast differences in leadership style. 
Wilkins was driven, staid, conservative, avidly anti-communist, and fiercely devoted to 
running the NAACP in a top-down manner. Evers was level-headed but also steeped in a 
growing internationalist worldview and dedicated to militant action on the ground in an 
area of the country so oppressive to black folk, it may as well have been as far away from 
New York City as Kenya was, given how much the environments both men lived within 
differed. Perhaps no situation served as a better example of the two men’s opposite 
natures and experiences than the Tri-State Bank campaign. 
While it was picking up steam, Wilkins began to grow concerned over the 
situation from a public relations perspective. As the national black press picked up on the 
news and spread the story around, Wilkins began to worry that some individuals in 
Mississippi saw the bank as the solution to all of their problems. More specifically, he 
corresponded with Evers to warn him that because the National Office had decided to 
publicize the situation, it was paramount that Evers and the Mississippi branch presidents 
relay to those in need of loans that the money was only available to those who could meet 
the requirements of the bank. In a letter to T.R.M. Howard, Wilkins wrote that he felt 
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“the publicity had the effect of creating in the minds of many Mississippians the idea that 
a huge amount of money was available for them and all they had to do was step up to the 
window and ask for it on the claim that they were being persecuted.” Confirmation of 
this, Wilkins felt, was to be found in the actions of Amzie Moore, who had been turned 
down for a loan by the Tri-State Bank because he was deemed too large a credit risk.57   
Moore was, in spite of his many amiable qualities, a bad businessman. But he 
continued to look to the NAACP for help in the situation. Evers, who did his best to aid 
Moore while adhering to Wilkins’ demands, found himself stuck in the middle. In 
January of 1956, Moore applied for a loan of $7,000 under the Tri-State Bank program. 
Wilkins, as well as bank officials, were wary of the application given Moore’s past 
financial troubles, which were both due to economic reprisals by the citizens’ council as 
well as his seeming inability to handle money well. Under Wilkins’ direction, the Tri-
State Bank turned down the loan application, arguing Moore possessed “insufficient 
collateral.” Moore then looked to Howard for aid, who provided him with emergency 
funds and pitched his story to other financial backers who agreed to help him. However, 
when some of the money did not come through as promised, Moore wrote Wilkins to 
complain about the issue, imploring he understand how dire the situation was in 
Mississippi, and that he desperately wanted to ensure his debts to white creditors were 
paid off in case he was arrested for civil rights agitation and his wife was forced to take 
on his financial liability. Wilkins, while apologetic, was also direct with Moore in his 
reply, asserting that the matter was none of the Association’s business, and to take up the 
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problem with Howard. Evers, who understood why Wilkins had washed his hands of the 
issue, also knew firsthand how unfairly Moore had been treated by the white citizens of 
Cleveland, Mississippi.58 
Eventually, Moore procured funds through other means, but Wilkins’ concern 
with maintaining good relationships with Washington officials to curry favor for its 
desegregation and voter registration efforts directed attention away from the systemic 
inequality at the root of black farmers’ struggles. What is more, Evers’ work on the Tri-
State Bank campaign took up considerable amounts of his time, and according to Myrlie 
Evers, he struggled to pass along all the requests, apologize for delays, and soothe those 
who were turned down for the loans. Only a few months into his new job, Evers was, in 
some respects, up to his neck in the turmoil that plagued Mississippi blacks. While that 
turmoil was not unfamiliar to him, he had become the leading face of the NAACP in the 
state, and the pressures to succeed within an ever-worsening racial climate were 
enormous.59  
Perhaps no incident demonstrated the apparent degeneration of the situation in 
Mississippi than the murder of Reverend George. Vice-President of the RCNL and a 
leader in the Belzoni chapter of the NAACP, he had long been a prominent businessman, 
civic leader, and advocate for civil rights in the Delta. In April of 1955, he participated in 
the RCNL’s annual meeting in Mound Bayou, during which he and Gus Courts spoke to 
the crowd. At age 51, Lee was considered an amiable, down-home man with a gift for 
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oratory, who along with Courts had managed to register one hundred black voters 
throughout the state. That evening, he gave a speech in which he told the crowd, “pray 
not for your mom and pop, they’ve gone to heaven. Pray you can make it through this 
hell.” Shortly before midnight on May 7th, a car pulled up alongside his on the road, fired 
two shots into the driver’s side, and sped off. Lee died of his wounds shortly afterward. 
While local whites initially tried to downplay the event, it was well known to Lee’s 
colleagues that he had endured threats and economic pressure for refusing to take his 
name off the voter roll.  
Unsurprisingly, the local sheriff argued Lee’s death had been the result of a traffic 
accident despite the fact that Lee’s jaw had been practically blown off and was embedded 
with what appeared to be buckshot. In response, Evers mobilized an investigation while 
T.R.M. Howard contacted the African American congressman from Michigan, Charles 
Diggs, to press the FBI to conduct its own investigation. Two days after the assassination, 
it sent agents from its civil rights division. Evers, NAACP State President A.H. McCoy, 
and others also pressed on Governor White to investigate, but he refused. In the 
meantime, Lee’s wife planned a public, open casket funeral for Lee in Belzoni, which 
drew a crowd over one thousand people and attention in all the nation’s black papers. 
Eventually, after it concluded its investigation, the FBI announced it had been unable to 
find witnesses willing to talk or track down the assassin. Yet while the outcome of Lee’s 
murder investigation only resulted in more heartache for his friends and family, the event 
had a significant impact on Evers. According to Linda and Roy Beito, Evers “cut his 
teeth” on the Lee case. While local officials tried to hinder the investigation and 
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downplay the situation, Evers continually fed information to the press to keep the story in 
the news. And just as he had come to understand from following the plight of Mau Mau 
in Kenya, publicity could make all the difference in the world in Mississippi.60 
If the Lee murder was not enough to shift Evers’ world on its axis, what followed 
only a few weeks later certainly jolted Mississippi anew. On May 31, 1955, the Supreme 
Court handed down its implementation decision in Brown II. Writing for the Court, Chief 
Justice Warren stipulated that federal district courts were to oversee the implementation 
of desegregation in schools and that such actions should occur “at all deliberate speed.”61 
Responses to the Court’s decision were mixed. Both proponents and opponents of the 
Brown decision were quick to hone in on the “all deliberate speed” phrase, which white 
southerners took to interpreting far differently than their black counterparts. Aware that 
compliance with the ruling was left to individual district judges, Mississippi’s white 
power structure concentrated on erecting further barriers to desegregation at both the 
local and official state levels.  
The NAACP, on the other hand, sought to press forward with its desegregation 
campaigns immediately. In the June-July edition of the Crisis, Roy Wilkins and 
Thurgood Marshall co-authored an interpretive analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision. 
In it, they reaffirmed the Association’s crusade to end segregation in education, called on 
all state and federal officials to act with good faith, and asserted that the push to transition 
school systems to operate in accordance with the Court’s ruling must start promptly. 
“Armed with the powers embodied in the language of the Court’s opinion,” they 
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explained, “we look confidently toward the future.” Of those who sought to obstruct 
change, they reminded readers that “we now have the weapons to make them accept the 
highest court’s affirmation of true American principles.”62 Gloster Current then stepped 
forward to make an announcement that the Association would concentrate its summer 
work on prepping local chapters for participation in desegregation efforts, which included 
the supplying of technical aid and briefing the field secretaries on the next steps in the 
process.63 
In Mississippi, Evers began the process of overseeing and publicizing the filing of 
petitions for desegregation of the public schools in Natchez, Vicksburg, Jackson, Yazoo 
City, and Clarksdale. Aware that the publication of the petitions was a tactical move that 
had the potential to help the movement yet hinder its participants, Evers and the local 
NAACP branch presidents remained in close contact with one another. Aaron Henry, 
whose chapter filed the petition in Clarksdale, began the process at a public meeting. The 
petition, which had been carefully prepared and that called upon the local schoolboard to 
implement the Supreme Court’s decision immediately, was posted in churches and 
businesses around Clarksdale. Within a month, the petitions had garnered four hundred 
signatures, and when they had all been collected, the chapter sent them to the schoolboard 
in September of 1955. Henry was fully aware of what would follow the submission of the 
petition, and in a letter to him written in July, reminded Evers “As you direct each person 
who signs the petition must know the probable and extreme consequences. Yet, the 
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program cannot be sold on a defeatist mood by playing up all the bad points. To do it that 
way will scare or frighten every one away from us in this move.”64 
Henry was right to remind Evers of the risks. In Clarksdale, economic reprisals 
and a campaign of misinformation sponsored by the Citizens’ Council were set in motion 
as soon as the NAACP announced its intentions to push for the desegregation of the 
town’s schools. In response, Evers and Henry clarified the situation through a small 
publicity campaign of their own. In the July 26, 1956 edition of the Jackson Daily News, 
an article ran claiming the black population of Clarksdale had agreed to a policy of 
voluntary school segregation.65 With the struggles that both men faced in attempting to 
convince the local black population of the futility of such a plan, any publicity stating 
otherwise was extremely detrimental to the campaign. In an angry letter fired off to the 
editors of the Daily News the following day, Henry quickly cleared up the issue.66 
However, the misinformation campaign paled in comparison to the citizens’ council’s 
next step, which was printing the names and addresses of all the petition signers in the 
local newspaper. Economic reprisals quickly followed, and Henry later admitted that he 
and Evers “realized we had made a serious mistake by using so many names of people 
who were not prepared to handle the intimidation.” Of the signers, he added 
“some…were forced to flee the state, others could not even buy basic staples, and 
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carpenters and plumbers in the building trades were no longer hired by whites.” If your 
name was on the petition, he concluded “you caught hell.”67 
Similar situations occurred in the other towns where petitions had been filed. In 
the August 18, 1955 edition of the Yazoo City Herald, the names and home addresses of 
53 local petitioners were published on the front page. Over the course of the next month, 
the paper continued to print an updated list of those petitioners who chose to remove their 
names, as well as those whose signatures still remained on the document, on their front 
page until all but two signers were left.68 Such tactics were favorites of the citizens’ 
councils, and while the NAACP did its best to convince its members and supporters that 
participation in the desegregation campaigns were paramount to the success of breaking 
down white supremacy, turning verbal acquiescence into action was easier said than 
done. What is more, though he understood why so many of the signers decided to remove 
their names from the document, Evers was left considerably frustrated with some of 
them. Namely, the small number of middle class teachers in Mississippi’s black 
communities who failed to cooperate with the NAACP’s campaign. Charles Payne noted 
“schoolteachers who had profited from the NAACP’s push to equalize school 
expenditures particularly irked him.” Despite the increase in salaries and opportunities 
that the NAACP had helped them obtain, Evers maintained that many of the 
schoolteachers only went out of their way to help the organization “in isolated cases.”69 
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At the same time, however, Evers was fully aware of the level of repression that 
the school desegregation campaign participants were under.  Thus, in certain periods 
when concerns over the lack of participation in the campaigns were raised by some of the 
members of the local branches and individuals in the National Office, Evers tried to 
express his disappointment while also reminding those such as Wilkins of just how 
difficult it was for black Mississippians to live day to day in Mississippi. In reference to 
the situation in Yazoo City, Evers wrote the executive secretary in September 1956 and 
expressed his sorrow and frustration with both the black population of Yazoo City and 
the oppressive system that resulted in their decisions to withdraw their names from the 
school petitions. “Honestly, Mr. Wilkins,” Evers wrote, “for Yazoo City there doesn’t 
seem to be very much hope. The Negroes will not come together, and our former 
president has not cooperated at all.” The root of the problem, in Evers’ estimation, was 
fear, and in light of the pressures the black community was placed under, it was not 
surprising. “I would say it is worse than being behind the Iron Curtain,” he stated. “You 
can’t possibly imagine how cruel the white element is to the local Negro citizens.”  
Lastly, he noted that “Yazoo City…is half delta and hill town with a predominant 
plantation atmosphere, which makes the problem even greater. I thought you should 
know a few things about Yazoo City so that you would be able to understand the 
condition under which Negroes, especially NAACP members, live.”70  
The problem of fear was a central one, and as Evers continued to delve deeper 
into investigating Mississippi’s white power structure and facilitating the Association’s 
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campaigns, another catastrophic event occurred that was as seemingly common as it was 
horrifying – yet another reminder of the reality of black life in Mississippi. While Evers, 
Henry, and other NAACP leaders were hard at work stirring up support for the 
desegregation push, recruiting new members, and encouraging black Mississippians to 
register to vote, fourteen-year-old Emmett Till was murdered in cold blood while visiting 
his relatives in Mississippi. Originally from Chicago, Till’s mother, who had grown up in 
Mississippi, reluctantly allowed her son to visit his uncle and cousins, who lived outside 
the small hamlet of Money, Mississippi. While on a trip to the local grocery store, Till 
walked to the counter to purchase some candy from the white wife of the store’s owner, 
Roy Bryant. What happened next remains the subject of great debate. Carolyn Bryant, the 
woman working the cash register that day, claimed young Till made sexual advances 
toward her. His cousins, as well as some of the other children standing outside the door, 
claimed Till might have wolf-whistled at Bryant, or whistled to himself on account of a 
stutter he suffered.  
Regardless of Till’s exact actions, what was made clear was that when Roy 
Bryant returned home and learned of the situation, he and his half-brother, J.W. Milam, 
drove to the house of Till’s uncle, demanded he turn over the young teenager to them, 
then drove Till out to an abandoned barn, beat him, shot him in the head, and then 
weighed his body down with a cotton gin fan and tossed it into the Tallahatchie River. 
Three days after his disappearance, Till’s body was found by a fisherman. The 
investigation and murder case that followed knocked the state of Mississippi on its heels, 
and in the process, placed Evers and the state NAACP on the national stage in a way he 
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had not yet experienced. It also reinforced his militancy, desire to remain officially 
nonviolent but increase protections for himself and his family, and understanding of the 
importance of utilizing publicity to garner attention on both the national and international 
stages.71  
Evers immediately set out to conduct an investigation on behalf of the NAACP 
alongside Ruby Hurley and other field representatives, but not before, according to 
Myrlie Evers, he broke down and cried at the injustice of the situation. In and around 
Money, Evers and the others combed the area, looking for witnesses, taking statements 
when they felt safe to do so, and keeping abreast of the attempts by local white officials 
to downplay the incident. Indeed, both local law enforcement and the coroner initially 
tried to cover up the murder by quickly burying the body. However, Till’s mother 
demanded a more thorough investigation and that the body, after it had been identified by 
a relative, be sent back to Chicago. There, she insisted her son be given an open casket 
funeral, which was attended by thousands of mourners. The photographs of Till’s 
mutilated corpse were spread far and wide via the pages of Jet Magazine, and quickly 
ushered the story onto the front pages of newspapers across the nation. Because of the 
negative publicity surrounding the case, Mississippi officials were pressured to bring 
Bryant and Milam to trial for Till’s murder.  
                                                 
71 Till’s body was found twelve miles north of Money, only around fifteen minutes away from the 
birthplace of his mother, Mamie Till-Bradley. Stephen J. Whitfield, A Death in the Delta: The Story of 
Emmett Till (New York and London, The Free Press, 1988), 22. For more on the details of the Till murder, 
investigation, and murder trial, including his mother’s account, see Christopher Metress, ed., The Lynching 
of Emmett Till: A Documentary Narrative (Charlottesville and London, 2002); and Mamie Till-Bradley and 
Christopher Benson, Death of Innocence: The Story of the Hate Crime that Changed America (New York: 
One World Books, 2003). 
  
 170 
 Along with Hurley and another Mississippi native named Howard Spence, Evers 
worked to give the National Office consistent updates on the situation, many of which 
were repurposed into press releases condemning the murder and calling for racial justice. 
Once, after returning to Jackson from an investigatory trip to Money, Spence entered the 
state office to find Evers in conversation with a Detroit reporter. Spence recalled that the 
reporter told Evers “never before has a case of this kind been able to escape the borders 
of Mississippi,” but assured him that on account of Evers’ report, the report would be in 
the Detroit Free Press the following day. What is more, according to Minnie White 
Watson, a resident of Jackson and friend of Evers, he had played an instrumental role in 
convincing Mamie Till- Bradley to have an open-casket funeral for her son, arguing that 
photographs could impact the public in a way mere words could not.72 At the same time, 
Wilkins also spoke directly about Till’s death, referring to it as a lynching, and declared 
that “it would appear that the State of Mississippi has decided to maintain white 
supremacy by murdering children.” In the pages of The Crisis, an editorial lambasted 
Mississippi and highlighted how such a brutal act played on the international stage. 
“Mississippi whines that she is misunderstood, that she is slandered, traduced, and 
maligned, that there are good people in the State who condemn the lynching-crime of 
Money. But where are they?” it asked. “The United States,” it continued, “shouts its 
democracy to the world and pleads with tear-filled eyes for world peace, but crimes like 
this imperil the position of the United States as the leader of the Free World.”73  
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The trial of Bryant and Milam, while precedent-setting in that it placed two white 
men on trial for the murder of black child in Mississippi, was also a mere formality. The 
verdicts of not guilty had been decided far in advance and were delivered by a jury 
consisting of mostly white country farmers. In response, NAACP officials, including 
Evers, exploded in anger. Wilkins and Marshall asked the Department of Justice for 
“prompt and effective action” against the “reign of terror” in Mississippi. The National 
Office was deluged with phone calls and letters offering financial assistance and moral 
support, and protest meetings were held at the headquarters of various branches across 
the nation. On September 25th, Evers traveled to Detroit to attend a public protest 
meeting. Alongside Charles Diggs, Evers spoke of the need for continued support of the 
Mississippi movement, adding that pressures on the state’s black population had reached 
an unbearable level, but that they would not retreat in the demands for racial equality. In 
response, the crowd of 15,000-strong, who stopped traffic within an eight-block radius 
around the Methodist church where the meeting was held, donated $14,000 to the 
Association.74 
In the meantime, Mississippi’s white power structure was at work trying to retain 
its hold over voting power through the use of expanded economic pressure campaigns. As 
Neil R. McMillen explained, effective resistance to Brown not only encompassed efforts 
to curb the NAACP’s desegregation campaigns, but also “required the minimization of 
the Negro’s role in state and local elections.”75 In light of the legislation proposed and 
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passed in special legislative sessions called into existence after the Court’s initial 
decision, it came as no surprise to Evers that black Mississippians were prevented from 
registering to vote in extensive campaigns to eliminate black access to polling places. 
Following elections, Evers often traveled around the state to accrue sworn affidavits by 
individuals who had been prevented from voting on the basis of racial discrimination. 
Several individuals noted that after arriving at the polls and filling out a ballot, the clerks 
in charge refused to place the ballot in the ballot box. Instead, the ballots were placed in 
envelopes on which the name of the voter was placed, and then set aside.76 Others who 
tried to register were not allowed based on the results of their literacy tests or their 
failures to pay poll taxes. Perhaps the most exasperating affidavit was that of a young 
man named Clyde Kennard, who attempted to register in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Luther 
M. Cox, the county circuit clerk, refused Kennard’s request. When Kennard asked Cox 
why he had been refused, Cox simply replied “no reason.”77 
One of the most vicious crackdowns on voter registration occurred in Belzoni. In 
1955, of the 16,000 blacks who resided in Humphreys County, only 126 of them were 
registered. Following the passage of the state constitutional amendments further 
disfranchising blacks, a “systematic program of economic pressure” followed. Potential 
voters or those already on the rolls were denied credit, fired from their jobs, or harassed 
in other ways that eventually resulted in the total number of registrants declining to 95. 
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Evers referred to the pressure campaign in Belzoni as particularly hard core, adding 
“they’d come and tell them ‘you’ve lived in this community for a long time and if you 
want to stay here in peace, you’d better get your name off this list.’” The crackdowns 
were particularly devastating to the Delta region, where black participation in NAACP 
campaigns was already difficult to come by.78  
 The Belzoni campaign seemed to come to a head in November of 1955 when Gus 
Courts, friend of the late Reverend George Lee and co-founder of the Belzoni branch of 
the NAACP, was shot in the arm and abdomen by unknown white assailants in front of 
the grocery store he owned. His crime had been the efforts he had made to try and 
register black voters. A few days prior to the shooting, he had received a warning from 
members of the local citizens’ council. A white businessman who entered his store to talk 
with Courts told him “they’re planning to get rid of you. I don’t know how and I don’t 
want to know how.” Blessedly, Courts survived the shooting, and in the aftermath, Evers 
investigated the incident, remarking that if Courts had not been immediately transferred 
to a hospital in Mound Bayou, he likely would have died from his wounds. Due to the 
potential for more negative publicity, Governor White promised an investigation and sent 
Sheriff Ike Shelton to Belzoni to solve the case. Shelton declined to interview Courts, 
claiming the hospital in Mound Bayou was out of his jurisdiction. The resultant 
conclusion of his investigation was typical of the kind demanded by the Governor. 
Shelton claimed he did not believe white men were involved in the crime at all, instead 
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stating “I honestly think some d--- n------ just drove their [sic] and shot him. But I could 
be wrong. I don’t think the (citizens) council has got a thing to do with this.”79 
 By the end of Evers’ first full year on the job as field secretary, he had investigated 
numerous murders, attempted murders, and systematic efforts to disfranchise, 
circumvent, and stonewall black Mississippians throughout the state. His learning curve 
had been steep. In the aftermath of Brown, full-scale efforts to destroy the NAACP had 
emerged out of hysterical calls for an all-encompassing campaign of white mass 
resistance. As Evers’ delved deeper into Association work, he emerged as the face of the 
NAACP in Mississippi. Thus, as his career trajectory trended upward, so too did the 
potential for greater amounts of violence and harassment aimed at black Mississippians in 
general and his family and him in particular. Yet there had been victories too, albeit small 
ones when compared to the set-backs. Mississippi’s racial problem was longer the dark, 
hidden secret of those who lived within its oppressive walls. Thanks to Evers’ efforts to 
publicize every attempt by the state’s whites to humiliate, threaten, and carry out open 
acts of violence against black citizens, Mississippi’s antidemocratic, white supremacist 
system was on display across the nation and around the world. 
 However, the fight to break down the walls of segregation was far from over. In some 
respects, it was just beginning. On March 29, 1956, the Mississippi legislature passed a 
bill establishing the Mississippi Sovereignty Commission. Conceived as an organization 
intended to serve as a kind of “state-level FBI” with investigatory capabilities and a 
prominent public relations arm, the Sovereignty Commission quickly emerged as the 
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greatest, and most powerful, enemy of the NAACP in Mississippi.80 In order to fight its 
seemingly endless reaches, Evers would spend the next seven years of his career risking 
life and limb to continue publicizing information about racial oppression in Mississippi, 
reformulating tactical approaches for use on the ground, and struggling to maintain 
organizational control amidst a changing activist landscape. They would be the most 
rewarding and devastating years of his life.
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CHAPTER 4: 
 
“ALL THE WORLD’S A STAGE:” SPOTLIGHTING MISSISSIPPI 
 
In his prizewinning study of the civil rights era in Mississippi, former Tougaloo 
College professor John Dittmer noted “in the wake of Brown white Mississippians had 
developed a siege mentality so pervasive it encompassed virtually every citizen and 
institution. ‘Keeping the Negro in his place’ was no longer sufficient, for the real enemy 
lay outside the state’s borders – in the New York offices of the NAACP, in the chambers 
of the Supreme Court, inside the Kremlin walls.”1 In a world beset by escalating Cold 
War pressures, white Mississippians sought to anchor their segregationist values to 
legitimate American values, true to the patriotic vision of the nation’s founders, and 
under attack by outside communist forces intent on destroying the Southern way of life 
from within. This was a particularly significant phenomenon given that by the mid-1950s, 
the Red Scare that had swept across the United States, driven by heightened fears of 
communist subversion and the histrionics of opportunist politicians, had somewhat 
lessened in intensity. Nonetheless, given the NAACP’s claim of victory in Brown, its 
announced intentions to push for the desegregation of schools across the South, and its 
support of an ever-expanding number of independence movements threatening to destroy 
traditional colonial boundaries in parts of the Americas, Africa, and Asia, the struggle to 
maintain white supremacy in Mississippi had become international in scope.  
In Kenya, fighting between Mau Mau rebels and British colonial forces had 
shifted away from the cities and farmlands of the European highlands to the forests at the 
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base of Mount Kenya and the Aberdares Hills. The flight to the forests by gangs of Mau 
Mau indicated the tide of the conflict had turned against the rebels. Unable to match the 
British in firepower and especially vulnerable to damage wrought by informers working 
with colonial authorities to destroy the insurgency from within, those still willing to take 
up arms against white rule sought out the protection of the forests as a last resort and a 
strategic means to force British soldiers into fighting on treacherous terrain. The resultant 
death toll was grim. By January of 1956, at least 10,000 Mau Mau or suspected Mau Mau 
were dead. In addition to military efforts, the colonial government instituted a policy of 
villagization, intended to serve as a means of rooting out remaining Mau Mau 
sympathizers throughout the Central Province. Upward of 100,000 Kikuyu were forced 
into government-funded concentration camps or enclosed villages.2  
While British and loyalist forces inched closer to snuffing out the threat of an 
organized Mau Mau fighting force, their actions were the source of great international 
debate and criticism. Throughout 1955, an escalating food crisis induced by the 
villagization policy, together with the widespread usage of forced labor and torture in the 
camps, led to a torrent of additional Kikuyu deaths throughout the battered Central 
Province. International relief organizations, including the Red Cross, distributed food to 
the region, but were placed under the control of Governor Baring and directed to focus 
their efforts on areas populated by loyalists to the British colonial cause. Anger and 
dismay at such indisputable efforts to block the distribution of aid to a large number of 
enclosed villages bubbled over in the colony’s own Medical Department, which issued 
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official statements condemning Baring’s actions and criticizing the colonial 
government’s failure to prevent the food shortages. Colonial authorities, who two years 
prior had issued official “Security of Information” directives to stem the flow of leaks out 
of the colony, declared the reports of starvation alarmist and pointed to the well-fed 
loyalists as proof. Nonetheless, the regime could not prevent accusations of wrongdoing 
and brutality from spreading near and far.3 
In May of 1956, a former camp rehabilitation officer named Eileen Fletcher, a 
Quaker from Middlesex, England, expressed her disillusion with the treatment of the 
Kikuyu in the camps into a three-part written series published in the Quaker periodical 
Peace News titled “Kenya’s Concentration Camps – An Eyewitness Account.” It was a 
damning exposé. Historian Caroline Elkins, who undertook an extensive analysis of 
Fletcher’s editorials, noted they “emphasized the capricious justice of the screening 
camps, the relentless labor routines in the work camps, the sexual abuse of female 
detainees, the unsanitary conditions of most of the camps, and the undernourishment and 
general poor health of the detainees.” In the months that followed, former British officers 
stepped forward to corroborate Fletcher’s report and provide their own eyewitness 
accounts of camp horrors. Despite Baring’s assurances that the British operations against 
the Mau Mau had reached “the mopping-up stage,” his comments did nothing to assuage 
concerns about the accusations of torture, neglect, and intentional starvation. Unable to 
ignore the rising level of interest in the situation but wanting to avoid a political 
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showdown over the issue in the House of Commons, the British government looked to 
the head of the Colonial Office, Alan Lennox-Boyd, to sort out the problem.4  
The allegations against the Kenyan colonial government were no small matter. At 
stake was Britain’s imperial image and rationale for empire. As the world emerged from 
World War II, the western powers understood that endorsement of universal human rights 
– personhood, equal protection under the law, mobility, and safeguards from inhumane 
treatment – was essential to the preservation of western territorial claims and political 
philosophies in the developing ideological battle with the Soviet Union. This notion of 
human rights as a weapon against the forces of tyranny was conceptualized in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948 and the 
Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights in 1953, both of which 
Britain was a principle signatory. Within the new western framework, the Colonial Office 
endeavored to uphold a general protection of fundamental rights in the colonies while 
maintaining dedication to its civilizing mission. In Kenya, Governor Baring’s handling of 
the Mau Mau crisis upset that precarious balance, and the international outcry over the 
mistreatment of captured labor camp detainees could not be ignored for fear of negative 
geopolitical implications. More so than ever before, the justifications for colonial 
trusteeship were being placed under suspicion or outright attack.5 
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When speaking on the Kenya situation in the House of Lords on February 10, 
1955, Arthur Richards, 1st Baron Milverton and former governor of Gambia, Jamaica, 
and Nigeria, expressed his concerns regarding the international attention paid to the 
Kenyan colonial government’s actions toward the Mau Mau. “We pay a lot of attention 
nowadays to world opinion and it seems to me not unreasonable to pay at least some 
attention to public opinion in the country where the trouble has occurred.” The 
government policies regarding land, villagization, and the “absence of a clear lead” in 
organizing a home guard, Lord Milverton argued, “suggest…a lack of grip and 
understanding.” In his assessment, Kenya resembled “a ship at sea in a storm, with no-
one on the bridge.” The key to the preservation of the colony lay in political reform, the 
development of African leadership, and the improvement of the educational system 
reinforcing the merits of a “multi-racial community” defined by the “maintenance of law 
and order and the observance of law and justice.” Doing so would not only secure the 
future of British trusteeship in Kenya, but eliminate the possibility of communist 
infiltration and exploitation. Lord William Jowitt, in response to Milverton, agreed that 
emphasis on the creation of a multi-racial community was paramount, as was the need for 
better police work and screening in the labor camps.6 
Their criticism was too much for Lennox-Boyd and his imperialist sensibilities. 
He repeatedly denied the accusations against him and conducted a masterful 
disinformation campaign to confound his critics. Within this high imperialist framework, 
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he asserted the mistreatment of African detainees and violence were merely isolated 
incidents rather than signs of widespread mismanagement. He also worked tirelessly to 
cover-up or obstruct investigations into the colonial government’s misdeeds. Barbara 
Castle, a Labour Party MP who called for an independent investigation after the sudden 
resignation of Colonel Arthur Young as Kenya’s Commissioner of Police, found herself 
targeted by Lennox-Boyd. During her visit to Kenya in late 1955, she struggled to obtain 
any information from individuals close to the Colonial Secretary. She also endured 
episodes of intimidation and attacks on her character. So too did Eileen Fletcher, who 
was alleged to be “hysterical in temper” and possessing of “a catty manner.”7 In the short 
term, Lennox-Boyd’s efforts paid off, as his and Baring’s efforts to spin or outright 
fabricate stories in Kenya allowed them to retain power and move forward with their 
policies.  
 In the United States, mainstream newspaper coverage of the situation in Kenya 
noticeably declined in the aftermath of Jomo Kenyatta’s trial and imprisonment. Only the 
nation’s black newspapers maintained a steady stream of coverage, particularly in light of 
the leaked reports about the labor camps. In August of 1956, this was buoyed by a visit to 
the United States by Tom Mboya, the General Secretary of the Kenya Federation of 
Labor. A member of the Luo tribe, the second largest ethnic group in Kenya behind the 
Kikuyu, Mboya attended a Catholic mission school, won a scholarship to study at 
Oxford, and founded the Kenya Local Government Workers Union. After Kenyatta’s 
arrest and imprisonment, Mboya was elected treasurer of the KAU. Though he was not 
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Kikuyu, he expressed solidarity with their plight. Wunyabari O. Maloba explained that 
Mboya and the trade union movement in Kenya “continually harangued the colonial 
authorities on matters related to the emergency as well as on traditional labor matters.” In 
regard to his relationship with the Mau Mau, Maloba noted “although the trade unions 
never supported Mau Mau, they continually pointed out the economic basis of the revolt 
and the need for African political parties through which Africans could channel their 
fears, frustrations, and hopes.”8  
 Mboya’s visit to the United States was sponsored by the American Committee on 
Africa (ACOA) and designed to encourage the support of American trade unions and the 
creation of scholarship programs for Kenyan youths to study in American universities. 
The ACOA, which emerged out of solidarity with the Defiance Campaign against South 
Africa’s apartheid system, was backed in part by the NAACP. Desiring to continue 
playing a guiding role in ending colonialism but stretched thin by its efforts to contend 
with Southern white backlash to Brown while it recovered from the sudden death of 
Walter White in March of 1955, the Association threw its support behind the creation of 
an organization focused on anticolonial issues in Africa. This was especially significant 
given the dust-up that had followed the exit of W.E.B. Du Bois from the NAACP in 1948 
over the former Director of Special Research’s assessment that the Association allowed 
its fear of red-baiting to stand in the way of any meaningful work on Africa. For Roy 
Wilkins, the future of the NAACP’s intersection with African colonial movements lay in 
its promotion of strong, democratic rule across the continent, and Mboya fit perfectly into 
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that framework in promoting a vision of liberation for Kenya and black Americans absent 
Mau Mau-type atrocities.9  
Included in Mboya’s national tour was an appearance on NBC’s interview 
program ‘Meet the Press’ and visits with several American political leaders including 
Vice President Richard Nixon, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Adlai 
Stevenson, Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell, United States Senator John F. Kennedy, 
and meetings with members of the United Auto Workers and United Steelworkers 
unions. He also spoke to students on numerous college campuses and wrote pieces in the 
Pittsburgh Courier about the evils of colonialism, the right of self-determination, and 
“the importance of a better understanding of Africa” in a world where peoples of all races 
were no longer isolated from one another.10 Though he did not express support for 
“atrocities” committed by the Mau Mau, he provided readers with a contextualized 
assessment of why the rebels felt compelled to utilize violence against their colonial 
oppressors. “Atrocities have been committed by Africans” he explained, “but there is no 
need for dramatizing or generalizing over these incidents. To conclude from these 
dramatizations that Africans are a primitive people seeking to revert into barbarism is 
erroneous since it is impossible to explain the conduct of some British troops and 
administrative officers who have committed serious crimes during the emergency despite 
                                                 
9 In a sense, the founding of the ACOA was directly related to Du Bois’ exit from the NAACP, in that the 
new organization labeled itself a noncommunist alternative to the Council on African Affairs (CAA), the 
anti-colonialist organization chaired by singer, actor, and activist Paul Robeson that Du Bois joined after 
his exit from the NAACP. As the Cold War heated up, the CAA found it increasingly difficult to survive 
attacks on its existence and eventually feel apart. Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans, 146-147; 
Anderson, Bourgeois Radicals, 297-303. For more on the rise and fall of the CAA, see Anderson, Eyes Off 
the Prize, 261-270, Von Eschen, Race Against Empire, 141-144, and Plummer, Rising Wind, 191-192. 
10 Gerald Horne, Mau Mau in Harlem?, 173; “Evils of Colonialism Hit by African Visitor,” Atlanta Daily 
World, October 5, 1956. 
  
 184 
their claim to be the upholders of democracy, civilized standards and Christian way of 
life.”11 
By crafting his comments within an anticommunist framework that emphasized 
colonialism as untenable in a world divided between communist states and free 
democracies, Mboya connected the destruction of American racial apartheid with the 
democratization of Africa. In this manner, he appealed to moderates concerned with the 
negative impact race relations had on America’s image abroad while also advocating for 
African self-rule. Racial unrest and desegregation battles throughout the South, he 
argued, damaged the international reputation of the United States and increased the 
possibility of “Soviet penetration” into Africa and the Middle East. In a speech at 
Howard University, Mboya asserted “the struggle of the American Negro for civil rights 
is the same struggle of the African to end colonialism,” and added “the only reason 
America is morally ineffective is because she has a domestic disease.” Unless that disease 
was eradicated, American efforts to end colonial-style oppression would be seen and 
highlighted by her enemies as nothing but hypocritical, empty rhetoric. Why, Mboya’s 
asked, should the United States “ask the prime minister of South Africa to stop 
apartheid?” The prime minister, Mboya claimed, would answer with “go back home and 
deal with Mississippi.”12  
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Mboya’s placement of Mississippi as the epicenter of American racial hypocrisy 
was apt. As he journeyed through the United States, Mississippi’s campaign of massive 
resistance was in full swing, riding high on the tidal wave of post-Brown hysteria. In a 
May, 1955 Jackson Daily News editorial that ran after the announcement of the Supreme 
Court’s school desegregation implementation decision titled “Yes We Defy the Law,” the 
tenor of the piece was clear. “If the Supreme Court decision is the law of the land” it 
read, “then we intend to defy the law.”13 In addition, the development of the citizens’ 
councils had not only successfully erected barriers against the NAACP’s voter 
registration and school desegregation campaigns, but also sought to shroud the 
Association’s civil rights work in the red flag of communism. “While we slept,” a cartoon 
in an Association of Citizens’ Council newsletter illustrated, the red termites had 
infiltrated the homes of white Mississippians and threatened to eat away the very 
foundations of Southern society. “Many of us are now awake,” the accompanying 
commentary declared. “But need to awake millions more. It is going to take hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to get the message across. Let’s go!”14 In his estimation of this 
period in the Mississippi movement’s history, Aaron Henry held that an “air of fanaticism 
prevailed, and it almost seemed as if the whites had gone insane.”15 In Mississippi, that 
insanity was becoming increasingly well organized, far-reaching, and deadly. 
 Among the state’s black population, an overwhelming sense of defeat grew 
prevalent throughout 1956. As citizens’ councils financially choked black citizens who 
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participated in the desegregation or voting rights campaigns, fears of further violence 
escalated. Several notable black leaders and NAACP members left the state, including 
Dr. Clinton Battle, the founder of the Indianola branch of the NAACP and Dr. Maurice 
Mackel, a key figure in the school desegregation drive. Even Dr. T.R.M. Howard, the 
most prevalent black leader in Mississippi whose confidence and dedication to black 
financial uplift had placed him at the forefront of RCNL campaigns for voting rights and 
equal education, finally had enough. Increasingly vicious threats on the life of his family 
and him drove Howard to flee the state in frustration and reestablish his medical practice 
on the South Side of Chicago. Still others, who comprised the small black middle class 
that profited from the segregated economic system and feared the escalation of violence 
and intimidation, seemed only too willing to, in the words of Henry, embrace the “old 
submissiveness.”16  
Just as the Mau Mau movement faced the prospect of total annihilation at the 
hands of organized resistance from the colonial government in Kenya, the growth of 
organized white resistance, directed from the Jackson statehouse, had successfully wiped 
out a significant portion of the Mississippi NAACP’s ground gains in the wake of Brown. 
Defeats in the Association’s school desegregation and voting rights campaigns prompted 
a large portion of the state’s black population back into a position of frightened 
acquiescence. Faced with a myriad of setbacks to its civil rights goals, Medgar Evers was 
depressingly aware the Association’s back was against the wall. However, his awareness 
of the significance of America’s image abroad in relation to the success of its foreign 
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policy goals to defeat the spread of communism, and refusal to abandon the needs of 
fellow black Mississippians or cower to white reprisals drove Evers’ desire to press 
forward on the ground. Though he issued no call for the black community to retreat to the 
forests of Mississippi, Evers actions, which included working harder than ever to 
publicize the state’s oppressive system of race relations in the press and directly 
challenge its white supremacist power structure, mirrored the Mau Mau-style tactic of 
enticing Mississippi’s most virulent racists into the open to fight on increasingly 
treacherous terrain – the international stage. 
In November of 1955, the National Office published a pamphlet titled “M is for 
Mississippi and Murder.” Comprised of details provided by Evers regarding the rash of 
murders and shootings that had occurred the year before, including those of George Lee, 
Lamar Smith, and Emmett Till, the pamphlet also highlighted the establishment of the 
citizens’ councils. In its final section subtitled “This is Mississippi,” it argued “it is the 
people who make a state. It is their sense of decency and humanity, their delineation 
between right and wrong, their relative kinship to the Almighty and their stewardship of 
that kinship which determine the society of the state.” In a similar manner to Mboya’s 
statements about colonial Kenya, the pamphlet lambasted the notion that a defense of 
white supremacy was acceptable in “a state within the United States of America…164 
years after the ratification of the Bill of Rights…85 years after the adoption of the 
Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution…2000 years after the birth of Jesus Christ…” 
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This was Mississippi for its black population: oppressive, deadly, un-American, and un-
Christian.17 
 The racially motivated murders continued. In early February of 1956, Evers 
submitted an official report on the death of Edward Duckworth of Smith County, 
Mississippi. Duckworth, believed to have been around thirty years of age, was shot five 
times through the heart by a white store owner claiming the drunken black man had made 
advances on his wife. Though his brother attempted to save his life by moving him to the 
nearest hospital that would treat blacks, Duckworth died en route. Unsurprisingly, the 
shooting was deemed self-defense by local law enforcement, and potential witnesses 
were threatened into silence. When Evers arrived on the scene with a photographer, 
several members of the local black community were able to help him piece together what 
had occurred, but no one at the scene of the incident would speak with him.18 Hanging 
over these grim events was the emergence of James “J.P.” Coleman as the state’s 51st 
governor. Coleman, who originated from the small town of Ackerman in Choctaw 
County, on the eastern edge of the Delta region, ran in the election as a moderate 
candidate. He had previously served as a district attorney and Mississippi Supreme Court 
Justice before he was named the state’s Attorney General under the administration of 
Governor Hugh L. White from 1950 to 1956. During the Democratic gubernatorial 
primary held in the summer of 1955, all five candidates hoping to secure their party 
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nomination spoke at a Madison County Citizen’s Council rally. Essentially, each 
candidate was asked to describe his racial views and affirm the doctrine of segregation. 
Though he maintained the same pro-segregation stance as the other candidates and 
claimed he work to preserve it if elected governor, Coleman’s support of organized 
resistance as practiced by the citizens’ councils was cool at best. 
 Nevertheless, his relationship with many of the state’s largest powerbrokers and his 
assurance he would not enforce desegregation directives was enough to procure a victory 
in the November election. Once in office, he established himself as a career politician 
hoping to advance beyond state politics. He opposed any extremist measures to root out 
and destroy all civil rights activity in the state, including the introduction of bills to 
outlaw the NAACP or bar the FBI from investigating incidents of racial violence. This 
was particularly significant, for despite Mississippi’s oppressive levels of racism, the 
NAACP was allowed to remain in place while it was banned by injunction in other states, 
including neighboring Alabama. Coleman was not averse to using race-baiting rhetoric if 
an expedient opportunity arose, but his methods for maintaining segregation were 
deceptively understated. It had been Coleman who had interviewed Evers and worked to 
make sure his application to the law school at the University of Mississippi was rejected. 
In his study of the formation and growth of the citizens’ councils, Neil R. McMillen 
argued “at that troubled juncture in the state’s history, [Coleman] was probably about as 
moderate as a governor with further political aspirations could afford to be. At any rate, 
time would prove (despite his defeat in the gubernatorial primary of 1963 by Paul B. 
Johnson) that he was not only a shrewder politician but a far shrewder segregationist than 
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his successor.” Perhaps no better example of that assessment exists than Coleman’s 
approval of the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission, created under his watch.19 
 On March 29, 1956, the Mississippi Legislature voted to establish a new state agency 
designed to protect the sovereignty of the state of Mississippi from unlawful intrusion by 
the federal government. Funded by citizen tax dollars, the Sovereignty Commission 
officially entwined the machinery of the Mississippi government with the fight to 
maintain white supremacy. Its creation was an unprecedented maneuver, even for a state 
considered one of the most racially oppressive in the South. Given the increasing level of 
paranoia regarding the infiltration of the state by “outside forces,” which in the minds of 
white Mississippians included the federal government, the Sovereignty Commission’s 
founding was part of a massive effort to “save” white Mississippians from their ultimate 
destruction should segregation ever be dismantled. Because of Coleman’s position of 
“moderation” on issues of race, the Sovereignty Commission was fashioned to work 
largely in an investigative capacity and serve as a “watchdog of segregation.” Its staffers 
included former FBI investigators and researchers and largely relied on extracting 
information on individuals and organizations via paid and unpaid informants. The agency 
also waged a propaganda war of its own to carry the “accurate, official” Mississippi story 
to the world. If the Supreme Court and the NAACP had thrown down the gauntlet, the 
state of Mississippi intended to answer with all of the force and power it could muster.20  
 The propaganda war between the state of Mississippi and the NAACP was 
particularly significant in the aftermath of the Till case, which had wrought massive 
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amounts of criticism on from both national and international actors. Thanks to the work 
of Evers and other NAACP members and volunteer investigators, details of Till’s murder, 
subsequent investigation, and trial had become worldwide news. French newspapers, 
including l’Humanite and Liberation published condemnations of the event.21 To counter 
the onslaught of bad press, the Sovereignty Commission encouraged northern reporters to 
tour and witness the “real” Mississippi, while the citizens’ councils worked in concert 
with members of the state’s power structure to further taint the NAACP as a communist 
front organization. In August of 1956, a citizens’ council booklet titled “The Red 
Menace” began circulating across the South. It included a mimeographed speech 
supposedly given at a Jackson, Mississippi NAACP meeting by a Howard University 
Professor and NAACP staff member named Roosevelt Williams. In the speech, Williams 
demanded “that the War and Navy Department eliminate Jim Crow” and “the abolition of 
all state laws which forbid intermarriage of the different races…,” adding “the whole 
world knows that the white man prefers the Negro woman” and that “it is well known 
that the white woman is dissatisfied with the white man, and they along with us demand 
the right to win and love the Negro men of their choice.” Williams was also quoted 
referring to Soviet General Gregori Zhukov as “our good friend” who had reported to 
Stalin that “he could never understand why the American Negro fought for America,” as 
“…the Negro is the white man’s superior.”22  
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 The speech was everything white Mississippians feared and assumed would come to 
pass should school desegregation be carried out: a communist front organization stood at 
the forefront of an effort to destroy the South from within – through the mixing of the 
races. The booklet made its way across Mississippi and elsewhere in the South like 
wildfire. Its message was further buttressed by the circulation of other citizens’ council 
promotional materials railing against miscegenation. One of the most inflammatory was a 
speech titled “Mixed Schools and Mixed Blood,” an article written by South Carolina 
author Herbert Ravenal Sass for the Atlantic Monthly and reprinted by the Greenwood, 
Mississippi Citizens’ Council. It argued that “the Negroes of the U.S.A. are today by far 
the most fortunate members of their race to be found anywhere on earth” and that “what 
America, including the South, has done for the Negro is the truth which should be 
trumpeted abroad in rebuttal of the Communist propaganda.” He went on to explain that 
race-mixing was not only a “crime against both religion and civilization,” but that it was 
bolstered by “a fantastic perversion of scientific authority.” The Supreme Court, he 
argued, had “usurped” its Constitutional power, and that in conjunction with power-
hungry leaders of the NAACP, intended to force Southern whites and blacks to destroy 
the identity of both races.”23 
  Letters questioning the tenor of the Roosevelt Williams speech poured into the 
NAACP, especially given the tendency of Southern whites to grasp onto the race-mixing 
issue and set it at the heart of their growing hysterical reactions to Brown. In an effort to 
stem the tide of criticism and get to the bottom of the situation, the Association called for 
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an investigation into the matter. Who was Roosevelt Williams? Why had he given such 
an inflammatory speech at an NAACP meeting, and how had a copy of it fallen into the 
hands of the citizens’ councils? Medgar Evers had never heard of him, nor had anyone 
else in Mississippi. An investigation by a Columbus, Georgia daily paper The Ledger-
Enquirer soon revealed Howard University employed no one by that name. Roosevelt 
Williams did not exist. Additional investigation by the Ledger-Enquirer, as well as the 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution and the Atlanta Journal, also revealed that when asked 
about the matter, Robert P. Patterson, Executive Director of the Mississippi Citizens’ 
Council, asserted “we never claimed it (the speech) to be authentic.” In response, the 
NAACP fired off a press release condemning the actions of the Citizens’ Council as 
evidence it was out to destroy the Association and all civil rights gains across 
Mississippi.24 
 In his study of the Southern campaign of massive resistance to Brown, George Lewis 
interpreted the Roosevelt Williams deception as “significant in aiding attempts to unravel 
the mind of the segregationist South in the post-Brown 1950s, or at the very least the 
mind of that coterie of segregationists that was drawn into the Citizens’ Councils.” That 
the document written by Williams was a forgery increased its overall impact. “Here was a 
document created entirely in the minds of segregationists,” Lewis argued, “who, with no 
obvious template to follow, set about creating a document bristling with the issues and 
language they believed was most likely to raise the ire of their fellow resisters.” These 
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types of propaganda efforts helped forge a blueprint for “fake news” long before its 
emergence in the modern era, and proved Mississippians were all too willing to make the 
directives issued by the white power structure their own. Evers and the Association 
refused to back down. In publicizing the story, they spun it as evidence the white power 
structure was on its heels and losing its grip on reality.25 
  The Roosevelt Williams’ unmasking coincided with the National Office’s work to 
lobby the Department of Justice and Congress to take action against the Southern 
campaigns to paralyze the NAACP through unprincipled attacks. In an effort to expand 
its influence, the Association courted allies to join its fight to publicize the threat of the 
citizens’ councils and the Sovereignty Commission. On October 21, 1956, the American 
Jewish Congress passed a resolution characterizing the Southern campaign against the 
NAACP as “a concerted attack on the fundamental guarantees of the First Amendment.” 
Furthermore, it asserted “the newest method of defending the institution of jimcrow (sic) 
is a greater menace to constitutional liberties than mob violence. In the guise of legality 
and with the stamp of governmental authority, these states are attempting to stop lawful 
organized protest against segregation and to deprive the Negro community of its chosen 
instrument for obtaining equality and the full rights of citizenship.” The resolution 
specifically highlighted Mississippi’s creation of the State Sovereignty Commission, 
“with a large appropriation and subpoena powers, to fight all elements antagonistic to the 
state’s ‘way of life,’” as a prime example.26 
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 The arguments set forth in the Jewish Congress’s resolution were further strengthened 
by the release of a special report in November by the Southern Regional Council. 
Comprised of religious and civic leaders, it had formed in the 1940s to promote racial 
equality throughout the South. Its November report was a summary of a three-month field 
survey of “the pro-segregation ‘resistance’ organizations” in the Southern States. In 
particular, it focused on the development and work of the citizens’ councils. In 
Mississippi, the state movement of councils was referred to as “the strongest in the 
South” and predicted to have “considerable influence for years to come.” It also claimed 
“this state is the major fountainhead of the region-wide WCC movement” and “this 
movement has the support of, or is feared by, the majority of the people of Mississippi.” 
The estimated membership totals of the councils by 1956 were reported to be around 
80,000 with an estimated budget of $400,000, the highest in the South.27  
 This publicization campaign reinforced the NAACP’s determination not to cower to 
pressure tactics or unlawful maneuvers to prevent blacks from exercising their full rights 
as American citizens. Rather, it intended to use those pressure tactics to its tactical 
advantage, highlighting their tone of paranoid desperation and absurdist nature to the 
detriment of their segregationist adherents. In a December 31, 1956 letter sent out to all 
of its members in states that had successfully secured injunctions including branches in 
Louisiana, Alabama, and Texas. “Far from being discouraged” Wilkins explained, “our 
people are working harder than ever before” and reminded readers “the NAACP is still in 
existence and very much in the fight. It grows stronger as our opponents resort to more 
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and more desperate measures, including violence.” The comparisons to British efforts to 
put down insurrectionist efforts in Kenya and elsewhere, though not explicitly made in 
Wilkins’ letter, could not have been lost on Evers or anyone else following the ongoing 
narrative of the emerging anticolonial movement worldwide. 
“When they use trickery,” Wilkins argued, “when they use the power of the state to 
suppress freedom, and when they use violence, we know that they have no argument left 
that can be upheld morally.” He finished by noting “we enter 1957 with the firm 
determination that there shall be no let-up in the campaign.”28 
 Indeed, as the new year dawned, Evers continued to push the Association’s voting 
rights and school desegregation campaigns forward as the barriers set against progress 
grew higher and thicker than ever before. The most notorious enemy of the NAACP, 
given its levels of secrecy and wide reach, was the Sovereignty Commission. 
Investigation into its workings – at least what little could be determined – revealed both 
black and white informers were paid to spy on NAACP meetings and report information 
back to the Commission. Membership lists and license plate numbers were among the 
bits of information passed on to investigators, all of which was compiled into a massive 
index of files. Though initially, the Sovereignty Commission did not directly fund the 
citizens’ councils, information about black civil rights workers was freely shared between 
the high-ranking officials of both organizations. Predictably, Evers was a central target of 
the Sovereignty Commission’s investigations, as was his family. Files existed not only on 
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him and Myrlie Evers, but also on their children, including birth certificate records and 
documents pertaining to their school enrollment. 
 Evers did not cower from the Sovereignty Commission’s threatening tactics. Instead, 
he continued his efforts to publicize them by releasing reports of the Commission’s 
activities and operational methods.29 Such actions were important for two reasons. The 
first concerned the underlying intent of the Sovereignty Commission itself, which was to 
investigate civil rights workers and uncover information to use against them in some 
fashion, preferably as a means of shutting down NAACP operations altogether. Evers and 
the Association made it clear they were aware of the Commission’s intent and would not 
be cowed by threats, whether made publicly or in a more underground fashion. The 
second reason was related to Evers’ and the NAACP’s continued campaign to publicize 
everything Mississippi’s white power structure was doing to suppress NAACP activity. 
Publicly discussing the Commission and its methods served to gradually lift the veil on 
its inner workings and place it front and center in the Mississippi narrative the NAACP 
was spreading. What is more, while the Mississippi movement continued to struggle, 
civil rights activity began to heat up in other areas of the South and quickly grabbed 
national and international headlines. Myrlie Evers noted her husband paid close attention 
to, and was inspired by, the results of those campaigns to push further.30  
 One of the campaigns he followed closely was the boycott of the segregated public 
transportation system by the black population of Montgomery, Alabama. It began in 
December of 1955 when NAACP member Rosa Parks was arrested for refusing to give 
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up her seat on a crowded bus to a white passenger. At the time of her arrest, Parks was 
forty-two years old and a longtime veteran of the civil rights movement in Alabama. In 
particular, she had worked to shed light on issues of white-on-black sexual violence 
beginning with efforts to raise money for the Scottsboro Boys, the nine young black men 
falsely accused of raping two white women while riding the rails across Alabama in 
1931. In 1944, she banded together with other black advocates against sexual violence to 
form the Committee for Equal Justice in the aftermath of the brutal gang rape of Alabama 
native Recy Taylor by six white men. Five months prior to her arrest, Parks had also 
attended desegregation workshops at the noted Highlander Folk School, an educational 
facility dedicated to the training of labor and civil rights activists located in Grundy 
County, Tennessee.31  
After she was taken into custody, Parks requested the assistance of E.D. Nixon, 
the president of the Montgomery chapter of the NAACP and the city branch of the 
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters union. Together with Parks and other local activists, 
Nixon coordinated a boycott of the bus company that lasted over a year. Unlike the 
voting rights or school desegregation campaigns of the NAACP, the Montgomery boycott 
was the type of nonviolent direct action protest that had emerged out of the labor 
movement as well as smaller-scale efforts such as the RCNL’s “DON’T BUY GAS 
WHERE WE CAN’T USE THE WASHROOM” campaign and an eight day boycott 
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against the segregated bus system by blacks in Baton Rouge, Louisiana in 1953. In 
Montgomery, the boycott was a full-scale effort by the black community coordinated by 
an organization founded to lead the protest, the Montgomery Improvement Association 
(MIA). Because individuals refused to ride the buses, other means of transportation were 
facilitated by the MIA, including both small and large carpool systems. In an effort to 
squelch the boycott, Montgomery’s White Citizens’ Council called for economic 
sanctions against the black community. At the same time, the city government declared 
the boycott illegal under a 1921 ordinance which prohibited boycotts against businesses 
without “just cause” and arrested the movement leaders.32 
One of those leaders was Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., a young, recently 
arrived minister who emerged as the voice of the protestors. Among the ministers who 
served as leaders in the MIA, King was considered the most eloquent and dynamic 
speaker and elevated to the position of primary spokesman for the movement. His 
speeches, together with active efforts by the MIA to publicize the boycott, gained the 
attention of the press and resulted in the growth of his popularity. Along with MIA 
leaders Nixon and a white Lutheran minister named Robert Graetz, King endured the 
bombing of his home by suspected members of the Ku Klux Klan. Yet arrests and 
violence did not halt the boycott, which continued throughout 1956 while a claim filed by 
the MIA to end segregation on public transportation made its way through the federal 
court system. Finally, on June 4, 1956 a federal district court ruled segregation in 
Alabama’s public transportation systems was unconstitutional. After the Supreme Court 
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upheld the ruling, the Montgomery boycott ended in December of 1956, having lasted a 
total of 382 days.33 
Medgar Evers was particularly impressed with the work of the MIA and the 
subsequent success of the boycott, and in the aftermath met with King and other leaders 
of the Alabama movement interested in facilitating nonviolent direct action protests 
against segregation ordinances throughout the South. On February 14, 1957, Evers 
traveled to New Orleans to attend a meeting of the Atlanta transportation conference 
group, the temporary name given to the association of ministers and other activists 
interested in forming their own civil rights organization committed to further dismantling 
Jim Crow. Eventually, out of the meeting arose an organization called the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), of which King was elected its first president. 
Evers agreed to accept the position of assistant secretary. Other officers included 
Montgomery minister and close associate of King, Ralph Abernathy, who was elected 
treasurer, and Fred Jemison, who was elected third vice-president. It was Jemison who 
had facilitated the eight day bus boycott in Baton Rouge four years before.34 
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As Evers soaked up as much of the positive energy surrounding the Montgomery 
victory as he could, so too did the NAACP’s national leadership, who hoped it would 
translate to more support for its voting rights and desegregation campaigns. As the call 
for massive white resistance to Brown translated to increased levels of organized 
opposition and racial violence, the Association stepped up its call for the passage of 
federal legislation to protect the voting rights of black men and women across the nation. 
Evers, who continued to provide the National Office with information regarding the 
citizens’ councils and Sovereignty Commission’s efforts to disfranchise black voters 
throughout Mississippi, played a crucial role in bringing attention to the need for federal 
voter protection. In particular, he focused on the inability of black Mississippians to 
register to vote as the central barrier keeping blacks from the ballot and persisted in 
accumulating and passing on to the National Office affidavits detailing the illegal actions 
of local registrars preventing blacks from registering to vote.35 In a letter to President 
Dwight Eisenhower on the issue, Roy Wilkins specifically cited the suppression of black 
voter registration in Mississippi and other parts of the South as a primary reason the 
federal government “must set the tone, not necessarily by waving a big stick, but by 
emphasis upon the obligation of every citizen to uphold the courts and the law, and upon 
the determination of the government that law shall prevail.”36 
Wilkins’ emphasis on the need for federal intervention not only stemmed from the 
Association’s beliefs that Southern obstructionism could only be dismantled by federal 
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power, but was also a reaction to Eisenhower’s coolness toward civil rights issues. A 
Texan by birth, he spent his childhood in Kansas before embarking on his illustrious 
military career, culminating in his ascension to Supreme Allied Commander during 
World War II. His military background bled directly into his political career, where he 
preferred a leadership style based on caution, measured responses and delegation to 
various experts and aides. It was no surprise then - but no less frustrating - to Wilkins and 
Walter White that upon meeting Eisenhower shortly before his election to the presidency, 
he was observably tense, relied mostly on his aides for answers to the questions asked of 
him, and seemed only marginally interested in the topic of civil rights at all, choosing 
mostly to define it as a “political football” that distracted from other important national 
matters (a statement so myopic it resulted in a rare instance of Wilkins rendered 
speechless). When pressed to propose solutions to the problems of Southern race 
relations, Eisenhower consistently favored local, state solutions and slow, measured 
progress over direct federal intervention, holding firm to conservative federalist 
principles.37  
As president, however, Eisenhower was unable to avoid wading into the swirling 
waters of civil rights debate, nor was he entirely unwilling to do so in an area where local 
government laws restricting segregation in public facilities were not enforced: 
Washington D.C. Calling on the leaders to implement an effective desegregation 
program, Eisenhower’s first move on race relations was a small, albeit important, first 
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step on the issue.38 Yet the Brown decision, which followed soon after, quickly 
overshadowed Eisenhower’s early successes and placed him in a position he had hoped to 
avoid – one in which he had to publicly support or criticize the groundbreaking Supreme 
Court decision. He chose a lukewarm response, publicly accepting the Supreme Court’s 
decision but withholding any statements of approval or disapproval, preferring instead to 
privately sympathize with white Southerners struggling to accept the dismantling of their 
cultural traditions. Much to the dismay of NAACP and other movement leaders, when 
asked if he would ever consider sending federal troops into the South to enforce a federal 
court decision, Eisenhower noted he could not imagine any circumstances that would 
induce him to do so.39  
Nevertheless, the uncertainty and tension surrounding the Supreme Court’s 
directive that desegregation occur at “all deliberate speed,” in addition to continued calls 
by the NAACP, SCLC, and other civil rights advocates for strong federal enforcement of 
voting rights laws throughout the South, prompted Attorney General Herbert Brownell 
and other advisors to encourage the President propose a new civil rights bill. In his state 
of union message to Congress in January of 1957, Eisenhower called for the creation of 
legislation authorizing a bi-partisan commission to investigate civil rights violations, a 
permanent civil rights division in the Justice Department, and the right to empower the 
Attorney General to sue the states and local officials who endorsed voting restrictions or 
                                                 
38 Herbert Brownell, “Eisenhower’s Civil Rights Program: A Personal Assessment,” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2, Measures of the Presidents: Hoover to Bush (Spring, 1991): 235. 
39 Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 129-131. 
  
 204 
refused to carry out desegregation directives.40 Predictably, though the proposals were 
relatively moderate in scope, Southern leadership in the Senate reacted with disdain and 
threatened to defeat the passage of the bill with the filibuster. The showdown over the 
legislation officially began in July, comprised of floor fights riddled with threats of 
filibusters and a statement by Georgia Democratic Senator Richard Russell in which he 
asserted the South “was being made a whipping boy” and “treated like a badgered 
animal.” North Carolina Senator Sam Ervin concurred, describing the bill as “utterly 
repugnant to the American constitutional and legal system.”41 
Debate raged on through August, culminating in a 24-hour filibuster by South 
Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond and resulting in a successful, if not excessively 
labored, effort by Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Baines Johnson to rally support for 
passage of a weaker version of the bill. The final iteration, which became known as the 
Civil Rights Act of 1957, passed by a 52-38 margin. It included the creation of the Civil 
Rights Commission and the establishment of the Justice Department division, but 
removed Part III, which effectively weakened the power of the federal courts to issue 
federal injunctions to enforce integration. Injunctions could be brought against anyone 
interfering with the rights of others to vote, but instead of being tried by a federal judge, 
those charged would be tried before a jury. In essence, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was a 
limited victory that did little to nothing to dismantle the system of white supremacy 
throughout the South, given that white juries would never convict individuals charged 
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with violating the voting rights of black men and women. Roy Wilkins tried to remain 
positive, declaring the law to be a step in the right direction.42 But it was a small step, at 
best, and in the aftermath of the Montgomery success, was not the vehicle pushing the 
nation toward racial equality many had hoped it would become. 
Instead, some in the movement began to favor the addition of direct action protest 
strategies to the NAACP’s platform emphasizing change through the national legal and 
legislative processes. As a result, eight days after the passage of the Civil Rights Act, 
nine black teenagers from the local NAACP youth council attempted to integrate Central 
High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. The integration attempt was the brainchild of 
Daisy Bates, president of the Little Rock chapter of the NAACP and her husband L.C., a 
prominent activist in the black community. After the United States Supreme Court 
handed down its implementation ruling in Brown II, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus 
argued that school integration needed to happen at a slow and deliberate pace. According 
to the official plan laid out by the city school board, integration efforts were to be delayed 
for two years, followed by the implementation of a three-phase effort to integrate the 
schools beginning at the senior high level, followed by the junior highs, and finally, the 
elementary schools. Aware that the plan was purposefully limited and meant to drag out 
the integration process slowly, the state chairman of the NAACP Legal Defense 
Committee filed suit in federal court for the immediate integration of all grade levels. On 
appeal after a lower court ruled in favor of the Little Rock School Board, a court of 
appeals ordered the schools integrate for the new school year, beginning in September of 
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1957. After the decision was finalized, Bates selected nine black students with 
impeccable public and educational records who agreed to voluntarily desegregate Central 
High School.43 
Local citizens’ councils and other anti-integrationist whites threatened to prevent 
the students from entering the school building, and on the day they arrived to enroll, 
Governor Faubus, generally considered a “moderate” on issues of race relations, ordered 
the Arkansas National Guard to refuse them entrance. His reasoning for doing so was, in 
his words, “to preserve the peace,” though some critics of his administration asserted his 
move was part of a larger effort to maintain the support of white segregationist voters.44 
Whatever the underlying reasoning behind his decision to call in the National Guard, 
there was no question the situation that unfolded in front of the high school was on its 
way to becoming a national crisis as members of the local and national press picked up 
the story. Photographs and video footage of the nine black students being turned away at 
the school doors by National Guardsman and harassed by mobs of white citizens 
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screaming racial epithets were carried in newspapers and on evening news programs 
nationwide, appearing as the headline or on the front pages of 67 percent of newspapers 
across the North and 68 percent in the South almost overnight.45 It then spread beyond 
American borders, as newspapers worldwide began printing daily stories of the 
continuing standoff. So extensive was the international coverage that according to Mary 
L. Dudziak, the amount of press pieces covering Little Rock amazed U.S. news writers, 
who not only covered the event itself in their newspapers, but also kept readers abreast of 
how much the event was being reported overseas.46 
 As the world looked on, the Eisenhower administration found itself in the middle 
of a political and public relations nightmare. In the wake of his comments on federal 
intervention, Eisenhower was reluctant to intercede in Little Rock.47 However, as racial 
tensions spilled into the streets in such a public fashion, the President found himself in a 
position in which he could not ignore the picture being painted of the situation 
internationally. In the pages of Sweden’s Svenska Dagbladet, editorials argued that if 
Eisenhower did not did not assert federal authority in the crisis, it could prove irreparably 
damaging to the international prestige of the United States. Soviet papers also lambasted 
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an impotent federal response to the situation. Several major publications, including 
Komosomolskaya, Pravda, and Izvestia ran stories about the crisis that focused on the 
hypocrisy of American democracy, particularly as the individuals involved in the 
desegregation efforts were children. As the criticism expanded, Eisenhower lamented that 
“overseas the mouthpieces of Soviet propaganda in Russia and Europe were blaring out 
that ‘anti-Negro violence’ in Little Rock was being ‘committed with the clear connivance 
of the United States government.’”48  
As the standoff continued, the State Department informed Eisenhower the 
situation was not only deteriorating at home, but becoming increasingly problematic 
abroad. Eisenhower made the decision, albeit reluctantly, to move. On September 24th, 
two weeks after the crisis began, the President issued an executive order federalizing the 
Arkansas National Guard and sent in the 101st Airborne Division to ensure the black 
students, dubbed “the Little Rock Nine,” be allowed to enroll in the high school.49 
Speaking to the nation about his decision via a radio-television address the following 
evening, Eisenhower defended his decision by maintaining the United States to be “a 
nation in which laws, not men, are supreme.” Taking a page from the segregationist’s 
playbook and flipping it on its head, he labeled the instigators in Little Rock “misguided 
persons,” many of whom he claimed were imported into the city by “agitators.” These 
individuals were, therefore, not representative of the majority of Americans. His 
emphasis on the adherence to law and order as it concerned desegregation directives was 
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paramount to restoring the image of America on the international stage as a bastion of 
democracy. “Our enemies are gloating over this incident,” he declared, “and using it 
everywhere to misrepresent our whole nation.” The true spirit of the nation corresponded 
with a faith in the fundamental human rights “which the peoples of the world united to 
proclaim in the Charter of the United Nations.”50  
For the NAACP, Eisenhower’s decision was not only a victory for its 
desegregation campaign, but represented a clarion call for the restoration of Part III to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1957. In letters addressed to all US Senators from non-Southern 
states, Roy Wilkins declared Little Rock proof that the federal legislation empowering 
the U.S. Attorney General to act in cases where desegregation efforts were being violated 
was crucial to the success of the integration movement.51 Clarence Mitchell, head of the 
Washington Bureau, echoed Wilkins’ assertion at a luncheon sponsored by the national 
chapter of the American Jewish Congress, adding that “Senators and Governors who 
opposed the President are worse than the mobs which milled outside the school in Little 
Rock. Congress at its next session should extend civil rights law to include all civil 
rights.”52 
Blacks in Mississippi rejoiced in the outcome. Lillie Jones, a civil rights activist 
in the state, hoped it would give the black population hope that similar desegregation 
successes could occur at home. With each new civil rights victory, no matter how small, 
the South inched closer to desegregation and, perhaps even more importantly, invited 
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more international attention to its racial problems. Evers overwhelmingly shared in and 
reinforced that hope with his publicization efforts. Unfortunately, the National Office 
appeared to be moving in the opposite direction of where he hoped the Association’s 
work would go in the aftermath of Little Rock. While he firmly believed in the efficacy 
of the desegregation and voter registration campaigns, Evers was not averse to looking at 
the use of other strategies – including the incorporation of direct action protests to draw 
media attention to the high levels of white backlash – for use in the state NAACP’s 
program. However, while Wilkins and other Association leaders praised the Little Rock 
victory, they maintained dedicated to moving their campaigns through the courts and 
Congress.53  
Though reports differ as to why, Little Rock was the source of ever-expanding 
tensions between Evers and the National Office. According to John R. Salter and 
Reverend Ed King, both close friends of Evers and fellow leaders in the Mississippi 
movement, Evers suspected the national NAACP and the Eisenhower administration had 
plotted to pursue a “purely legalistic course of action in Mississippi” as a means of 
cooling tensions in the wake of Little Rock.54 How Evers came to this conclusion is 
unknown, but but when asked about it by historian Adam Nossiter in 1993, Gloster 
Current denied any such gentleman’s agreement ever existed, remarking “the 
employment of Medgar Evers,” he asserted, “attests to the intention of NAACP [sic] in 
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Mississippi to press for desegregation.”55 Evers’ suspicions may have intensified when 
Roy Wilkins’ demanded he resign his position with the SCLC. In a letter dated April 2, 
1957, Wilkins wrote “Staff members of the NAACP do not ordinarily accept posts to 
function with other groups, especially those operating in the same field as the 
Association. That does not mean you will not cooperate with the ministers on such 
projects as the NAACP may decide, it means only that you cannot assume duties. The 
NAACP does wish to cooperate with the ministers group and we wish to be certain that 
nothing arises to suggest that we are at odds with them.” Though disappointed in 
Wilkins’ directive, Evers dutifully resigned his position in August of 1957.56 
That Evers perceived of the existence of a back-door gentleman’s agreement 
between Wilkins and Eisenhower, despite the fact that both men greatly disliked one 
another, indicated the struggle was taking a mental and well as physical toll on Evers. 
While he respected the organizational integrity of the NAACP, the SCLC were riding a 
wave of momentum that could not be denied. As 1958 dawned, Evers was stuck between 
a rock and a hard place. Luring Mississippi’s most virulent racists into the open to 
publicize racial horrors required surviving the fight in treacherous terrain, not 
succumbing to annihilation. As the situation worsened, Evers came to believe that 
without direct federal intervention, the destruction of the white supremacist system would 
be next to impossible, and the most effective means to compel the federal government to 
intervene was to illuminate its facilitation of Southern apartheid for the world to see. The 
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United States government had to answer for its hypocrisy just as British officials had to 
answer for their acceptance of the colonial government’s abhorrent actions in Kenya, and 
any approach that prohibited direct action in Mississippi slowed down the march toward 
racial justice. As crackdowns continued, it was difficult not to become discouraged. 
Myrlie Evers noted that a glance through his files revealed “an hour, a day, a week of 
Medgar’s life in a surrealist version of hell.”57 
Yet he pushed on in Mau Mau fashion, translating his frustration and anger into 
solutions that adhered to the spirit of the Association’s official policies but could be 
strategically altered on the ground. Though he had no intention of deliberately causing 
problems for the Association, Evers was also unwilling to turn away from opportunities 
to involve Mississippi’s black youth in integration and voting rights efforts. In particular, 
he grew increasingly impressed with the protest efforts of students at Alcorn College, 
who initiated a boycott against the school in March of 1957. Their protest was in relation 
to a series of editorials about the NAACP published in the Jackson State Times by 
Clennon King, a professor of history at the college. In his commentary, King employed a 
common tactic used by white supremacists and their collaborators: publishing crime 
statistics lacking proper context and blaming the NAACP for sowing racial discord. In his 
editorial “NAACP Said Closing Doors of Opportunity to Negroes,” King argued the 
NAACP did “nothing in the South to ease racial tension,” was “utterly quiet about the 
disquieting rate of Negro crime (except excuses),” and was “was much a tool for 
conniving whites as for anyone else.” In another he connected to the NAACP to a 
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socialist front, and argued that “real” Uncle Toms were college-bred blacks from the 
North, eager to ape the actions of white society.58 
Furious, over 500 Alcorn students refused to attend classes until the all-black 
Mississippi State College Board dismissed King from his position for insubordination.59 
It was a counterpunch borne of a growing sense of militancy gradually inching its way 
across the campuses of black colleges across the South. The efforts of the Little Rock 
Nine had proven determined students could institute change, and Alcorn’s were prepared 
to take the first step in holding faculty accountable for damaging, misleading statements. 
Evers watched this militant philosophy evolve up close and viewed it as a benefit to the 
Mississippi movement, but the NAACP National Office took a middle ground approach 
on the issue. While it applauded the students for standing their ground against 
segregationist rhetoric, it also defended King’s right to speak his mind. Henry Moon, 
NAACP Public Relations Director, sent a wire to the Alcorn Student Council that 
asserted “we deplore any pressure which denies him free speech on integration. We 
believe King is mistaken, but under our system of government, any person has a 
constitutional right to express his opinion on any issue.”60  
Despite the National Offices’ castigation, the students held strong and refused to 
end their protest. As a result, the all-white State College Board, hoping to nip the 
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escalating crisis in the bud before it garnered too much public attention, fired Alcorn 
President J.R. Otis. No official reason was given for his dismissal. Otis was replaced by 
J.D. Boyd, who reopened the college, expelled the student protesters, and stipulated they 
could not enroll at another Mississippi state institution.61 Supportive of the student’s 
efforts but publicly accepting of the Association’s policies in regards to Clennon King’s 
right to free speech, Evers correspondence with the National Office focused on how to 
best remedy the situation. Because the expelled students could not attend other colleges 
in the state of Mississippi, the NAACP made arrangements to transfer the students to 
other institutions outside the state as well as provide financial assistance for travel.62 
In a letter to Roy Wilkins, Evers praised the National Office for “making it 
possible for seven young Americans to continue their education without too much 
interruption. As a staff member I knew how great our organization was, but the recent 
incidents involving the transfer of these students, at the expense of the NAACP, helped 
me to realize even more fully the great magnitude of our organization.” His concern for 
the safety and well-being of the students, however, prompted Evers not to release any 
public announcements relative to the situation until the school board had successfully 
transferred the students’ credits to their new institutions of learning. In the same letter he 
alerted Wilkins to a recent meeting between himself and Septima Clark of the Highlander 
Folk School, during which he had discussed the NAACP’s actions relative to the Alcorn 
students. Located in the hills of Monteagle, Tennessee, Highlander was founded by Miles 
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Horton, a student of renowned pacifist theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. Its educational 
approach centered on teaching communities how to build societies that embodied the 
ideals of democracy, justice, and brotherhood. Evers was particularly inspired by 
Highlander’s creation of citizenship education schools to assist and train black 
Southerners in the voter registration process. However, Highlander’s association with 
civil rights work and labor unions brought it under the attack of segregationists, who 
labeled it communist in the hopes of discrediting the school’s efforts and minimizing its 
impact.63 
Evers was acutely aware of the National Office’s desire to remain apart from any 
organizations deemed communist or communist-inspired. In his reply on the matter, 
Wilkins urged Evers to maintain a distance from Highlander. “We have friendly relations 
with Highlander Folk School,” he explained, “but not too close. They are going in our 
direction, but not hand in hand.”64 Evers treaded lightly, maintaining a distance from 
Highlander but working to incorporate their strategies into programs in Mississippi. 
When he unveiled the NAACP’s program for voter registration for the coming year in 
September of 1957, it included the incorporation of committees on registration and voting 
in seven Mississippi cities made up of ministers and community volunteers. Each was to 
run a citizenship school to educate black citizens on the process of voting and create 
additional committees in Mississippi as the registration campaigns grew. According to 
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Michael Vinson Williams, this move indicated Evers was working to create “a sound 
political foundation in Mississippi that involved more direct-action strategies” other civil 
rights groups would build on in the coming years. It also highlighted Evers’ Mau Mau-
inspired intent to propagate mass participation at the local level. Each successful 
registration attempt functioned as its own kind of metaphorical blood oath, strengthening 
the bonds of community and solidarity in the face of massive resistance to racial justice.65  
Evers also looked for ways to position himself front and center in his efforts to 
publicize the struggle for civil rights in Mississippi, highlighting his love for his home 
state, desire to see it free of racial animus, and his reasoning for fighting for equality with 
the NAACP in a February, 1958 Ebony Magazine interview titled “Why I Live in 
Mississippi.” It served to boost his image as the state movement’s central face, a move 
that encouraged a growth of support for the cause but also instigated more direct attacks 
against him by the state’s white power structure. In the interview, Evers spoke of his 
experiences growing up in a racially oppressive environment and the horrors that 
entailed, but also proclaimed his love for the land and his determination to force the state 
power structure to live up to the democratic ideals it purported to protect. “This is home” 
Evers explained. “Mississippi is part of the United States whether the whites like it or 
not, I don’t plan to live here as a parasite. The things that I don’t like I will try to 
change.” Moreover, he maintained black Mississippians not only deserved the equal 
rights they were guaranteed under the United States Constitution, but also undercut the 
argument that segregation was the foundation of a tranquil, democratic society. Without 
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equality, Evers argued, Mississippi’s blacks could not live productive lives or make 
positive contributions to the South as a whole.66  
In the interview Evers also discussed his fascination with Jomo Kenyatta, the Mau 
Mau, and how he had once dreamed of arming his “own army of blackshirts” and 
“extracting an ‘eye for an eye’ from whites who mistreated” Mississippi’s black 
population. Though he explained he later renounced thoughts of violence, he maintained 
that he had greatly admired Kenyatta’s character, intelligence, and refusal to compromise. 
His mention of the Mau Mau and support for Kenyatta’s cause was a significant 
maneuver on Evers’ part, as he was well aware of the ways in which Southern whites 
utilized distorted information about the violence and brutality of the Kenya movement to 
rationalize the need to maintain white supremacy. However, in also highlighting that it 
was through the NAACP that he discovered the proper vehicle through which to utilize 
his own talents and determination to fight for freedom and equality, Evers’ comments did 
not outright condemn the Mau Mau. Instead, they served to clarify how the history of 
Kikuyu oppression was similar to Mississippi’s. “You know” he argued, “any man with 
an ounce of pride who works in the delta soon wants to do something. You discover that 
the education the Negro gets is designed to keep him subservient. The poor black man is 
exploited by whites and by educated Negroes too.”67 By maintaining the engine of 
change lay in proactive, nonviolent campaigns to knock down the walls of segregation, 
Evers was actively reforming the lessons he learned from the Mau Mau and utilizing 
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them to dismantle the barriers of institutionalized white supremacy in a non-violent 
fashion. 
Reaction to the interview was predictably mixed. NAACP officials were happy 
with the tenor and message of the article, but some members of Mississippi’s middle 
class black community resented Evers’ incessant push for integration. When Medgar and 
Myrlie purchased a home in a new all-black subdivision in Jackson, others in the 
neighborhood objected to the arrival of their new neighbors. The majority of homeowners 
in the subdivision were black teachers, many of whom believed the NAACP’s 
desegregation campaigns threatened their lives and livelihoods. What is more, in the 
Ebony article, Evers had directly criticized black teachers for accepting the fruits of 
NAACP campaigns to raise their salaries, yet remaining on the sidelines or refusing to 
participate in other NAACP programs. According to Myrlie Evers, “we had no sooner put 
our money down and begun to count the days until our house would be completed that we 
began hearing rumors of a petition to keep us out.” She maintained there was “nothing 
personal about it,” but on account of her husband’s work, “there was talk the wrong 
house might be burned down by mistake,” and that “to have us in their midst would be 
dangerous for the whole community.” Whether or not the reasoning behind the petition 
was “personal,” however, Evers had been plagued with problems related to the support of 
the black middle class in Mississippi for some time. The situation did not appear to be 
improving.68  
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Unsurprisingly, white Mississippians focused on Evers’ mention of Kenyatta and 
the Mau Mau in his statements, equating the NAACP’s work in the state with a desire to 
destroy civilized society through terrorist tactics. As the white power structure pushed to 
put the school equalization program in place to work around the Brown ruling, Evers 
coordinated a public protest the construction of an all-black, $500,000 public school in 
Madison County. In response to the protest, a Madison County grand jury exchanged 
barbs with Evers. In a public statement, the grand jury equated Evers to a hound baying at 
the moon who “in public print likened himself and his organization to the Mau Mau 
terrorists of the Kenya Colony” and cautioned the people of Madison County to “think 
twice” before supporting an organization “that is nothing more than a leech on the body 
politic.” Evers’ countered that the grand jury, “which approved of second class 
citizenship for Madison Negroes” failed to point out that Madison County’s schools were 
overcrowded and that if not for the NAACP, black schools and teacher salaries would 
never have improved in the first place. Furthermore, he maintained “any attack on the 
NAACP is an attack on the entire Negro community whose only hope for first class 
citizenship in this state lies in the continued work of this great organization.”69 
 Yet for all of his hard work and positive rhetoric, in the words of Myrlie Evers, the 
majority of action leading to meaningful change was “happening somewhere else. 
Mississippi stood still.” Evers, who spent much of his time on the road either 
investigating incidents of racial violence or economic strangulation or speaking at 
NAACP functions elsewhere in the country, also experienced an additional set-back 
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when he was physically attacked by a white man on a bus from Meridian to Jackson in 
March of 1958. He was returning from a regional NAACP meeting in North Carolina. On 
the bus, he refused to move to the rear when the driver demanded he do so, and for his 
insolence Evers was taken to police headquarters and questioned. After he was released, 
he reentered the bus and took the same seat. Three blocks from the Jackson bus terminal, 
a white cab driver motioned for the bus to stop, boarded, and punched Evers in the face. 
The bus driver than ordered the cab driver immediately exit the bus, and Evers remained 
seated in the front of the bus all the way back to the terminal.70  
 The attack on Evers was both indicative of continued crackdowns on the black 
population of Mississippi as well as a harbinger of more dark events to come. One such 
incident occurred in June of 1957, when Evers learned of the rape of a seventeen-year-old 
black high school student by Bernard Gautier, the city attorney of Pascagoula. The young 
girl, who was working for Gautier’s family as a babysitter, was leaving his home when he 
forcibly took her to a wooded area and attacked her. Evers immediately contacted the 
presidents of the Moss-Point Pascagoula and Gulfport branches of the NAACP and asked 
them to conduct an investigation. They assured him they would so, but never followed 
through. Evers then drove to Pascagoula himself – over two-hundred miles from Jackson 
– to investigate the incident. There, he discovered it had occurred a month prior and had 
been covered up by law enforcement officers, city officials, and, perhaps most 
distressingly, the girl’s own family who were fearful of repercussions. Because it was 
almost impossible for the victim’s father, William L. Norvel, to procure an attorney, 
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Evers set him up with Mississippi’s leading black attorney R. Jess Brown. In a letter 
detailing the case to Roy Wilkins, Evers noted “we have assured Mr. W.L. Norvel that 
we in the NAACP will be happy to cooperate with him in whatever legitimate way 
possible to see that justice is meted out in this case.71 
 No justice occurred. While publicity of the case resulted in the arrest and indictment 
of Gautier for the crime of statutory rape, he was given a five-year suspended sentence. 
The Jackson Country Circuit Court jury deliberated for less than two hours before they 
returned their verdict.72 In response, Evers fired off a scathing press release that read: 
“one of the most glaring spectacles of justice, in Mississippi courts, is to be found in the 
recent suspended sentence given Bernard Gautier, white attorney of Pascagoula, 
Mississippi, for the convicted rape of his seventeen-year-old Negro baby sitter. It is not 
an assumption but a matter of fact” it continued, “that the degree of law that is applied 
when a Negro man is accused and convicted of raping a white woman does not apply 
when a white man is accused and convicted of the same crime against a Negro woman. It 
is no wonder that Mississippi has the reputation that it has with its one-sided law 
enforcement and biased court decisions.”73 
 That reputation was again on display in April of 1959 in the most horrific case of 
racial violence to occur in Mississippi since the murders of George Lee and Emmett Till. 
It also provided another test for the federal government regarding the protection of civil 
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liberties in the South. The case concerned the lynching of Mack Charles Parker, a 23-
year-old black man from Poplarville. On February 23, 1959, Parker and three of his 
friends were on their way home when they came across a car on the side of the road 
between Poplarville and the neighboring town of Lumberton. Inside the car were June 
Walters and her four-year-old daughter, Debbie. June’s husband, Jimmy Carol, had 
undertaken a long walk to Lumberton to request assistance with his car, which had 
broken down. As the four men passed the stalled car, they stopped to glance inside and 
then proceeded on toward Poplarville. According to one of the men inside the car, Parker 
made crude statements about having sex with the woman in the car, but the group of men 
assumed he was only speaking in jest. Later that night, June Walters claimed Parker 
returned to her car and abducted and raped her. Afterward, she and her daughter walked 
back down the highway where they were spotted by a trucker and picked up. “I’ve been 
raped by a nigger,” June told him.74 
 The following day, Parker was arrested by Pearl River County Sheriff W. Osborne 
Moody. Though Walters was unable to positively identify him in a line-up, Parker was 
thrown into jail regardless. However, he was quickly moved to the Hinds County jail in 
Jackson for fear he would be lynched if he continued to be held in Pearl River County. 
Parker remained in the Jackson jail until April when he was indicted by a grand jury for 
kidnapping and rape. Parker’s attorney was R. Jess Brown, whose history of civil rights 
work in the state annoyed officials. He further incensed them when he immediately filed 
three motions. They highlighted the grand jury that had indicted Parker contained no 
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blacks, none would be allowed to serve on a jury because they were barred from voting in 
Pearl River County, and that local whites were so hell-bent on convicting Parker a fair 
trial could not be held unless it was moved to another venue. In his examination of this 
case, historian Philip Dray explained that the motions regarding the lack of black jurors 
and voting rights were explosive, especially given that a month earlier, a federal appeals 
court had overturned the murder conviction of black man in Carroll County because no 
blacks were allowed on his jury. “Contrary to popular impression,” Dray explained, the 
convicted murderer “had not been released from prison because of the court’s action, but 
the precedent fed the perennial anxiety that black rapists and murders would evade 
punishment through courtroom manipulations and sentimental federal rulings.” What is 
more, the thought that a black attorney would be allowed to publicly question a white 
woman on the stand was unconscionable to many Mississippi whites.75  
 To avoid the miscarriage of Southern justice many believed was coming if Parker’s 
case was allowed to go to trial, a mob made up of locals including farmers, merchants, 
and even a Baptist preacher stormed the Hinds County jail the night of April 25, 1959 
and demanded Parker be turned over to them. Parker put up a vicious fight but was 
eventually overwhelmed by the mob, driven to a bridge overlooking the Pearl River, shot 
twice, run over by another vehicle, and tossed body into the river below. His body was 
found nine days later. After quick deliberation, a coroner’s jury declared the death of 
Parker “occurred at the hand of a person or persons unknown,” while local newspapers 
argued the perpetrators were likely from another county.76 Evers, who had met with the 
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Parker family after his initial indictment and helped them secure the aid of R. Jess 
Brown, learned of the lynching on television. Myrlie Evers claimed Medgar “smashed the 
bedroom dresser with his fist” and cried out “why? How can people do such things?” His 
body wracked with sobs, he screamed “I’d like to go get a gun and just start shooting!” 
Then, after a few minutes, he calmed himself down, took a shower, and headed into the 
office. “Somebody’s going to pay for this,” he told her as he headed out the door. “And 
I’m not leaving. I’m going to stay here and fight until someone does the same thing to 
me.”77 
 Evers and the NAACP investigated the incident and demanded the FBI undertake an 
investigation of its own. They were not the only ones who asked for a federal 
investigation. Distressed with the continued existence of extralegal mob violence and 
aware of the negative publicity the incident would bring on the state of Mississippi and 
his administration, Governor Coleman also requested FBI assistance. He was also aware 
that the NAACP planned to use the Parker lynching as a key element in its crusade for 
the passage of a federal civil rights bill. Two days after Parker’s death, the NAACP fired 
off its next salvo in the campaign with a memo directed at the President and members of 
the House Judiciary Committee that read “the brutal beating, kidnapping, and probable 
lynching of Mack Charles Parker in Poplarville, Miss., on April 25 offers tragic 
demonstration of the need for strong federal civil rights legislation to protect the lives and 
rights of American citizens in areas where state and local authorities are either unable or 
unwilling to do so.” Furthermore, it attacked the systems of white supremacy throughout 
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the south, tying their leadership structure to the crime itself. “This crime,” it read, “is the 
natural consequence of an organized campaign of law defiance led by governors of states, 
members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives and state and local 
politicians.”78 
 FBI investigators arrived in Mississippi shortly after Coleman placed his official 
request and immediately began the process of accumulating all evidence and questioning 
locals. The investigation force was so large, at one point up to 60 agents were working in 
and around Poplarville. According to Philip Dray, “so intense was the FBI invasion of 
Poplarville and so ceaseless the questioning that one of the mob suspects died and two 
others were hospitalized.” By the time the investigation concluded, the report of the 
incident reached 378 pages and was, according to United States Attorney General 
William Rogers, “one of the most complete investigations I’ve ever seen.” In all, the 
members of the FBI’s Mississippi Bureau managed to piece together a comprehensive 
breakdown of the lynching, identified the participants of the mob, and had even extracted 
confessions from a few of them. The Justice Department, wary of indicting and 
prosecuting members of the mob on conspiracy charges, decided the better option was to 
support a prosecution of the mob by the state of Mississippi, backed by the information 
found in the report and making FBI agents available as witnesses.79 
 Yet despite the relative open and shut nature of the case, when the report was 
presented to the local district attorney, he ignored it completely and refused to call any 
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FBI witnesses. Due to his intransigence, the grand jury was not presented with any of the 
information and no indictments were handed down. Pearl County residents, incredulous 
at what they deemed an “invasion” by spies of the federal government, supported the 
district attorney’s actions. The Justice Department, annoyed by the clear efforts made by 
local officials to obstruct the carriage of justice, brought federal charges under Sections 
51 and 52 of Title 18, the “Conspiracy Section” of the United States Criminal Code. The 
federal judge who presided over the grand jury, however, was a Southerner named 
Sidney Mize. In his opening remarks to the grand jury, he remarked “there’s no place in 
the nation where the relation between the races is as good and highly respected as 
Mississippi.” Then, through a series of specific manipulations, Mize convinced the jurors 
they would have to indict all or none of the alleged mob conspirators, which greatly 
decreased the likelihood of indictments. His plan worked. Despite the comprehensive 
investigation of the lynching, a docket full of witnesses, and even a handful of 
confessions, no indictments for the murder of Mack Charles Parker were handed down.80 
 People across the nation recoiled in shock and anger. If they had not previously 
considered the need for federal civil rights legislation prior to the Parker case, that 
quickly changed. Gus Courts, who had fled to Chicago after Mississippi citizens’ 
councils ran him out of the state, told the Chicago Defender “strong civil rights laws are 
the only thing that will stop lynching in Mississippi and gain the vote for Negroes. All 
these Federal investigations will do nothing but hurt Negroes until the proper laws are 
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passed.”81 A New York Times editorial depressingly asked of the refusal to indict Parker’s 
lynchers: “What to do about it?” It concluded nothing much could be done outside of 
federal intervention. “The Parker case emphasizes the need for Federal anti-lynching 
legislation. It also suggests that the Civil Rights Commission undertake its contemplated 
inquiry into the administration of justice in respect to civil rights, something that the 
Parker case shows to be in serious jeopardy in Mississippi.”82 
When news of the failed indictments reached him in New York, Roy Wilkins 
exploded. He immediately dashed off a telegram to the Attorney General which 
demanded the FBI report of the Parker investigation be released to the public “so that the 
world may know who the suspects are and be able to appraise the quality of justice 
administered in the state of Mississippi. These ‘flagrant and calculated’ miscarriages of 
justice demonstrate anew the urgent need for strong civil rights legislation.”83 Evers also 
released an official statement that called for “federal legislation with teeth” that would 
guarantee equal rights to all races. It had been Evers who had met with Parker’s mother 
before her son’s lynching and assured her the NAACP would do whatever it could to 
ensure Mack Charles was given a fair trial. He had failed in that endeavor, but was 
determined to everything in his power to ensure Parker’s death had not been in vain.84 In 
response to Wilkins’ hastily worded, angry telegram, the ACLU issued a response of its 
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own, reminding him that a public unveiling of the report was a violation of the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Wilkins quickly apologized, 
remarking that “we were so outraged that we yelled for something that we felt certain 
would ease some of our pain.”85 
That pain continued largely unabated in Mississippi as the 1950s came to an end. 
A look back at the decade revealed some progress in the aftermath of Brown, but the 
growing level of white resistance had successfully slowed the NAACP’s efforts to a 
crawl in most respects. Ross Barnett, an ardent race-baiter who had previously run two 
unsuccessful campaigns for governor, harnessed the anger of white segregationists over 
the FBI’s “invasion” and maintained he would not kowtow to weak moderates on the 
issue of race relations. In his study of the Parker lynching and subsequent investigation, 
Howard Smead noted that “in Mississippi at this time, being called a racial moderate was 
tantamount to being called a communist, and the term ‘moderate’ itself was extremely 
misleading.” Barnett’s election posters read “Remember Hungary. Remember Little 
Rock. Remember the Occupation of Poplarville by J.P. Coleman and the FBI.” A vote for 
Ross Barnett was a vote for the protection of the Southern way of life. His campaign 
strategy worked. In the 1960 gubernatorial election, Barnett was elected the 52nd 
Governor of Mississippi.86 
Barnett’s election was a watershed moment for Evers and the NAACP in 
Mississippi. Though Coleman had been no friend of the movement for racial equality, he 
had at least attempted to curb the power of the councils and spoke out against white-on-
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black racial violence. Under Barnett’s tenure, all bets were off.  According to John Salter, 
Barnett’s ascendency “completed – if, indeed, such had not already existed – the 
Citizens’ Council coup in Mississippi.” At the same time, Barnett also worked to expand 
the powers of the Sovereignty Commission. Under Coleman, the Commission had mostly 
existed as a pro-segregation public relations agency. Under Barnett, its role was expanded 
to that of a secret detective agency. It also transformed into an organization through 
which the citizens’ councils were funded with tax dollars, essentially turning them into 
smaller pieces of a quasi-state agency. “Mississippi was a total situation,” Salter 
explained. “Total segregation, total repression, a total monolith.”87 
Though the Parker lynching had been horrific, perhaps no event in the early 1960s 
served as a better example of Salter’s assessment than the case of Clyde Kennard. Not 
only did it stand as undeniable evidence the Sovereignty Commission had a developed a 
stranglehold on the state, but it rocked Evers and members of the Mississippi movement 
to their cores. John Dittmer argued the Kennard case was, “in many respects, the most 
tragic of the decade.”88  Born in 1927, Kennard hailed from the town of Hattiesburg in 
Forrest County, Mississippi. As a child, he spent time living with family in Chicago 
before he enlisted in the United States Army during World War II, where he served as a 
paratrooper. At war’s end, Kennard returned to Chicago, where he attended the 
University of Chicago, but eventually quit his studies there and moved back to 
Hattiesburg to work on his family’s chicken farm. In Hattiesburg, Kennard became 
involved with the local NAACP and subsequently met Evers. The two became good 
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friends. When he attempted to register to vote in 1957, he was turned away by the 
registrar, but the rejection did not hinder his determination to press for civil rights. In the 
hopes of finishing his education, he sought to enroll at Mississippi Southern College, 
located not far from his home.89  
In December of 1958, Kennard wrote a letter to the editor of the Hattiesburg 
American about the subject of integration in Mississippi. “In our state,” he explained, 
“the officials spend much of their time and perhaps much of our money trying to 
convince the integrationists, and reassure the segregationists, that the policy of perpetual 
segregation is the wisest course for us to pursue, in spite of the tremendous cost of 
duplication.” The price of segregation, he argued, was its largest folly. “After our 
paralleled graduate schools, where do our parallels of separate but equal go? Are we to 
assume that paralleled hospitals are to be built for the two groups of doctors? Are we to 
build two bridges across the same stream in order to give equal opportunities to both 
groups of engineers? Are we to have two courts of law…two legislatures…and of course, 
two governors?” There could be no question. Integration was paramount to the 
foundation of a prosperous, equal society. “This, I believe, is our creed,” Kennard 
explained. “And though it is not perfect, still I had rather meet my God with this creed 
than with any other yet devised by human society.”90 
Kennard’s letter, combined with his application to Mississippi Southern College, 
placed him directly in the sights of the Sovereignty Commission. In response, Governor 
Coleman called Kennard before him in 1958 and offered to pay his expenses to attend 
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any college or university in America. Kennard refused, asserting he wanted to remain in 
Mississippi and attend college close to his home. In September of 1959, Kennard’s 
application was rejected by Mississippi Southern. Seeking answers, Kennard met with 
Mississippi Southern President William D. McCain to further discuss his rejection. Also 
in the meeting was Zack J. Van Landingham, a leading investigator of the Sovereignty 
Commission in charge of collecting information on Kennard. In light of this meeting, it 
quickly became apparent that Kennard’s life was in danger. According to Van 
Landingham, the head of the Hattiesburg Citizens’ Council told him that if he wanted 
Kennard’s life snuffed out, he could make it happen. “Kennard’s car could be hit by a 
train or he could have some accident on the highway and nobody would ever know the 
difference,” he was told. Though Van Landingham was no supporter of Kennard or his 
ambitions, apparently the suggestion of arranging an accident was too much for him to 
consider.91 Instead, Kennard was framed for allegedly stealing five pounds of chicken 
feed from a cooperative warehouse in Forrest County. It was a comically tragic situation. 
According to John Dittmer, Kennard’s supposed accomplice “was so confused on the 
witness stand that he could not even get his story straight.” The district attorney 
eventually led him through his testimony, “supplying him with the information as to 
when and how Kennard allegedly set up the theft.” For his “crime,” Kennard was 
sentenced to a seven-year prison sentence in the Parchman Farm penitentiary.92  
The Sovereignty Commission’s handling of the Kennard case shed a great deal of 
light on the amount of power the agency possessed. Van Landingham, a former 
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investigator with the FBI, worked on the case for over a year and left no stone unturned. 
In a December, 1958 memorandum to Governor Coleman, Van Landingham noted he had 
contacted a former special agent of the FBI to dig into Kennard’s army records, 
specifically as pertained to his time stationed at Fort Bragg in North Carolina. “No 
criminal record, arrest record, or any other identification data with reference to Kennard” 
turned up. When Kennard submitted his application to Mississippi Southern in 1959, Van 
Landingham sent another memorandum to Coleman to tell him he had spoken with a few 
prominent black citizens in Hattiesburg who knew Kennard and would dissuade him to 
apply to the college. The use of black informants or collaborators was a common tactic 
employed by the Sovereignty Commission, which helped to build a network of useful 
spies willing to infiltrate the NAACP at every level.93 As was clear in the Kennard case, 
the results were usually devastating. 
Evers was disgusted by Kennard’s arrest and immediately spearheaded a 
campaign for his release. On November 22, 1960, he issued a news release in which he 
called Kennard’s conviction based on falsified evidence “the greatest mockery to judicial 
justice.” This was especially true, given that no indictments were handed down in the 
Mack Charles Parker case despite mountains of evidence. The press release also ran in 
the pages of the Hattiesburg American. The publication of Evers’ angry release provided 
an unforeseen opportunity for his enemies to ensnarl him in a trap, which they did by 
arguing Evers’ statements had been made with the intent to “impede, degrade, obstruct, 
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embarrass, interrupt, defeat, or corrupt the administration of justice in the Honorable 
Circuit Court of Forrest County, Mississippi, and said statement being an expression of 
contempt for this Honorable Court.” Evers quickly hired attorneys Jack H. Young and R. 
Jess Brown to represent him. They argued Evers’ statements were protected under the 
right of free speech set down in the First Amendment to the Constitution, but were unable 
to get the contempt charge dismissed. Evers headed to trial. He was convicted of 
contempt, fined $100, and sentenced to thirty days in jail. He appealed.94 
As Evers defended himself in court, Kennard labored under horrific conditions at 
Parchman. Given the miscarriage of justice that placed him there, his experience mirrored 
that of the Mau Mau detainees laboring in Kenyan prison camps. His conviction and 
imprisonment had been intended to send a message: the white power structure would not 
be defeated. Though the work was backbreaking and exhausting, when he could, Kennard 
offered to write letters for illiterate inmates as well as teach them how to read and write.95 
The NAACP Legal Defense Fund handled his appeal. In August of 1961, Thurgood 
Marshall petitioned the United States Supreme Court to review Kennard’s conviction, 
arguing that he had been tried “by a jury procedure which systematically discriminates 
against Negro jurors,” and that “unless petitioner has a right…to present evidence to 
support his charge of jury discrimination, the protection offered by the Fourteenth 
Amendment against conviction by a jury from which his race has been excluded will be 
hollow indeed.”96 In the meantime, Evers and the NAACP made every effort to keep the 
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Kennard case in the news in addition to holding fundraisers for his family. However, in 
October of 1961, the Supreme Court denied a hearing on the case, thus affirming the 
lower court’s decision. Evers was crushed. At a NAACP Freedom Fund banquet, he 
stood to give a statement about the Kennard case and broke down into tears. It was the 
only time John Salter remembered seeing Evers cry.97  
Evers won his appeal in June, successfully arguing that his statement in defense of 
Kennard was not contemptuous but rather protected under the right of free speech. 
However, he could not stop the physical deterioration of his friend Kennard, who at age 
of thirty-six was dying from intestinal cancer.98 As his condition worsened, Evers and the 
NAACP implored Barnett to release Kennard from prison. Angered over the negative 
publicity the case had brought upon Mississippi, Barnett eventually agreed and suspended 
Kennard’s sentence in January. He immediately flew to Chicago to undergo medical 
treatment at Billings Hospital on the campus of the University of Chicago.99 When he 
arrived for treatment, Kennard’s spirits were high, and he spoke of his desire to return 
home to Mississippi and run a motel on property he owned outside of Hattiesburg.100 
Like Evers, Kennard loved Mississippi despite all of its barriers and wanted to continue 
working to “help improve race relations in my state.”101 He never got the chance to 
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return. Kennard died on July 4, 1963, American Independence Day. The irony of the date 
was likely not lost on his friends, family, or myriad of supporters.102  
Medgar Evers stood on the edge of the new decade at a career and personal 
crossroads. Efforts to publicize the terrors of white supremacy and significance of the 
NAACP’s desegregation and voter registration campaigns shed light on the Mississippi 
movement, but the counterinsurgency of massive resistance managed to slow civil rights 
progress to a crawl. Direct action efforts were on the rise across the South, however, and 
young people in Mississippi were paying attention. Evers played an important role in 
encouraging those young people to involve themselves in the fight for civil rights, and 
had come to understand that to be successful, strategies needed to possess a certain 
degree of fluidity.103 While the Mau Mau radicals had failed in physically fighting their 
way to concessions on land and citizenship rights from the Kenyan government, their 
revolt had not been in vain. So long as calls for concerted action and unity continued 
among Kikuyu rebels, Britain could not hide the situation from the world nor avoid 
international pressure to bend toward Kenyan independence. Unceasing pressure, though 
high in its physical and emotional cost, worked. In the final years of his career, Evers’ 
battles with the National Office over these issues would increase in both size and 
frequency. According to Myrlie Evers, the pressures of his position as head of the 
                                                 
102 “Clyde Kennard Dies; Lost Mississippi Bid,” New York Times, July 5, 1963; “Kennard, Miss. Injustice 
Victim, Dies of Cancer,” Atlanta Daily World, July 7, 1963. 
103 John Dittmer argued “the years that Evers had spent on the road meeting small groups of blacks across 
the state…had reached young people who, inspired by his example and by the black awakening in other 
parts of the South, were ready to move.” Dittmer, Local People, 85. 
  
 236 
NAACP movement in Mississippi also took a significant toll on her marriage to Medgar. 
In time, those pressures would cost him his life.104 
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CHAPTER 5: 
 
“EVERYBODY KNOWS ABOUT MISSISSIPPI GODDAM” 
 
“Please help me” was the cry Medgar Evers heard in his sleep every night. It was, 
in the words of his wife Myrlie, “a cry that haunted him, that drove him to frenzies of 
activity, that took him into danger and brought him back weak with rage at his 
powerlessness.”1 For the first time since he had taken up the mantle of NAACP Field 
Secretary, Evers questioned whether the Association’s strategies to push back against 
Mississippi’s white power structure were the right course of action for himself, his 
family, and the state’s black population. Though he continued to believe in the National 
Office’s goal of shepherding its desegregation and voting rights efforts through the 
courts, Evers grew increasingly sympathetic to the idea of implementing direct-action 
tactics as a strategy for provoking federal intervention in Mississippi. The highly 
publicized efforts of the Montgomery boycotters and the Little Rock Nine proved that in 
a contentious international arena, direct-action was developing into a more effective 
means of forcing the federal government’s hand than relying on legal victories, and the 
inception of the Citizens’ Council and Sovereignty Commission portended greater 
difficulty in navigating the labyrinth of state-sanctioned political and economic barriers 
designed to protect white supremacy.2  
Violence remained an ever-present concern, and each new wave of terror 
threatened what few gains the NAACP had achieved. Of the efficacy of direct-action 
strategies in Mississippi, Michael Vinson Williams surmised Evers “must have 
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considered the possibility that with violence directed against African Americans 
intensifying throughout the state, nondirect tactics would take too long to achieve the 
desired result.”3 This reasoning was especially plausible given the outcome of the Mack 
Charles Parker murder case. Despite the existence of the 378-page FBI investigation, 
including a comprehensive breakdown of Parker’s lynching and confessions from 
members of the lynch mob, the grand jury failed to produce any indictments. The 
Sovereignty Commission not only ensured acts of white-on-black violence went unsolved 
or unprosecuted, but in doing so, actively facilitated its continuation. Reaching from the 
halls of the Jackson statehouse to the most remote, rural areas of Mississippi, violence 
was a multifaceted tool essential to the preservation of the racial status quo and the 
defense of white supremacy against lawless Negroes and civil rights agitators. Of this, 
Myrlie Evers explained that “white men were elected to office on the unspoken promise 
that such would remain the case: the bigger the brute, the larger the vote.”4  
This was certainly the case in Philadelphia, Mississippi in October of 1959, when 
police officer Lawrence A. Rainey killed Luther Jackson, a native of Neshoba County 
and black Korean War veteran. Allegedly seeking to arrest Jackson for public 
drunkenness, Rainey dragged him out of the vehicle, shot him dead, then called for back-
up, saying “come on down here. I think I have killed a nigger.” Two witnesses, including 
Jackson’s girlfriend and another black woman who had passed by the scene, accused of 
Rainey of killing Jackson “for no reason.” For this, they were jailed, harassed, and fined.5 
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Despite these eyewitness accounts that contradicted his story, Rainey utilized a 
justification for his actions regularly applied by law enforcement: self-defense. The 
officer held that Jackson had drunkenly lunged at him when exiting the vehicle. True to 
commonly reinforced stereotypes employed to validate the legal and extralegal killings of 
black men since the earliest era of American slavery, Rainey repurposed Jackson’s form 
into that of an uncontrollable black brute, possessing of a superhuman ability to withstand 
traditional means of restraint and in need of being put down by deadly means. By arguing 
he feared for his life at the hands of an uncontrollable, dangerous Negro, Rainey’s actions 
ticked off all the boxes required to accept the murder as a justifiable homicide. After a 
short investigation, the Neshoba County Corner endorsed this position, labeling the case 
closed.6 
Rainey’s reign of violence did not end there. In May of 1962 he was involved in 
the shooting death of a twenty-seven-year-old black epileptic with a history of 
institutionalization named Willie Otis Nash. Fearful that his “mind had gone bad again,” 
Nash’s father called law enforcement to transport his son to the mental hospital for 
treatment. Though hopeful Willie would receive the help he needed, Levie Nash feared 
for his son’s life when Sheriffs Rainey and Hop Barnett arrived to pick up his son. 
During a previous epileptic episode, Barnett had called Willie a son-of-a-bitch and 
threatened to murder him. Levie Nash was right to be fearful. Willie never made it to the 
mental hospital that day. Both sheriffs claimed Willie had been killed attempting to reach 
for a gun in the glove compartment despite being handcuffed in the backseat. When the 
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county coroner examined the body, Willie Nash’s death was also ruled a justifiable 
homicide.7 In the years that followed, Rainey’s reputation for brutality fueled his 
ascendancy up the Neshoba County law enforcement ladder. Rather than view his record 
as proof he was unqualified to act honorably and fairly in his position, 67% of Neshoba 
County voters elected Rainey Deputy Sheriff in 1961, justifying the application of state-
sanctioned violence in maintaining white supremacy. His campaign slogan was “the man 
who can cope with any situations that may arise.”8 
Just as the colonial government’s tightening of proverbial institutional screws 
worked to quell the Mau Mau threat in Kenya, the escalating violence and intensity of 
state-sponsored white backlash threatened to derail the Mississippi movement 
completely. But while deeply discouraged, Evers was not ready to give up. Instead, his 
consideration of direct-action tactics indicated his philosophy of social justice was 
undergoing a transformation. He had always possessed a militant nature, notably 
indicated by decision to always keep a firearm nearby and his fascination with the Mau 
Mau. Despite their struggles to maintain a cohesive resistance under British pressure, he 
took a page from the Mau Mau blueprint to force the insanity of Mississippi’s white 
power structure into the open. By 1960, this worldview widened to include the use of 
direct-action tactics in the hopes of forcing federal intervention. Though the Eisenhower 
administration had dragged its feet on responding to the Little Rock crisis, it had 
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ultimately felt compelled to act under a deluge of damaging international criticism, 
setting a precedent its subsequent efforts to avoid further race-related disruptions could 
not erase.9  
According to John Salter, Evers heard “on good authority” that Democratic 
President John F. Kennedy, elected in November 1960, might begrudgingly intervene in 
Mississippi if its racial tensions exacted a negative hit on the administration’s 
international image or party support across the South. Given Evers’ annoyance with the 
National Office for supposedly striking a deal to ignore Mississippi until change 
happened elsewhere, the possibility of influencing the Kennedy administration was no 
doubt welcomed.10 Utilizing direct-action to engage Mississippi’s black youth in the 
movement also greatly appealed to Evers, who hoped to harness the militant energy of 
students at Alcorn and other colleges that remained relatively untapped within the 
NAACP’s legal framework. Though he worked effortlessly to recruit students into local 
youth councils, the Association’s focus on its slow-moving voting rights and 
desegregation campaigns coupled with the stifling atmosphere of racial oppression hurt 
recruitment efforts. Those who agreed to join the youth councils were few in number and, 
in the case of the Jackson councils, meant they barely functioned as an operating body. 
Rather than fear a developing desire among Mississippi’s black youth for mass protest, 
Evers hoped to serve as a crucial connective agent between students calling for locally 
led, direct-action and the organizational resources of the NAACP.11  
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The growing brazenness of Mississippi’s state power structure offered up its own 
testing ground for a militant, direct-action response to white backlash. Governor 
Barnett’s election cemented the ascendancy of Citizens’ Council representatives to the 
highest positions of authority in the state, but his move to transform the State Sovereignty 
Commission into a detective agency effectively pitted the two organizations against one 
another. Since its creation in 1956, the Sovereignty Commission had primarily functioned 
as the public relations arm of the state’s white power structure, marking anti-segregation 
advocates as communist subversives. Under Barnett’s tenure, the Commission began 
subsidizing Council propaganda projects with official state tax funds. While most 
Council members supported the Commission’s more activist role, a sense of rivalry 
developed regarding strategy and policy influence on Barnett’s administration. Aware of 
their squabbling, Evers did what he could to take advantage of the levels of hysteria such 
a divide represented. If he could not directly defeat the Councils and the Commission 
through legal mechanisms, Evers hoped to drive them to defeat themselves.12  
 An NAACP event celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Brown decision in May of 
1959 bolstered this possibility. Roy Wilkins was the keynote speaker, and in the months 
leading to the event, Evers and local NAACP branches publicized the Executive 
Director’s forthcoming participation. Sovereignty Commission’s lead investigator, Zack 
J. Van Landingham, gathered information about the event by informants paid to infiltrate 
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NAACP meetings as part of “a secret underground organization of Negroes to assist in 
maintaining segregation in Mississippi.”13 
One month prior to Wilkins’ arrival, Van Landingham sent a memo to Sovereignty 
Commission director Maurice Malone incorporating information passed on to him by a 
black informant named B.L. Bell, who reported Medgar Evers told him the NAACP 
planned to file a desegregation suit in Jackson in the coming months.14 Bell and other 
members of the black middle class unwilling to fight segregation caused Evers’ blood to 
run cold. Much like the African loyalists in Kenya, these individuals traded their dignity 
and freedom for bribes and false senses of security at the hands of a white power 
structure determined to exploit them. On many occasions, he openly referred to such 
individuals as Uncle Toms who worked to preserve racial segregation and prevented the 
“more aggressive students” in the state’s black communities from speaking out and acting 
against racial oppression.15 
 The Sovereignty Commission favored a calculated response to the NAACP’s plans, 
which ruffled feathers inside the Citizens’ Councils. At a Commission meeting on April 
23, 1959, Senator Earl Evans of Canton, Mississippi reported 90% of black 
Mississippians opposed the NAACP. If that was indeed the case, he suggested the 
commission locate “a large group or delegation of Negroes opposing the NAACP” to 
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picket the anniversary event with placards that read “Go Home Roy Wilkins, We Don’t 
Want You Stirring Up Trouble in Mississippi.” When Van Landingham relayed the query 
to Bell, the school supervisor replied that in light of the “Poplarville incident,” it was 
doubtful a picket line outside the meeting would be of much value to the anti-NAACP 
cause. Facilitating negative press attention was something Van Landingham and other 
members of the Sovereignty Commission wanted to avoid so soon after the Parker case, 
so the picket plans were scrapped.16 Members of the Jackson Citizens’ Council were in 
no mood for surreptitious responses to the coming invasion of NAACP officials. They 
favored sending a strong message that desegregation efforts and destruction of the racial 
status quo would not be tolerated. Spearheading this response was Elmore Greaves, 
Director of the Jackson Council. He went before the Justice of the Peace of the Fourth 
District and filed an affidavit for the arrests of Wilkins and Evers on misdemeanor 
charges for conspiring to “overthrow or violate” the segregation laws of Mississippi 
“through force, violence, threats, intimidation” or any other means.17 
  Afraid of the national publicity that would stem from the arrest of NAACP officials, 
Van Landingham received permission from Attorney General Joe Patterson to prevent the 
warrants from being carried out. Neither Wilkins nor Evers was made aware of the 
situation, and Wilkins soon returned to New York. The following day, Van Landingham 
defended himself in the Jackson Daily News, arguing that arresting Wilkins and Evers 
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would have given the NAACP what it wanted and hurt the cause of maintaining 
segregation.18 Greaves was livid. He fired off a response excoriating state officials for not 
taking advantage of the opportunity to stymie the NAACP and apply force to the message 
that outside agitators would not be tolerated. No one was spared his wrath, wrapped in a 
skewed transnational framework. For his decision not to enforce segregation laws, 
Greaves labeled Governor Coleman “Mississippi’s goodwill ambassador to the integrated 
hinterlands,” stating he found it “inconceivable that our governor could be frightened at 
the prospect of ‘the world’s biggest nigger’ languishing in a Mississippi jail.” Greaves 
also expressed surprise that the Sovereignty Commission “was organized to wet-nurse 
visiting negro dignitaries” and labeled Evers “the Mau Mau admirer who is on the 
NAACP payroll as Mississippi field secretary.” He concluded by asking of the “fearless 
moderates wring[ing] their hands about the ‘bad publicity’ accompanying the slight 
inconvenience to the negro Wilkins which the administration of justice might demand,” 
would anarchy be “preferable to a bad press?”19 
Evers certainly did not think so. According to Michael Vinson Williams, he 
“reveled in the infighting between the two segregationist groups and their leadership” and 
“pointed to the amount of press coverage the whole episode garnered.” He also took 
notice of the positive effect the divisions between Council and Sovereignty Commission 
officials had on the state’s black citizenry following the situation, arguing it “was 
favorable to the NAACP.”20 By imploring greater numbers of black Mississippians to 
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become politically active, the odds of driving a wedge between the white power structure 
over the issue of “bad publicity” increased exponentially. Violent retribution was not 
required to become a successful Mau Mau-type force for change. Rather, it required 
solidarity and determination among the masses to act. The National Office wasted no 
time in publicizing the failed arrest attempt, putting together an official report for public 
release that included a reprint of Mississippi Codes 2339. The “crimes” listed in the code, 
given institutional efforts to silence black dissent across the state by utilizing the very 
same tactics, represented the height of irony.21 Wilkins also spoke out to the press from 
his office in New York, arguing that the decision to withdraw the warrants “is clear 
indication that someone in authority realized the folly and futility of arresting us for 
exercising our constitutional right to freedom of speech” and promised the NAACP 
would “take every possible step” to fight segregation in Mississippi.22 
 As members of Mississippi’s white power structure fought amongst themselves, the 
last of the Mau Mau rebels faced defeat in the forest reserves in Kenya. However, 
increasing international criticism of the colonial government’s treatment of captured Mau 
Mau prisoners led to growing anxiety in Parliament that their doctrine of colonial 
trusteeship might disintegrate. News of atrocities committed against Mau Mau detainees 
found its way into international press accounts, and the colonial government’s actions 
embarrassingly ran counter to the imperial image of the British Empire as a civilizing 
force in the world. Her Majesty’s government was in a state of crisis regarding image and 
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strategy. To many officials, including Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd, Governor 
Baring, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, a loss of the Kenya colony was 
unconscionable and a threat to rationale of the empire at large. According to Caroline 
Elkins, not only did officials fear the loss of Kenya might set a precedent others would 
follow, but just as the forces of white supremacy dictated that the lifting of racial barriers 
in Mississippi would hearken the death of white civilization, British officials also 
believed losing Kenya would be a grievous defeat to the “forces of dark savagery.”23 
On March 3, 1959, an event at the Hola detention camp in Kenya’s Coast 
Province reinforced concerns over the future of colonial trusteeship and challenged 
officials’ definitions of dark savagery. Located in the Tana River District, the Hola camp 
housed detainees deemed uncooperative and zealous “hard core” Mau Mau adherents. On 
orders from the camp’s commandant, eighty-five of the hard core were forcibly marched 
to a site one mile away and ordered to dig an irrigation trench. They refused the work 
order on grounds they were not prisoners but political detainees and freedom fighters 
under no obligation to perform hard labor. Angry over their defiance, John Cowan, the 
Superintendent of Prisons, ordered the men into a twelve feet deep trench. When Cowan 
blew his whistle, security guards unleashed a reign of terror on the detainees that lasted 
for three hours. In his recollection of the horrific event, former detainee James Muiguai 
exclaimed "I remember the order being issued in Swahili, 'Piga mpaka wafanye kazi’ 
(flog them till they work), they were beaten like unwanted animals." By the time the 
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beatings were finished, eleven of the detainees were dead and dozens more badly 
wounded.24 
Brutality at Hola camp was not limited to the massacre on that fateful day. The 
use of violence had been set down in an official policy called the “Cowan Plan,” under 
which detainees could be beaten, tortured, sexually abused, or forced to labor under 
terrible conditions at the will of the camp supervisor. Its intent was to coerce detainees 
into confessing, and ultimately renouncing, their Mau Mau oaths. Based on the official 
myth of Mau Mau as “a collective psychosis that invoked a complete rejection of 
civilization,” the Cowan Plan was justified as a means of permanently separating Pipeline 
detainees who refused to renounce their oaths from those who would agree to rejoin 
Kenyan colonial society as willing subjects of the crown.25 It had originated in the 
aftermath of the failed House of Commons vote to institute an independent inquiry into 
the Kenya camps. The largely partisan decision to allow Secretary Lennox-Boyd and 
Governor Baring to continue overseeing the “rehabilitation efforts” in the camps 
essentially gave Cowan carte blanc to use varying degrees of violence to force the hard 
core to work.26  
Cowan’s actions at Hola Camp resulted in political fallout. This was especially 
true because the deaths of the detainees were originally blamed on the consumption of 
contaminated water, a charge that Labour Party operatives in Kenya argued were 
falsehoods. Barbara Castle jumped at the opportunity to reveal a massive cover up. 
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Lennox-Boyd and Baring tried to cut calls for independent inquiries off at the pass by 
issuing a March 12th press release admitting the injuries on the bodies of the dead 
detainees might have been due to violence, but added the findings were inconclusive. On 
March 18th, the colonial government opened its own internal investigation by Senior 
Resident Magistrate W.H. Goudie. In his final report issued in May, Goudie admitted the 
detainees had died due to violence at the hands of prison guards, but was careful to argue 
it was “impossible to determine beyond a reasonable doubt which injuries on the 
deceased were caused by justifiable and which by unjustifiable blows, and which injury 
or combination of injuries resulted in the shock and hemorrhage causing death.” 
Justifiable blows, as specified in the report, were any used by guards to “compel” 
troublesome detainees to work.27 
Goudie’s assessment was widely condemned by members of the Labour Party, 
who called for a full investigation of the murders. As the House of Commons prepared 
for hearings, Commandant M.G. Sullivan and Deputy Commandant A.C. Coutts of the 
Hola Camp were suspended from their positions and the camp opened to visiting 
reporters for tours. Baring hoped it would result in more favorable press coverage of the 
events, particularly as the debate over an investigation kicked off. During discussion of 
the issue on June 16th, Barbara Castle accused Lennox-Boyd of orchestrating a cover up 
to protect the top officials and pin blame for the murders on Sullivan and Coutts. She also 
took the opportunity to once again question the entire system of Mau Mau rehabilitation 
in the camps, arguing confessions of Mau Mau detainees extracted via torture “should 
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horrify this house.” Lennox-Boyd, in typical fashion, managed to expertly evade the lines 
of questioning by opposition leaders and redirect blame for the violence away from those 
in power. In using the same “civilizing” language put forth to justify the rehabilitation 
process, he maintained any prisoner deaths at the hands of guards were “the result of 
misjudgment by the authorities of the depth of brutality and savage nature of the 
detainees.”28  
In the final vote, the House split down party lines to defeat a Labour Party motion 
to censure Lennox-Boyd and colonial government officials collectively responsible for 
the widespread violence in the camps.29 In July, Sullivan and Coutts were officially 
dismissed from their positions while Lennox-Boyd, who narrowly escaped censure, 
retired as colonial secretary shortly thereafter.30 Yet while a battle to maintain the 
colonial government’s policies of Mau Mau rehabilitation had been won, the tide was 
turning in the larger moral war being waged by the Empire regarding the issue of human 
rights and illiberal actions by its colonial authorities. According to historian David 
Anderson, “after Hola there was no way back.”31 As incidents of violence against 
Africans in Kenya gained further attention in the international press, the hypocrisy in the 
call to defeat the dark forces of savagery through the application of British law and 
culture was on worldwide display. This was especially true given the Empire’s eventual 
ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights in 1961. Though officials 
                                                 
28 Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 348-349; The Hola Detention Camp 16 June 1959, Hansard Parliamentary 
Debates, Commons, vol 607 cc 248-384. 
29 “Kenya Censure Fails in London, Commons Defeats Laborite Motion in Death-by-Beating of 11 Mau 
Mau Captives,” New York Times, June 17, 1959. 
30 “Kenya Camp Chief Ousted,” The New York Times, July 24, 1959. 
31 David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 327. 
  
 251 
managed to both work within and around the Convention by assuming official states of 
emergency, the brutal suppression of insurrections exacted a terrible toll on the colonies. 
In his extensive study of the British Empire and the European Convention, A.W. Simpson 
explained “to be sure…it was thought possible from a military point of view, at least by 
some, to crush colonial rebellions, but it was certainly not possible, even with restraint, to 
look good in the process.”32 
 Looking good was a turn of phrase with extensive geopolitical implications. 
Though the post-World War II era had seen the inception of the European Convention 
and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, the central force driving concerns 
about international embarrassment regarding the suppression of insurrections was a fear 
of communist infiltration into Africa. By the beginning of the 1960s, those fears were 
heightened as several prominent African colonies in addition to Kenya groaned under the 
yolk of white settler rule and state-sponsored violence. In Algeria, efforts by French 
colonial leaders to squelch dissent led to the deaths of over 150,000 Algerians and French 
citizens combined, while violence over decolonization efforts resulted in scores of 
African and Belgian settler deaths in the Congo. In South Africa, the violent massacre of 
sixty-nine black demonstrators by white police officers in Sharpeville followed boycotts 
by black South Africans against the government’s apartheid laws. As the horror unfolded, 
it was captured by television cameras, revealing the brutality of the South African regime 
on the global stage. The human cost was horrendous. Yet the efforts of colonized 
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Africans to transform their desire for independence into action influenced an atmosphere 
of resistance and solidarity that connected oppressed peoples worldwide.33 
Within this framework, the shadow of British actions in Kenya loomed large. A 
sizeable segment of British voters initially supported military actions to defeat the Mau 
Mau, but the colonial government’s crackdown on the insurgents and suspected 
sympathizers backfired. Internal squabbles over the preservation of colonial trusteeship 
played out in the House of Commons and on the pages of newspapers around the world. 
In the United States, government officials viewed an unstable African continent as a 
breeding-ground for Soviet infiltration that threatened the global balance of power and 
American access to crucial natural resources in the Middle East. At the same time, 
escalating racial conflicts at home intensified the spotlight on the hypocrisy of American 
democracy and threatened the credibility of the United States in the international arena. 
For the incoming Kennedy administration, striking a cautious balance between 
responding to criticisms of American racial discrimination and minimizing the possibility 
of violent Southern white backlash was deemed crucial to winning the Cold War. 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk summed up importance of the issue when he declared 
American racism “the single biggest burden that we carry on our backs in foreign 
relations.”34  
Initially, NAACP officials hoped the young president’s administration would be 
more open to publicly supporting the cause of racial equality after the adoption of a 
strong civil rights plank at the 1960 Democratic National Convention, despite the tenuous 
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path tread to its inclusion. Kennedy’s assessment of race relations during his career in the 
United States Senate left much to be desired. His voting record revealed he had spent 
very little time around black Americans, and had even less experience breaking down and 
understanding the pervasive discrimination blacks faced across the nation. But leading up 
to the election of 1960, Kennedy worked to reverse the opinions of black leaders and 
court black votes, meeting to discuss race relations with Wilkins and Martin Luther King, 
Jr. He also actively supported the incorporation of a civil rights plank into the Democratic 
platform at the national convention, which included a call for federal legislation to end 
literacy tests, poll taxes, and empower the Attorney General to file civil injunctions 
against civil rights violators in federal courts.35 However, during his first few months in 
office, any action taken by Kennedy to support the push for racial equality was largely 
symbolic. While his courtship of black voters helped swing the election in his favor, 
Kennedy’s win over Richard Nixon was by the slimmest of margins. The Kennedy and 
Lyndon Johnson ticket carried a large majority of Southern electoral votes, but Southern 
Democrats had no intention of acquiescing to desegregation demands. Instead, they 
utilized their control of over half of thirty-eight congressional committees and federal 
funding to their political advantage, effectively enabling them to hold Kennedy’s 
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legislative agenda hostage. To placate his supporters calling for an end to racial 
oppression at home and abroad, Kennedy appointed racial liberals to key administration 
positions, but made no further efforts to stir the waters of racial tension.36  
In Mississippi, symbolic appointments did nothing to stop the deluge of 
oppressive violence raining down on its black citizenry or aid Evers in eliciting support 
from much of the state’s black middle class. However, his work had begun to tap into the 
rebellious energy fermenting in the state’s black high schools and colleges. Awakened to 
the possibilities of mass action, the air of militancy around the students was a refreshing 
counterpoint to the fear-based conservatism of many educators and preachers in 
Mississippi’s black communities. In the aftermath of the Alcorn protest, Evers canvassed 
statewide for the creation of new NAACP youth councils. By encouraging members to 
take the initiative and conduct their own student-led protests, Evers sought to harness that 
energy to strategically exploit the hysteria of the white power structure and connect the 
Mississippi struggle to the national movement for civil rights.37  
The youth in Mississippi were not the only people influenced by the direct-action 
tactics utilized in Montgomery and Little Rock. Students across the South, many of 
whom were members of NAACP youth councils, were inspired to shift the national 
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movement for civil rights in a new direction. A key moment occurred on February 1, 
1960. North Carolina A&T students and members of the local NAACP youth council 
Joseph McNeil, Ezell Blair, Jr., Franklin McCain, and David Richmond initiated a sit-in 
at the segregated lunch counter in the Greensboro Woolworth department store. 
Predictably, they were told the lunch counter did not serve Negroes, but though they had 
prepared to nonviolently resist any physical blows that might come their way, they only 
received confused looks from onlookers. News quickly spread to the student body, some 
of whom agreed to join with the four men when they returned to the lunch counter in the 
coming days.38 Again, the protestors met no resistance, but their actions did interest local 
reporters, who captured footage that hit the national television and wire services. Initial 
reactions by Greensboro officials had been muted, but the protest’s expansion and the 
angry white backlash it garnered influenced them to step up efforts to stop the sit-ins 
from continuing and encourage the owner to temporarily close the department store.39 
As plans for additional sit-ins in other Greensboro stores were announced, the 
sting of financial losses loomed large for Woolworths. So did the threat to segregated 
lunch counters beyond Greensboro’s borders. For less than a week after the original 
Woolworth sit-in began, students in cities and towns across North Carolina, including 
Fayetteville, Charlotte, Durham, Raleigh, and Winston-Salem, initiated their own sit-ins 
                                                 
38“Negroes in South in Store Sitdown: Carolina College Students Fight Woolworth Ban on Lunch Counter 
Service,” New York Times, February 3, 1960. 
39No state law required segregation in North Carolina eating establishments. Rather, lunch counters were 
segregated as a matter of established custom. Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black 
Awakening of the 1960s, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981), 9-10; “Bomb Scare 
Fails to Halt ‘Sit Down’ Against Bias,” Chicago Defender, February 9, 1960.; “Seek Service at Greensboro 
Lunch Counter: A&T Students Stage Sit Down at Woolworths,” Pittsburgh Courier, February 13, 1960; 
“Explains Student Sitdown Strike,” Chicago Defender, February 13, 1960. 
  
 256 
at lunch counters in downtown variety stores. As the protests spread, they remained 
peaceful. Nonetheless, city and state officials reacted with disgust. In Raleigh, Mayor 
William G. Enloe publicly condemned the protestors for endangering the city’s “friendly 
and cooperative race relations by seeking to change a long-standing custom in a manner 
that is all but destined to fail,” while North Carolina Attorney General Malcolm B. 
Seawell claimed the sit-ins posed “a serious threat to the peace and good order in the 
communities in which they occur.”40  
 The reactions of angry officials did nothing to hinder the broadening of the protests. 
Within two weeks of the Greensboro sit-in, black and white college students initiated 
their own sit-ins against segregated eating facilities in over thirty cities across the South, 
prompting additional condemnations from white officials and praise from civil rights 
leaders. Among the latter were the organizational heads of the Congress of Racial 
Equality (CORE), formed in 1942 by members of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. As 
pacifists, they drew inspiration from the use of nonviolent mass resistance by Gandhi in 
India and from the calls for self-determination among the colonized peoples in Africa. In 
the United States, they set out to use nonviolent, direct-action methods to fight against all 
forms of racial discrimination. CORE focused much of its attention on eradicating 
housing and employment discrimination in urban areas, but in the first decade of its 
existence it spearheaded a direct-action campaign challenging segregation laws in 
interstate travel called the Journey of Reconciliation. In response to the United States 
Supreme Court’s 1946 ruling in Irene Morgan v. Commonwealth of Virginia, declaring 
                                                 
40 “Negroes Extend Store Picketing: Raleigh is 6th Carolina City Affected – Student Action May Spread 
Here,” New York Times, February 11, 1960. 
  
 257 
segregation in interstate travel unconstitutional, black and white members of CORE 
traveled on interstate buses through Tennessee, Virginia, Kentucky, and North Carolina, 
where they suffered harassment and arrest for violating state segregation laws and 
customs.41 
 The attempts to force compliance with the Supreme Court decision by participants on 
the Journey of Reconciliation played a key role in influencing McNeil, Blair, McCain, 
and Richmond’s initial decision to sit-in at the Woolworth lunch counter. Their 
experiences participating in the youth council of the Greensboro NAACP, which held the 
reputation as one of the largest chapters in North Carolina, inspired them to act against 
segregation. Yet as the sit-ins spread across the South, the national office of the NAACP 
was deafeningly silent on the matter. Some local chapters offered their support, but when 
calls for legal aid for the protestors rang out within the growing movement, it was not the 
NAACP National Office that stepped in to provide assistance. Instead, CORE took up 
that position in addition to facilitating training workshops in nonviolent, direct-action 
protest. Hoping to keep control of the situation, the four students reached out to the 
president of the NAACP’s Greensboro chapter, Dr. George Simkins, Jr. Floyd 
McKissick, a black activist and lawyer from nearby Durham, agreed to serve as legal 
counsel for the protestors. When Simkins contacted the National Office to inform them of 
his branch’s endorsement of the sit-ins and the plans for their continuation, he was 
rebuffed and accused of “violating organizational policy.” In response, he turned for help 
to James Farmer, soon-to-be Executive Director of CORE. According to Raymond 
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Arsenault, Simkins’s call “sent shock waves through the CORE office” and “’did not 
endear him’ to his NAACP superiors.” 42  
Martin Luther King, Jr. and the SCLC also publicly backed the developing sit-in 
movement. At a packed rally in Atlanta on February 16, 1960, King called for the 
protests to continue and implored participants not to fear arrests. “No great victory comes 
without suffering,” he explained, and emphasized black men and women across the South 
were willing “to fill the jailhouses to be free.”43 Ella Baker agreed with King’s sentiment. 
In her estimation, the sit-ins proved the movement had the potential to shift in a militant, 
grassroots direction. To tap the wellspring of this militant energy, Baker coordinated a 
leadership conference at Shaw University for two hundred youth leaders to meet and 
discuss how to build on the momentum of the sit-ins. Frustrated with the SCLC’s overly 
bureaucratic, hierarchical internal structure, its emphasis on top-down, leader-led protest 
strategies, and the way the organization undervalued the contributions of its female 
staffers, Baker was all too happy to move on from its ranks in order to encourage the 
development programs for mass action and grassroots organizing among radical youth. 
On the final day of the conference, her hopes were realized when the student participants 
formed their own autonomous organization, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee. In her analysis of SNCC’s formation, Barbara Ransby explained Baker 
sought out radical youth possessing passion, creativity, and a “brazen fighting spirit” who 
she did not want to see “shackled by the bureaucracy of existing organizations.” Instead, 
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SNCC’s members fashioned themselves community organizers seeking to transform the 
energy of the sit-ins into militant, grassroots strategies for change.44 
 For Roy Wilkins, the rising tide of direct-action in the South fomented a sense of 
anxiety rather than excitement. While the Association did not discourage its branches 
from providing assistance to sit-in participants, it refrained from endorsing the protests or 
actively encouraging its youth councils to participate in direct-action campaigns. Even 
though the most treacherous period of the Red Scare was over by 1960, red-baiting 
remained a crucial tactic employed by Southern officials to discredit and destroy the civil 
rights organizations. Still smarting from the “invasion” of federal troops into the South 
during the Little Rock Crisis, Arkansas Representative Dale Alford stood up on the floor 
of the House in February of 1959 and claimed communists were behind the local NAACP 
branch’s decision to integrate Central High School. Not to be outdone by such lofty 
accusations, Representative John D. Flynt, Jr. of Georgia argued communist sympathizers 
were out to “stir up agitation” throughout the South, while Mississippi Representative 
John Bell Williams lamented the misunderstood region was “the victim of some of the 
most vicious, malicious propaganda ever seen.” In June, Southern Dixiecrats introduced a 
bill (HR 3) onto the House floor seeking to limit the abilities of federal courts to strike 
down state laws and brand the NAACP as a subversive organization.45 
 As direct-action campaigns spread, they were plagued with accusations of 
communist-inspired influence by anti-colonial movements in Africa and India. Seeking to 
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shake off accusations of communist infiltration, the National Office jumped at every 
opportunity to disassociate the Association from the real or perceived intrusion of red 
elements. In September of 1958, Gloster Current oversaw the dissolution of three 
NAACP branch units in Chicago. Theodore A. Jones, President of the Chicago branch, 
publicly indicated the executive action had been taken due to the “possibility of 
communist infiltration” in the units. Several branch members formed a group to protest 
the action as untrue and unconstitutional, but Current and the National Office stood by 
their decision, arguing the dissolution of the branch units had been carried out “in 
accordance with national branch policy.” Confident in the Association’s ability to 
eliminate threats of subversion, Wilkins critiqued the Dixiecrat’s HR 3 proposal as a 
“naked anti-Negro bill” clothed in an “anti-communist garment.”46 Threats also included 
Association members who advocated armed resistance. As Medgar Evers’ decision to 
arm himself with firearms indicated, the realities of living as a black man or woman in 
Mississippi meant armed self-defense was considered crucial to survival, but the NAACP 
had long attempted to discredit violent resistance as a means of achieving civil rights 
aims.47 
One advocate of armed resistance was Robert F. Williams, president of the 
Monroe, North Carolina branch of the NAACP. As a child, Williams witnessed countless 
acts of violence committed against blacks by whites and returned home from Army 
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service after World War II determined to resist white supremacy. While working as a 
labor and community organizer, he successfully rebuilt the Monroe chapter after threats 
and pressures from the white community had reduced its total membership to six. Aware 
of how apprehensive certain segments of the black middle class were about involvement 
in the Association, Williams recruited working class and poor blacks in pool halls, beauty 
parlors, and tenant farming communities. Though the chapter certainly had an element of 
middle class representation, Williams utilized a grassroots approach to recruit and give 
voice to anyone who had been abused, mistreated, or imprisoned.48 In October of 1957, 
Williams and other branch members engaged in a shootout with members of the local 
Klan after conducting a “stand-in” at a swimming pool in the local white country club. At 
a rally outside Monroe, Klan leader “Catfish” Cole whipped the crowd into a frenzy of 
bloodlust, arousing fears of NAACP-sponsored interracial mixing that would doom the 
white race to extinction. After the rally, several Klan members attacked the home of Dr. 
Albert Perry, a close associate of Williams and Vice-President of the Monroe branch. In 
response, Williams and his men met the Klan with a return of gunfire, eventually driving 
them out of the neighborhood.49   
 In 1959, Williams agreed to defend two black male youths, David Simpson and 
James Thompson, accused of trying to molest three white girls. The case stemmed from 
the actions of Simpson and Thompson, ages eight and ten respectively, who had playfully 
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engaged in a kissing game with three young white girls. Police arrested the two boys, 
who were refused the right to legal counsel, convicted of sexual assault, and sentenced to 
indeterminate terms in the Morrison Training School for Negroes.50 Williams called upon 
the NAACP State and National Offices for help but quickly learned both were leery of 
taking up a defense of the accused in a sex case. According to historian Timothy Tyson, 
the NAACP adopted a conservative, distanced approach on issues of “interracial 
sexuality, knowing that the deep-rooted taboo fueled white resistance to its goals.” 
Frustrated, Williams set out to publicize the case himself, firing off press releases, calling 
television networks, and petitioning President Eisenhower to intervene.51 He also chose 
to ally himself with the Socialist Workers Party, a Trotskyite group hoping to embolden 
its program for racial equality that sponsored Williams as he traveled to speak about the 
boys’ plight in labor-friendly venues across the nation. Eventually, press coverage of the 
case garnered the attention of the State Department, which quickly condemned Williams’ 
advocacy as damaging to the image of the United States abroad. Williams responded by 
stating “if the U.S. government is so concerned about its image abroad, then let it create a 
society that will stand up under world scrutiny.”52 
 These actions did not endear Williams to Wilkins, but the final straw that broke the 
back of his relationship with National Office executives began in May of 1959. In 
response to the acquittals of two white men who had violently attacked black women, 
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Williams publicly called for blacks to fight injustice on the spot and if necessary to 
protect themselves, “be willing to kill if necessary.”53 Predictably, Southern 
segregationists jumped on his comments as proof the NAACP was engaged in “a 
revolutionary enterprise.”54 In response, Roy Wilkins suspended Williams from the 
Monroe chapter and issued a press release stating that while black Americans were no 
longer willing to accept a double standard of justice, the NAACP “has never in its history 
advocated the use of violence.”55 At the NAACP’s annual convention in July, Wilkins 
bore the brunt of much criticism, mostly stemming from a belief he was hyperfocused on 
accusations of communist-infiltration and blind to the potential of militant, nonviolent 
direct-action protests because the largest group associated with them – the SCLC – was 
threatening the NAACP’s position atop the hierarchy of civil rights organizations.56 
 By the time the sit-ins expanded across the upper regions of the South, NAACP 
officials could no longer afford to waffle in support of direct-action protests or ignore the 
militancy and self-empowerment they reinforced in their participants. While the 
Association sat on its hands, the movement seemed poised to pass into the arms of 
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organizations advocating direct-action such as CORE and the SCLC. Wilkins had no 
intention of playing second fiddle to those organizations, but wanted no part of protests 
that might bring about violence surely blamed on revolutionary red elements inside the 
NAACP. Blessedly, as the sit-ins grew they not only remained overwhelmingly peaceful, 
but were successful in leading to the desegregation of lunch counters in several cities and 
towns across the Upper South. Within a month of their inception, the NAACP offered 
official endorsements of the protests and called for the withholding of trade from any 
chain stores that refused to serve black customers. At an April 16th speech at a city club 
forum in Cleveland, Wilkins laid blame for the sit-ins on the system of white supremacy 
across the South. The youth, he argued, had been forced by repressive patterns of 
discrimination to stand up and reject Jim Crow through bold, peaceful action.57 
In Mississippi, Evers watched the sit-ins spread with a sense of excitement. By 
utilizing independently led, militant tactics, students had further shifted the movement in 
a direction toward mass action that could not be ignored. Looking to in-state colleges like 
Alcorn A&M and Tougaloo, Evers hoped the students there would recruit members to the 
NAACP youth councils, carry out peaceful public demonstrations of their own accord, 
and embolden fearful members of Mississippi’s black communities to join. Yet for all of 
his excitement, Evers was keenly aware that Mississippi was not the Upper South. While 
the sit-ins moving across the region had been peaceful up to that point, the level of state-
sponsored racial oppression and violent retribution in Mississippi meant there was very 
                                                 
57 “Confab Backs Sit-Ins; Spurs Vote Campaign,” Chicago Defender, April 5, 1960; “South to Blame For 
Sit-Ins, Wilkins Tells Clevelanders,” Atlanta Daily World, April 28, 1960. 
  
 265 
little guarantee similar demonstrations would be as successful.58 C.R. Darden, president 
of the NAACP Mississippi State Conference of Branches, was apprehensive about the 
use of direct-action. Notoriously cautious, Darden shied away from aggressive tactics he 
believed would antagonize whites and lead to additional attacks on the NAACP. He also 
publicly excoriated Evers, Ruby Hurley, Herb Wright, and Gloster Current for usurping 
his authority at the NAACP Southeastern Regional Meeting earlier that year by 
discussing ways of involving Mississippi youth council members in sit-down protests.59 
The attack on his integrity was no surprise to Evers or members of the State 
Conference, the latter of whom several demanded an apology from Darden for his 
comments. But on the danger of incorporating sit-ins across the state, Evers was not 
indifferent to Darden’s concerns. Yet if the Mississippi movement did not move towards 
the incorporation of direct-action, the possibility of maintaining a spotlight on the state’s 
racial horrors, driving a wedge between factions of the white power structure, and 
harnessing the militant energy of the youth councils would be diminished. To strike a 
balance between intensifying the NAACP’s efforts and decreasing the chances of violent 
retaliation, Evers called for a community-led boycott of white owned businesses in the 
Capitol Street business district during the Easter holiday season. As was the norm across 
Mississippi, black customers in the district’s boutiques, variety stores, and hotels and 
restaurants were treated in an abusive and undignified manner, refused service until all 
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white customers had been helped, and banned from patronizing segregated public 
facilities including lunch counters.60 By encouraging the black community to facilitate 
and support the boycott, Evers hoped its success would not only strike back against the 
economic foundations of white supremacy, but lead to increased NAACP memberships 
and a community willingness to transition toward participation in more direct-action 
protests in the future.61    
The Jackson boycott lasted a week. Hundreds of students from Campbell as well 
as nearby Jackson State College and Tougaloo College volunteered to spread word about 
the event, passing out ten thousand mimeographed handbills and making personal phone 
calls asking black citizens to avoid shopping in the white-owned businesses.62 
Expectedly, the Jackson Daily News and Clarion-Ledger described the boycott a failure 
led by “a handful of screwball agitators,” but despite these attempts to downplay its 
impact, the boycott resulted in the loss of revenue for white-owned Capitol Street stores 
and benefitted Jackson’s black-owned businesses.63 In addition, it united Jackson’s black 
citizens together in larger numbers than prior NAACP campaigns had done. Predictably, 
it also grabbed the attention of State Sovereignty Commission officials, who rushed to 
collect information on as many participants as they could identify.64 
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That the boycott had succeeded despite efforts by the Citizens’ Council and 
Sovereignty Commission to pressure it out of existence was emboldening, and Evers 
hoped it would encourage further solidarity within Jackson’s black community in the 
days and months ahead. In the meantime, he was heartened by direct-action spreading to 
the city of Biloxi, where a doctor named Gilbert Mason was leading black residents in 
“wade-in” protests to desegregate the city’s whites only beaches. Ranking slightly below 
Jackson with a total population of 44,053 residents, around 12% of whom were black, 
Biloxi boasted a diversified economy, including manufacturing, shipbuilding, and 
construction industries that drew large numbers of out-of-state employees into the local 
workforce. The construction of nearby Keesler Air Force base during World War II and 
the manufacturing of a twenty-six mile stretch of beaches also imbued the area with a 
federal presence and tourism economy that on its face seemed to facilitate a quieter racial 
atmosphere, but also made it a hotbed of potential protest as calls for direct-action made 
their way across the South.65 
Unlike the Jackson boycott, which promised no public demonstrations, the Biloxi 
wade-ins were designed to confront beach segregation in the same way sit-ins were used 
to push back against segregated stores and restaurants. The possibility of violent white 
backlash was particularly high in Biloxi, where black anxiety over being associated with 
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the NAACP had damaged the Association’s ability to maintain an active branch in the 
city. When Mason announced the protests, the State Sovereignty Commission 
immediately opened up investigations to discredit him and other desegregation petitioners 
as NAACP stooges intent on destroying peaceful race relations in the region.66 Acutely 
aware the future of direct-action and the success of the movement in Mississippi hinged 
on the NAACP treading carefully in the case, Evers encouraged Mason to take the 
initiative when he felt the time was right and to contact the national office for bond 
money.67 He was soon horrified to learn a mob of forty white men armed with blackjacks, 
baseball bats, and chains had brutally attacked the protest participants on the beach. It 
quickly spilled over into local black neighborhoods, where the white mob moved through 
the streets striking passersby indiscriminately. Once the violence had subsided, over a 
dozen were injured and five individuals suffered non-life threatening gunshot wounds. 
The Biloxi police department feigned ignorance of the scope of the violence and made no 
arrests, claiming only one patrol car had been sent to the scene with orders to observe the 
proceedings.68  
Despite law enforcement’s attempts to downplay the severity of the situation, 
word of the assault spread from local to national news agencies. Shocked by the intensity 
of the violence, the New York Times dubbed the attacks on peaceful black swimmers “the 
worst racial riot in Mississippi history,” accompanied by a photograph of men, women, 
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and children fleeing the white mob. To counter the story, Biloxi civic leaders blamed the 
NAACP for purposely inciting the riot and “acting as an agent of the enemies of the 
United States” by inspiring and financing demonstrations like the wade-ins with “money 
from overseas.”69 Since the wade-ins had dissolved into the kind of widespread acts of 
violence and claims of communist infiltration the National Office worked hard to offset, 
Roy Wilkins vehemently denied charges the NAACP had planned or facilitated the 
protests. Yet while he stressed a lack of direct involvement, Wilkins appointed Legal 
Defense Fund attorney Robert L. Carter to oversee the cases of the wade-in participants.70 
His willingness to enlist the talents of one of the Association’s top attorneys indicated 
Wilkins was not unaware of the growing efficacy of direct-action or its significance to the 
movement, but outright endorsements of the protests went a step too far. Evers and 
Mason wasted no time in capitalizing on Wilkins’s move. Together, they worked to 
ensure the Biloxi situation garnered the attention of Justice Department officials by 
gathering affidavits and passing on information that detailed how Biloxi had received 
federal funds to repair its seawall and build a strip of public beaches after a hurricane 
struck the area in 1943. In excluding blacks from those beaches, the county and city had 
violated its contract with the federal government. Evers hoped the information would 
result in “immediate action” from the Department of Justice and the Civil Rights 
Commission.71 
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The move quickly paid off. The National Office used the information to form a 
public campaign challenging segregated public beaches in eleven states from New Jersey 
to Texas, and on May 17th, the Justice Department brought a suit against Harrison County 
and the city of Biloxi. The first of its kind, the suit charged that in excluding blacks from 
its public beaches rebuilt with federal funds, both the city and county had violated federal 
guidelines.72 The Sovereignty Commission responded by quietly vacating its operations 
on the coast and shifting its attention elsewhere in the state. Though it was by no means 
neutralized, the Biloxi situation highlighted the Commission’s greatest weakness: its 
efforts were inept in the face of federal power.73 Fueled by such limited yet significant 
moves forward, Evers took advantage of the reactionary sense of militancy growing 
within Biloxi’s black community. Together with Mason, he established a new NAACP 
branch in the city and distanced the state office from Gulfport branch president Felix 
Dunn, who in the aftermath of the wade-in riot met with Sovereignty Commission 
officials in order to work out a compromise with the city to erect a blacks-only beach.74  
Splitting from Dunn and denying NAACP involvement in the talks with the 
Sovereignty Commission openly warned that black “Toms” benefitting from the 
reinforcement of white supremacy had no place in the Mississippi movement. Those who 
facilitated a culture of fear and self-loathing only retarded progress, and Evers remained 
steadfast in his belief that the movement could not survive unless its black communities 
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took the initiative to confront the forces of white supremacy head on.75 Several members 
of the Mississippi NAACP State Board agreed. No longer content to adhere to C.R. 
Darden’s conservative stance, the board elected Aaron Henry its new president.76 Henry 
openly advocated a more militant style of protest and was not afraid to aggressively speak 
out against the Association’s enemies. At an RCNL meeting earlier in the year, Henry 
stood up and accused B.L. Bell of acting as a Sovereignty Commission informant. Bell 
denied the accusation, but Henry’s public criticism concerned Zach Van Landingham. 
The Commission could not afford to have it conduit of paid informants cut off, 
particularly in light of the militancy growing among Mississippi’s black youth.77  
Van Landingham’s concerns were well founded. In a letter to a Mr. Carter of New 
York on March 15, 1961, Evers excitedly wrote of helping Tougaloo youth council 
members plan direct-action protests against public parks, libraries, bus terminals, and 
other conveyances. He hoped to rely on the National Office for legal help in defending 
the protest participants, tying the militant zeal of the students to the organizational 
resources of the NAACP. On March 27, 1961, nine students were arrested for conducting 
a sit-in at the Jackson Public Library. The next morning, fifty students marched to the 
city jail in solidarity with the “Tougaloo Nine.” As they neared the building, the marchers 
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were attacked by police officers armed with clubs, tear gas, and trained dogs.78 The 
following day, violence erupted again outside the courthouse when peacefully assembled 
protestors broke into applause as the nine arrested students were escorted from the 
courtroom, prompting another unprovoked attack by law enforcement when a police 
officer yelled “move ‘em out!” Evers, who was among the injured in the melee, issued an 
angry press response detailing how “women and children in the group were beaten 
unmercifully” and denouncing the police state tactics of Jackson’s law enforcement.79 In 
New York, Roy Wilkins responded with a public attack of his own. Branding the Jackson 
police “attackers rather than protectors” who instigated violence as a means to demonize 
peaceful protestors as criminals, he labeled Ross Barnett a modern day Simon Legree and 
demanded the governor “call off the dogs” because “slavery is over.”80  
The Jackson library sit-in was a watershed event in the Mississippi movement. 
Myrlie Evers deemed it the moment “Negroes took the offensive in the struggle for 
citizenship.”81 The willingness of Mississippi’s black youth to carry out a direct-action 
protest reflected a growing sense of militancy and community solidarity Evers had 
tirelessly worked to promote. It also forced the NAACP National Office to sit up and 
accept that Mississippi would not be left behind in the national movement. Two weeks 
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after the sit-in, Evers and Henry met with a somewhat reluctant Wilkins in New York 
City to formulate ‘Operation Mississippi,’ a nationwide campaign to publicize the police 
attacks and mobilize political support to pressure state officials to end racial 
discrimination.82 Evers embarked on a speaking tour to NAACP chapters across the 
country, financial contributions poured in, and Attorney General Burke Marshall ordered 
an investigation by the Department of Justice and FBI into reports of police assaults on 
protesters.83 Hoping to avoid additional federal interference, Sovereignty Commission 
officials responded by doubling down on their own public relations efforts. Members of 
its speakers’ bureau were sent North to remind audiences that Evers and the NAACP 
were subversives and that “Negroes receive better treatment and more consideration of 
their welfare in Mississippi than in any state in the nation.”84 
Though Sovereignty Commission officials hoped that refracting white supremacy 
through a Cold War prism could offset the threat of federal action, their strategy 
highlighted the growing probability of the reverse occurring. In April of 1961, President 
Kennedy found himself facing harsh criticism from several members of the United 
Nations Afro-Asian bloc after United States-backed insurgents failed to overthrow the 
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Cuban regime of Fidel Castro during the Bay of Pigs invasion.85 Long critical of United 
States race relations, Castro and his supporters linked Cuba’s revolution to the larger 
struggles of people of color around the world, declared solidarity with nationalist 
movements in Africa, and pointed out the hypocrisy of the United States demonizing 
communist governments as dangerous and repressive when it did nothing to ensure free 
elections across the American South. Black citizens ruthlessly beaten on public beaches 
as Sovereignty Commission officials red-baited and droned on about the tranquil state of 
race relations did nothing but hinder the image of power, stability, and strong leadership 
an embarrassed Kennedy administration worked to foster in the aftermath of the Cuban 
fiasco. The biggest hindrance to American foreign policy goals remained the scourge of 
white supremacy at home, and nowhere was that scourge more severely entrenched than 
in Mississippi. Pittsburgh Courier editorialist Eric Springer best summed up the 
ridiculousness of the situation when he proposed the United States ease Cold War 
tensions by trading Mississippi to Russia in exchange for a Siberian salt mine.86  
Dark humor aside, the inception of Operation Mississippi ensured the state would 
play a visible role within the larger movement. Evers also hoped the NAACP was 
warming up to the idea of direct-action as its participants – including a growing number 
of youth council members- also embarked on voter registration drives, desegregation 
campaigns, and amassed affidavits on police brutality. The path to success in Operation 
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Mississippi was via a consistent application of planned pressure, and Evers was prepared 
to pile it on. Mississippi was no British colony, but it was certainly the jewel in the crown 
of a Jim Crow empire. Evers had come to understand that embodying the spirit of the 
Mau Mau in Mississippi did not require leading a violent insurrection. Rather, it entailed 
creative planning to inspire the masses to force the world to reckon with their oppression. 
As the state-wide operation got underway, four members of the Inter-collegiate chapter of 
the Jackson NAACP followed this lead, initiating a “ride-in” on Jackson’s public buses. 
Evers was excited by their willingness to take action, and also happy that the National 
Office asked him to gather information on the bus company for a planned protest. 
According to Michael Vinson Williams, this “demonstrated that the pressure Evers 
placed on the NAACP leadership to act more forcefully had begun bearing fruit.”87 
 This strategy was not without its challenges. As Operation Mississippi grew, so did 
the state’s visibility and designation as the final frontier of Jim Crow. By mid-summer 
1961, outside organizations impelled by direct-action successes and the NAACP’s call to 
arms targeted the state for its own campaigns. As volunteers from SNCC and SCLC 
fanned out from Jackson into the surrounding regions, they built upon the groundwork 
laid by Evers and the state office, connecting to the youth councils and encouraging their 
members to undertake direct-action efforts of their own. However, as the Mississippi 
movement expanded, it ran the risk of growing disunity and instability. To counter these 
hazards, Evers adjusted strategies on the ground and facilitated inter-organizational 
communication to maintain momentum and morale in the repressive atmosphere of 
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institutionalized white backlash. In the process, his own philosophy of resistance 
underwent further transformation that placed him at a crossroads with NAACP 
leadership. Influenced by the success of direct-action and the energy of the youth he had 
worked tirelessly to connect to the civil right struggle, Evers envisioned a future devoid 
of organizational barriers to change. Perhaps no event better represented the beginning of 
this shift than the Freedom Rides.  
In December of 1960, the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision 
in Boynton v. Virginia that held racial segregation in entities catering to interstate 
travelers, including restrooms, lunch counters, and waiting rooms, was unconstitutional. 
Boynton was a positive legal victory for Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP, but just as 
they had after Brown, many government officials, organizations, and businesses across 
the South refused to enforce the decision. In response, members of CORE declared their 
intention to embark on “Freedom Rides” across the South. Rooted in an earlier CORE 
project called the Journey of Reconciliation, a 1947 effort by sixteen participants to 
challenge Southern resistance to Morgan, the Freedom Rides called for interracial groups 
of passengers to ride interstate buses and patronize facilities that continued to uphold 
segregation statutes. While this type of direct-action protest was not new, it was 
deliberately confrontational. According to historian Raymond Arsenault, Riders 
purported to incite “a crisis of authority” and understood “their actions would almost 
certainly provoke a savage and violent response from militant white supremacists.” The 
decision to so openly defy custom for the cause of racial justice, Arsenault added, meant 
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“the civil rights struggle reached a level of intensity that even the sit-ins, potentially the 
most disruptive episode of the pre-1961 era, had managed to avoid.”88 
The architect of the Freedom Rides was CORE National Director James Farmer, 
Jr. Raised in East Texas and educated at Wiley College, Farmer gravitated toward radical 
politics and social ethics before taking a job in Chicago as Race Relations Secretary at 
the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), a Christian pacifist organization intent on 
fostering social justice through nonviolent resistance. In 1942, FOR expanded its 
framework to include the facilitation of interracial direct-action protests to combat racial 
segregation and became CORE. As National Director, Farmer’s organizational goals 
were ambitious, and no better example existed than the Freedom Rides. In April of 1961, 
Farmer announced the Riders would consist of CORE and SNCC members and 
commence their journeys in May, delving as far South as Alabama, Mississippi, and 
Louisiana. Unlike the Journey of Reconciliation, women were allowed to participate in 
the Freedom Rides, but were restricted to separate buses from the men. In the days before 
their departure, Farmer spoke with Roy Wilkins, who questioned if CORE was going to 
follow through on its proposed “joy ride.” Annoyed by Wilkins’ underhanded description 
but not wanting to burn bridges with the NAACP leader, Farmer affirmed the Freedom 
Riders were prepared to set off with no delay.89 
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Wilkins’ critical reaction to CORE’s announcement reflected his conservatism 
regarding direct-action and his suspicion of other civil rights organizations, but his fears 
of escalating violent reprisal were not unfounded. In South Carolina, SNCC leaders John 
Lewis, Al Bigelow, and Genevieve Hughes were beaten after exiting their bus and 
entering a whites only waiting room. On the highway outside Aniston, Alabama, one bus 
was firebombed by almost two hundred white men. When passengers tried to escape, the 
mob attempted to trap them inside the bus until one of the Riders pulled out a pistol and 
forced the door open. Another bus was met in Birmingham by a mob of Klansman alerted 
to its arrival by local law enforcement. The scene was horrific. Dozens of Riders were 
badly beaten, some nearly to death. Even so, it did not deter their desire to continue their 
journey. The Riders planned to continue on to Montgomery, but they needed proper 
police protection to make it safely. Alabama Governor John Patterson refused to provide 
it, arguing the protests were the work of outside agitators stirring up trouble. In the 
meantime, news agencies relayed images of the mob violence around the world. Once 
again, the ugliness of American race relations was front and center on the international 
stage.90 
Kennedy administration officials were livid. This was the kind of situation they 
wished to avoid. The possibility of more violence, coupled with the political showdown 
any federal intervention would bring, was not what Kennedy wanted to concentrate on 
heading into a Vienna summit meeting with Nikita Khrushchev in June. The plot 
thickened when Attorney General Robert Kennedy learned that the FBI had information 
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about the Klan plot to attack the Freedom Riders before they arrived in Birmingham, but 
had not alerted Justice Department officials. One of the FBI informants had even 
participated in the violence, gleefully beating several Riders within an inch of their 
lives.91Aware he could not stand by and do nothing, the President advised Robert 
Kennedy to handle the matter. Fearful that prolonging the situation would only lead to 
further bloodshed, the Riders agreed to leave Birmingham and fly to New Orleans by 
plane, bringing their journey to an end. The situation had seemingly been diffused. 92   
But the Freedom Rides were not finished. SNCC members active in the Nashville 
movement joined with John Lewis in a call to resume the protests. When they continued 
into Alabama a few days later, they were arrested in Birmingham under the auspices of 
“protective custody” and driven to the Tennessee line. Undeterred, they returned to 
Birmingham by private car and prepared to resume the Rides. Anxious to get them out of 
Birmingham, the Kennedy administration worked out a deal with Governor Patterson to 
ensure the Riders’ bus was safely escorted to Montgomery by the Alabama Highway 
Patrol. When they arrived, all hell broke loose. No police presence was visible at the 
Montgomery terminal, offering up the Riders to a bloodthirsty mob. Armed with baseball 
bats and iron pipes, the unruly crowd attacked with specificity, targeting the Freedom 
Riders and any journalists who tried to stop the melee, injuring over twenty, some to the 
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point of near-death. Not even Justice Department officials were spared in the violence. 
John Seigenthaler, Assistant to the Attorney General, was beaten unconscious.93  
Though only a few months into his presidential term, Kennedy was face to face 
with a local-turned national civil rights crisis he could not ignore in an international Cold 
War environment he could not control. The violence meted out to Freedom Riders was 
typical of the vigilante-style “justice” celebrated by white officials and white citizens 
alike, and the response of Alabama Governor John Patterson, who publicly bemoaned the 
presence of “agitators” and reiterated that state officials needed no help from the federal 
government in maintaining the law, was typical of the Jim Crow South. The ball was 
effectively in the Kennedy administration’s court, and with the clock winding down 
toward Vienna, the president begrudgingly sent federal marshals into Alabama.94 For the 
Freedom Riders and their supporters, this move indicated possible progress, but they 
quickly learned the situation was far from deescalating. The arrival of Martin Luther 
King, Jr. on the scene to support the Freedom Riders inflamed the anger of Patterson and 
Montgomery’s segregationist devotees, the latter of whom formed an angry mob and 
attacked both the marshals and the Montgomery church they were guarding as a 
community prayer meeting was held inside. Desperate to avoid further federal 
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intervention and restore what authority he could, Patterson declared martial law and 
mobilized the national guard to help marshals disperse the mob.95 
The following day, both the Kennedy administration and Patterson – hyperaware 
of the potential political fallout - employed damage control. Kennedy spun the story as 
one of successful state and federal government coordination to diffuse a difficult situation 
caused by provocation on both sides, while Patterson praised his response to unwanted 
intrusion by the marshals.96 Both were unsurprising responses given their respective 
political concerns. The Kennedy administration supported the legal arguments of the 
Freedom Riders but balked at its direct-action efforts as overtly provocative, while 
Patterson championed himself a staunch defender of white supremacy forced into an 
untenable situation by the federal government. But despite their efforts to state the 
contrary, there was no turning back from the path the Freedom Riders were carving out 
for themselves, nor could their actions be divorced from the growing influence of direct-
action on the movement and its impact on the nation’s standing in the international arena. 
Just as they had after Little Rock, the Russians had a field day printing stories of beaten 
bus passengers in their state-run newspapers, referring to the violent incidents as 
examples of the “wild, bestial mores in a country pretending to teach others how to 
live.”97 
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Evers certainly understood the reality of publicizing such hypocrisy first-hand, 
and he kept a watchful eye on the situation in Alabama as he continued shepherding the 
Mississippi movement forward. Following the library sit-in, black youth implemented 
direct-action protests including an effort to integrate the Jackson public zoo and a movie 
theatre in Vicksburg. The entrance of the Freedom Riders into Mississippi reinforced that 
growing sense of militancy, but the possibility of violent pushback akin to or worse than 
what had occurred in Montgomery threatened to shake the tenuous bonds of solidarity 
that had developed among the city’s black community in the wake of the Easter boycott. 
The stakes were high, and Evers was reticent about Mississippi’s readiness for the 
probable confrontation between activists and rabid segregationists threatening death to 
the Riders when they crossed state lines. This was reiterated by Roy Wilkins, who 
warned the Freedom Riders not to continue their journey into the Magnolia State, or at 
least to postpone it until a later date. Still, Evers knew the spirit of the Freedom Riders 
represented the ‘no gains without pressure’ direction the movement was headed, and 
Mississippi could not be left behind.98 
In comparison to Patterson, Mississippi authorities were better prepared for the 
onslaught of outside agitators headed into their state, largely due to the Kennedy’s 
administration’s efforts to avoid a repeat of the mob violence in Alabama. Unable to 
convince the Freedom Riders to accept his call for “a cooling-off period” and hoping not 
to set off new waves of violence by mobilizing federal marshals to Mississippi, Robert 
Kennedy made a deal with Governor Barnett. In return for their safe passage and 
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protection, the White House agreed not to enforce the Boynton ruling nor interfere in the 
state’s plans to have the Freedom Riders arrested for breach of peace. The decision 
certainly fit the administration’s pattern of prioritizing foreign policy concerns over civil 
rights protections, but it did nothing to stop more Riders from journeying into Mississippi 
and willingly filling jails. If anything, it emboldened the movement to continue and 
expand. Each day, another bus carrying Riders pulled in to the Jackson terminal, bringing 
the total incarcerated to over three-hundred by summer’s end. Law enforcement 
authorities began transferring the jailed activists to penal farms, including the notorious 
Parchman Penitentiary. Riders transferred there endured cruel and demeaning treatment 
at the hands of guards, including being confined to their cells for twenty-four hours a day 
in the maximum-security wing.99 
Frustration over the mass incarceration of the Freedom Riders carried over into 
inter-organizational disputes inside the movement and troubled Evers. In a special report 
to the National Office on the status of the Freedom Rides, he noted the aggressiveness of 
CORE representatives in setting up community workshops without NAACP coordination. 
Far from being rooted in petty organizational competitiveness, Evers’ concerns were 
underpinned by his belief that sustainable direct-action in Mississippi required patient, 
deliberate strategizing by the Association. While he viewed SNCC and CORE members 
as welcome additions to the fight for civil rights, their lack of organizational experience 
in Mississippi left them vulnerable to damaging mistakes that threatened to overturn 
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NAACP gains within the black community.100 Another problem was funding. CORE 
sponsored the Freedom Rides, but bond money for jailed Riders was in short supply. 
Though their actions were not officially sanctioned by the NAACP, Evers’ office 
provided arrested Riders with bail money, often to the detriment of its coffers.101  
Tactical frustrations aside, the pressures placed on federal authorities by the 
Freedom Riders succeeded in compelling the Kennedy administration to ask the Interstate 
Commerce Commission to step in and ban segregation in interstate transport in 
November of 1961. For the Riders who had placed their lives on the line and endured 
some of the most cruel and demeaning treatment imaginable in Mississippi’s 
penitentiaries, the ICC ruling was a substantial victory to build on. Yet Kennedy 
remained reluctant to utilize his enforcement powers for fear of further alienating 
Southern Democrats whose support he still required for his legislative agenda. Because of 
this, he encouraged the development of the Voter Registration Project (VEP), coordinated 
by the Southern Regional Council, to disseminate funds to civil rights organizations 
including the NAACP and SNCC. In emphasizing his support for voter registration, 
Kennedy hoped to shift attention away from direct-action protests. However, there was 
also no denying the continuing influence of the Freedom Rides on Mississippi’s black 
youth. One month after the first buses arrived, four Tougaloo students were arrested and 
jailed for organizing a home-grown Freedom Ride in Jackson. Despite the best efforts of 
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state-sponsored propaganda campaigns to demonize the activists as outside agitators, the 
“Tougaloo Four” were anything but.102  
Maintaining momentum and serving as a connective agent between the NAACP 
and the younger generation inspired to carry out direct-action was an important aspect of 
Evers’ transforming philosophy of activism, as was minimizing missteps. To generate 
solutions to these problems, Evers approached them in his own Mau Mau fashion. He 
altered the NAACP’s strategic approach to fit the changing environment by reviving the 
defunct Council of Federated Organizations (COFO), a coalition of all civil rights 
organizations in the state. At a February 1962 meeting in Jackson at the behest of Evers, 
he and Aaron Henry, Bob Moses of SNCC, and Field Secretary Tom Gaither of CORE 
transformed COFO into an organization that gave the evolving Mississippi movement a 
unified image and funding arm. Through COFO, funds were appropriated from the VEP 
and disseminated out to member organizations for registration campaigns and to pay 
volunteers – mostly SNCC field workers - meager salaries.103 The offering of VEP funds 
had been designed by the Kennedy administration to offset direct-action, but ultimately 
the funds covered them as support for the protests grew among Mississippi’s black youth. 
By committing the state office to COFO, Evers and Henry positioned the NAACP as a 
coordinating entity despite their continued frustrations with SNCC’s encroachment into 
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territory they felt the NAACP had gradually begun infiltrating, including the 
communities of the Delta.104 
Their concerns were well founded. As they canvassed the state, SNCC volunteers 
quickly learned how difficult their goals of registering black voters would be. Bob 
Moses, with the aid and advice of NAACP official Amzie Moore, initiated a voter 
registration projects that included workshops on passing literacy tests and conducting 
non-violent protests. They attracted many black students inspired by the movement’s 
shift toward direct-action, and eventually evolved into sit-ins at bus terminals and 
department stores in the Delta region. For their efforts, they endured violence and arrests 
for breach of peace. This violence included the September 1961 murder of Herbert Lee, a 
black farmer, NAACP member, and SNCC volunteer shot to death in Amite County by 
E.H. Hurst, a member of the Mississippi state legislature. Hurst claimed he shot Lee in 
self-defense during an argument over money, but a black eyewitness named Louis Allen 
claimed he saw Hurst kill Lee in cold blood. Allen feared reprisal for telling the truth, and 
when giving testimony had corroborated Hurst’s story out of fear. Hurst walked away 
from a murder scot-free and from that point forward, Louis Allen wore a target on his 
back.105 As Evers well understood, an organizational apparatus in a state of flux was little 
match for the full force of the state’s white power structure. Building on the foundation 
constructed by the NAACP was imperative for SNCC, but pushing too fast had the 
potential to frighten the black community back into silence.106 
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That the Mississippi movement did not collapse under the weight of these 
challenges was a testament to Evers’ fortitude and abilities to alter strategy on the ground 
while holding to the spirit of his original intent in joining the NAACP. COFO provided 
its members with a crucial space for communication and sharing, as well as serving as a 
collective mouthpiece for the state’s civil rights organizations when dealing with white 
officials. While the national office remained wary of other civil rights organizations 
operating in the state, Evers considered supporting the members of NAACP youth 
councils working with SNCC and CORE paramount to the movement’s evolution in 
Mississippi. According to Michael Vinson Williams, the growth of direct-action 
campaigns provided black youth “an opportune time to organize and participate in the 
struggle as soldiers of liberation rather than spectators of fortune.”107 
One of those young people was James Meredith. A native of Attala County, his 
early life and personality somewhat mirrored Evers. Meredith was a U.S. Air Force vet 
who had looked up to his father, a registered voter with a reputation for not backing down 
to whites. Inspired by “a new spirit” sweeping through the state’s black communities, he 
told Evers of his plans to apply at the University of Mississippi at Oxford. Evers 
promised him legal aid, but after alerting the National Office learned the NAACP 
remained averse to challenging segregation in higher education in Mississippi. Thurgood 
Marshall was irked by Evers’ offer of support, not only because it had not been cleared 
by the National Office first, but also because he believed integrating Ole Miss was still as 
risky as it had been when Evers wanted to enroll a decade earlier. Meredith took this as a 
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sign that the NAACP was of no use to him, but Evers hoped integration of Ole Miss 
would inspire black community support for NAACP voter registration and desegregation 
efforts across the state. Only after he carefully massaged the situation, which included 
him serving as a mediating voice on phone calls between Meredith and Marshall, did the 
Legal Defense Fund agree to take the case. Not only did Evers guarantee the NAACP 
backed Meredith, but his actions were another example of his growing willingness to 
challenge the National Office on matters deemed too dangerous to consider.108 
Steeped in lost cause mythology, the institutional identity of Ole Miss was 
revered as a powerful symbol of segregation, especially in the era of post-Brown massive 
resistance. Efforts by Ole Miss officials and state representatives to repeatedly block 
registration attempts bolstered this reality.109 However, the pressures exerted on 
Mississippi’s white power structure via direct-action protests revealed growing fissures 
between the Sovereignty Commission and the citizens’ councils. In a May 1962 
commencement address entitled “The Practical Way to Maintain a Separate School 
System in Mississippi,” Sovereignty Commission Public Relations Director Erle Johnston 
bemoaned the presence of “militant hot heads of both races” as barriers to racial 
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harmony. Evers condemned the speech, as did Citizens’ Council leaders who deemed it a 
conciliatory nod to eventual integration. Jackson County Council President Clarence W. 
McGowen went so far as to suggest the Commission was “infiltrated by our enemies” and 
called for its elimination. Johnston’s speech was publicly endorsed by only one elected 
administrative official, William F. Winter, a notable moderate on race relations. 
Undeterred by the unpopularity of his position, Johnston hit back at the Councils, 
denouncing them as power-hungry entities whose “chief objective in Mississippi now 
appears to be making white people hate other white people.”110 
While the situation did not bear resemblance to the Hola Massacre, it derived a 
strategic principal from that tragic event modified to fit the situation in Mississippi. 
Forcing federal intervention had the potential to continue driving wedges between the 
white power structure over the issue of “bad publicity” in a similar fashion. Meredith 
well understood this. In an interview given three decades after the ordeal, he maintained 
the Kennedy administration “would do nothing on my agenda” if they were not 
compelled to employ troops against Mississippi’s state forces.111 One month after 
Johnston delivered his address, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling in 
his case that made it possible for Meredith to sow that discord across state-federal lines 
and in the halls of the Jackson statehouse. Reversing a lower court decision, the Fifth 
Circuit Court affirmed Meredith had been denied entry into Ole Miss because of his race 
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and ordered an injunction forcing the university to admit him as a student.112 In a 
response aired statewide on television and radio, Governor Barnett labeled the situation 
the biggest crisis in Mississippi since the Civil War, declared social integration a step 
toward genocide, and reassured white citizens he would stand firm the “naked and 
arbitrary power” of the federal government.113 Barnett’s bloviating intended to pressure 
the Kennedy administration to back down from possible intervention just as much as it 
was to stir his segregationist base. In Washington, the president and his staff searched for 
ways to avoid another federal-state showdown that might dissolve into violence and 
would certainly complicate his bid for renomination in 1964.114 
But Meredith was determined to force the Kennedy administration to employ 
troops to help him successfully desegregate the university, and the NAACP backed his 
strategy, declaring anything less than federal military intervention in Mississippi 
“strengthens the hand of racists there and everywhere.”115 Though the situation was 
rapidly escalating, tensions still running high from the Johnston dust-up influenced 
Barnett’s decision to keep the Sovereignty Commission largely on the sidelines during 
the Ole Miss affair.116 Nevertheless, attorney and Sovereignty Commission Thomas 
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Watkins, an attorney with a reputation as a reasonable negotiator, was instrumental in 
crafting a solution that would concede to federal intervention yet help Barnett save face. 
This included a suggestion that Meredith register by entering through the back door of the 
registrar’s office while Barnett stood guard at the front, allowing the governor to claim he 
was misled by the Kennedy administration. Ultimately, Barnett balked at this plan after 
attending the Ole Miss-Kentucky game, where thousands of football fans praised his 
defense of segregation.117 President Kennedy responded by federalizing the Mississippi 
National Guard to campus, after which a bloody riot broke out when a mob of armed 
segregationists pelted the soldiers with rocks and bottles. By the time federal marshals 
were dispatched and order was restored, scores were injured and two people were 
dead.118 
Once again, the Kennedy administration found itself compelled to intervene in the 
South. By forcing federal intervention, Meredith’s enrollment had broken another 
significant barrier to black equality in Mississippi and fortified the importance of 
American race relations in its foreign policy. Overseas, newspapers stretching from 
England to India followed the story, highlighting American hypocrisy and questioning 
the federal government’s concerns for its black citizens.119 However, after he ordered 
federal troops into Mississippi, accounts overwhelmingly praised Kennedy’s handling of 
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the crisis, with the Swedish newspaper Stokhoms-Tidningen going so far as to declare 
“[t]here is hardly to be found a corresponding example in the world of a Government so 
powerfully protecting the rights of a minority.” Chester Bowles praised Kennedy’s 
intervention in the Meredith situation as “a turning point not only in our struggle against 
segregation in this country, but in our efforts to make the people of Asia, Africa, and 
Latin American understand what we are trying to do.”120 Though Kennedy had been 
reluctant to intervene, there was no doubt his decision to do so had garnered positive 
press coverage abroad, and he reminded Mississippians in a televised address that the 
eyes of the world were upon them.121 
Desperate to hit back, Barnett blamed the Oxford riot on the Kennedy 
administration, while Citizen Council representatives took credit for encouraging the 
governor and the students to defy federal authorities.122 But try as they might to spin the 
story as one of noble resistance, state officials could no longer claim Mississippi’s 
educational system was segregated. Sovereignty Commission efforts to revitalize its 
image by proposing an acceleration of the speakers’ bureau program failed to garner 
support for Barnett’s actions outside of the Jim Crow South. With frustrations running 
high, it was unsurprising that Johnston’s ascension to the directorship of the Commission 
the following March was met with protest by members and supporters of the Councils 
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who deemed it a move toward accommodationism.123 For Medgar Evers, the Ole Miss 
case was a substantial victory for the advancing Mississippi movement. In remarks 
published on the eve of Meredith’s enrollment, Evers announced black Mississippians 
were “more determined now than ever to demand their full Constitutional rights” and 
alerted observers to “look for an acceleration in the tempo of the civil rights struggle,” 
including new voter registration campaigns and integration efforts by black students 
statewide.124  
By the autumn of 1962, that acceleration was visible in and around Jackson. In 
August, the NAACP sponsored a petition to desegregate the city’s public schools, while 
the North Jackson NAACP Youth Council planned to carry out a series of direct-action 
protests downtown. Together with representatives from SNCC and CORE, the youth 
council members proposed a boycott of the Mississippi State Fair and of Capitol Street 
businesses that came to be known as the Jackson movement. Inspired by the rising 
atmosphere of resistance and building on the organizational precedent established by 
Evers, participants aimed to disrupt the downtown economy until city officials integrated 
public spaces and businesses discontinued discriminatory practices toward black 
customers and employees. Militant and determined to exploit the segregationists’ hard-
line strategy, these students were the foot soldiers Evers had long worked to embolden, 
an army of Mississippi Mau Maus united in their desire to protect and defend their home 
transformed into a vanguard for change. By utilizing public and commercial spaces as 
sites of black resistance, the protests linked the experiences of Jackson’s urban 
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population to the work of movement activists in rural areas, placing emphasis on 
solidarity among the masses as an essential element in the NAACP’s Operation 
Mississippi publicity campaign.125  
To publicize their efforts and enlist financial help, the North Jackson Youth 
Council published a newsletter called the North Jackson Action. Evers, who had 
embarked on a six month fundraising tour following Meredith’s enrollment, encouraged 
the students to use the newsletter to raise funds for bail money in addition to sharing 
information about their planned protests. John Salter, a recently-arrived Tougaloo 
College sociology professor and veteran of the labor movement, served as the youth 
council’s advisor and worked with Evers to prepare for the response from Mississippi 
authorities, including harassment, obstructionism, and possible state-sanctioned police 
violence. As the second week of October neared, Jackson movement participants called 
on the city’s black community to boycott the segregated State Fair activities. A thousand 
boycott leaflets were distributed in Jackson while Evers issued an NAACP release calling 
for black citizens to remain at home.126 
By the third day of the boycott, Evers declared it 95 percent effective, dwarfing 
previous NAACP efforts to target the event.127 For members of the Jackson movement, it 
represented a strong first step on the path to uniting the black community to challenge 
city-wide segregation. Next was a boycott of downtown businesses during the Christmas 
season, proposed by Evers and similar to a boycott in Clarksdale the previous year led by 
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Aaron Henry and the Coahoma County NAACP. The results there had been mixed. 
Henry announced the boycott was about 40 percent effective, but his encouragement of 
participation from CORE, SCLC, and SNCC representatives frustrated Gloster Current 
and Roy Wilkins, who disliked Henry’s willingness to include members of other 
organizations in NAACP operations.128 Even following COFO’s inception, NAACP 
national officers including Wilkins remained wary of issuing public support for inter-
organizational campaigns, particularly those that relied on NAACP funding. For Evers, 
the National Office’s resistance had become an increasingly frustrating barrier, but 
investment in the development of youth activism reinforced his hope in the success of the 
Jackson movement.129 
John Salter echoed Evers’ irritation with the National Office, especially when he 
observed a “climate of fear” on display at the 17th Annual Mississippi State Conference 
of Branches held in Jackson that November. Wilkins, Current, Ruby Hurley, National 
Youth Director Laplois Ashford, and other high-ranking officials were on hand to discuss 
the promotion of voter registration drives, community relations efforts, and desegregation 
campaigns. Yet it was only in the meetings of youth delegates where Salter witnessed 
visible excitement for boycotts and direct-action. Skeptical adults present in these 
meetings seemed inspired by the words of their youthful members, but Salter better 
understood the magnitude of the challenge Evers faced in shepherding the Jackson 
movement forward. Evers pressed on as always, continuing his fundraising tour as the 
North Jackson Action ran a call-to-arms titled “Start Putting Your Money on Strike.” 
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Youth Council members assembled at Salter’s home to strategize and were joined by 
dozens of new students from Tougaloo, who announced their intention to revive the 
defunct Tougaloo College NAACP chapter.130  
The Youth Council zeroed in on four principle goals for the boycott, including a 
demand for courtesy titles for black customers, guaranteed service on a first-come, first-
serve basis, equality in hiring and promotion, and the desegregation of restrooms, seating, 
and water fountains.131 One hundred-fifty downtown businesses were involved, and the 
boycott was officially sponsored by the North Jackson and West Jackson youth councils, 
Jackson and Campbell College NAACP chapters, and representatives of CORE and 
SNCC. As students distributed leaflets and made telephone calls, Salter proposed the 
campaign include picketing in the downtown area to garner additional press attention. 
When Salter and five other picketers walked to the front of the Woolworth store on 
Capitol Street, they were met by almost fifty police officers and a handful of newspaper 
reporters. The increased police presence was deliberate and sent a message: protesters 
would not be tolerated. Salter and the other five picketers were quickly arrested on 
charges of obstructing the sidewalk.132   
The arrests marked the beginning of the white power structure’s efforts to push 
back against the Jackson movement, but the energy built regardless. By February of 
1963, Aaron Henry announced the boycott was almost 70 percent effective and had 
driven four or five downtown stores out of business.133 This increase was especially 
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important given the threat of additional arrests and the National Office’s failure to 
provide bond money for the original six picketers, mention the boycott in the pages of the 
Crisis, or file the Jackson school-desegregation suit that had been prepared by Evers 
months prior. Divisions within the upper echelons of the Association regarding the 
efficacy of direct-action and a slow response to the movement in Mississippi would have 
been infuriating nonetheless, but the fact that the boycott was growing while the National 
Office dragged its feet widened the chasm between it and Evers. Despite these 
roadblocks, however, the Jackson movement played an important role in encouraging 
solidarity within the city’s black community and linking the struggles of black 
Mississippians in both urban and rural areas to a larger network of activism across the 
state. By early Spring of 1963, Aaron Henry had transformed COFO into a coordinating 
entity connecting SNCC projects in the Delta to support networks in other areas of the 
state, and Evers spent an increasing amount of time traveling across Mississippi to shore 
up NAACP branches and encourage other COFO-supported campaigns. Though he 
remained concerned about SNCC’s lack of organizational discipline, he acknowledged its 
positive influence on the youth movement. To cut ties with them entirely would not only 
have alienated blacks in the Delta, but fractured the network connecting students hard at 
work in both rural and urban areas.134 
 The situation shifted in April of 1963, when the National Office made an about face 
and set about promoting the Jackson movement with aplomb. Jackson movement 
participants whispered Wilkins’ decision to throw his support behind the boycott was 
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caused by fears the SCLC, with Martin Luther King, Jr. at its helm, might turn its eyes to 
a state-wide campaign in Mississippi and challenge the NAACP’s foothold there.135 
Initiated earlier that month, the SCLC’s Birmingham campaign drew public attention to 
segregation in Alabama and forced city officials to desegregate public facilities. The 
intransigence of white officials on full display, culminating in attacks by police officers 
and dogs on innocent children, shocked the world and prompted President Kennedy to 
send Attorney General Burke Marshall to Birmingham to mediate an end to the crisis.136 
But discussions between the national officers about the situation were anything but softly 
whispered. Gloster current quickly fired off memorandums to the branches that 
practically shouted the need for them to accelerate direct-action protests. If the SCLC 
moved into Jackson or any other major Southern cities with NAACP projects underway, 
Current argued it would “make it that much harder for the NAACP to carry on its work 
effectively.”137  
While these reasons for concern were not surprising to Evers, he also understood 
Birmingham created momentum the Jackson movement could not let pass it by. Given 
the significance of the images from Birmingham, he did not hesitate to take advantage of 
opportunities to promote the Jackson movement on television. On May 20, 1963, he gave 
a televised response to criticism of the Jackson movement by Mayor Allen Thompson, 
who declared Jackson’s black citizens satisfied with race relations and the boycott the 
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work of outside agitators. Evers countered with a blistering speech in which positioned 
the work of the NAACP and the experiences of black Mississippians within a 
transnational framework. Just as black Jacksonians “learned about the new free nations in 
Africa” and saw “black prime ministers and ambassadors, financiers and technicians,” so 
too did the rest of the world see “what white people are doing.”138 
 Thompson’s public proclamation of racial harmony fell on deaf ears inside the 
Jackson movement, though black business leaders and ministers in support of the boycott 
agreed to meet the mayor with a list of demands that expanded on the original four set 
forth by the Youth Council. With the NAACP’s blessing, these included demands of 
salary increases for black municipal employees, the hiring of black police officers and 
crossing guards, and the desegregation of all public schools. Though some of these 
individuals had quietly supported civil rights activity, their willingness to meet the mayor 
head on reinforced the importance of the Jackson movement in spurring community 
solidarity. Their efforts were in vain, however. Thompson refused to accept the bulk of 
the demands, and less than a week later, more demonstrations were planned for 
downtown Jackson. On May 28th, a group of student volunteers joined Salter for a 
planned sit-in at the Woolworth lunch counter, where they were met by a jeering mob. 
Photographs captured the horror of their experiences as dozens of angry white men 
accused the protestors of being communist stooges and brutally beat, spat upon, and 
covered them with food and drinks. Police officers stood aside and allowed the mob to 
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torment the protesters for two hours until the store manager turned off the lights and 
closed for the day.139  
 Undeterred, Salter and the students planned for additional more sit-ins and picketing, 
bolstered by classes on non-violent sit-in techniques offered by representatives from 
CORE at the NAACP headquarters in Jackson.140 Almost a thousand black Jacksonians – 
members of the NAACP and many who had never participated in civil rights activity 
before - packed the Pearl Street Church that evening to show their support. After an 
invocation delivered by Reverend Ed King and spirited renditions of several freedom 
songs, Evers reminded those in attendance “this is only the beginning!” and was greeted 
by loud applause.141 Editorials in the next day’s Jackson Daily News and Clarion-Ledger 
accused the demonstrators of being outside agitators and stooges manipulated by the 
“red” NAACP, but the overall tone of the city’s segregationist news media was one of 
escalating concern.142 Students had led the way, and adults in Jackson were waking up to 
join them, calling for a “massive desegregation drive.” On May 31st, hundreds of students 
from Jackson High Schools staged a march that pitted them against scores of helmeted 
police officers. With what Salter described as “cold-blooded, mechanical efficiency,” he 
and Evers watched as officers shoved and clubbed students, tore banners and flags from 
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their hands, and ushered them into garbage trucks. By the end of the day, over five 
hundred people were arrested and locked up in make-shift jails at the state fairgrounds.143  
 The NAACP’s public reaction was swift. Roy Wilkins, who had recently arrived in 
Jackson to personally participate in promoting its movement and, subsequently, block 
any efforts by the SCLC to institute its own project, held a press conference to condemn 
the “Nazi-type tactics” used to break up the protest and promise the Association would 
continue to back the Jackson campaign. Evers noted Jackson’s youth were ready to march 
in more mass demonstrations and that the NAACP was proceeding with care.144 Wilkins, 
when asked by students if he would participate himself, agreed to protest. The following 
afternoon, he and Evers were arrested alongside Helen Wilcher for picketing on Capitol 
Street.145 Jackson newspapers cheered the arrests as part of the crackdown on 
demonstrations, with the Jackson Daily News gleefully adding numbers to the “agitation 
box score” it printed on its front page. But the arrests only further galvanized young 
members of the movement. When Wilkins and Evers returned to the NAACP 
headquarters in downtown’s Masonic Temple, they were met by John Salter and students 
lined up with signs and flags, ready to head out on another march for freedom. Then a 
strange thing happened. Wilkins announced no new marches were planned. Salter was 
confused. Because of the publicity they brought to the Jackson movement, he thought it 
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probable to assume mass demonstrations would continue. Just as the Jackson movement 
picked up steam, the National Office seemed intent on slowing it down.146 
  According to Wilkins, the Jackson movement was headed in a new direction. Rather 
than mass demonstrations, its focus was on a widening of the boycott and a renewed 
emphasis on voter registration and legal challenges in the courts. Given increased 
participation in the Jackson movement by members of the city’s black community, there 
was hope it would translate to the Association’s core programs. But this public 
explanation was not satisfactory for everyone behind-the-scenes. If anything, it revealed 
the limits to which the National Office was willing to go regarding direct-action. Despite 
his arrest for picketing, Wilkins had no desire to be a Martin Luther King, engaging in 
civil disobedience and braving arrests to martyr himself for the cause of justice. The 
nature of direct-action threatened the respectable organization he expected the NAACP to 
be, disciplined and devoid of radical influence.147 This decision demoralized Evers, who 
showed increasing signs of physical and mental exhaustion. He was routinely harassed by 
police, his home had been pelted by Molotov cocktails and spammed by menacing phone 
calls, and he had little time to rest. Shifting away from mass demonstrations effectively 
pushed the students and community organizers back to the margins. For Evers, this 
amounted to a retreat from the militant direction the Jackson movement had taken, and he 
quietly told Myrlie he was considering leaving the Association altogether and finding a 
new means of organizing grassroots direct-action efforts for change.148 
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He never got the chance. Before Evers could come to a final decision about his 
future, he was murdered in his driveway in the early morning hours of June 12th. It was less 
than two weeks after his arrest in front of the Woolworth’s on Capitol Street and only a 
few hours after John F. Kennedy had endorsed the passage of a federal civil rights bill in a 
televised address. After years of public pronouncements calling for civil rights leaders to 
push for gradual changes in American race relations, the president changed course. In his 
speech, Kennedy highlighted the international scope of America’s “moral crisis,” noting 
Americans were “committed to a worldwide struggle to promote and protect all those who 
wish to be free.” National civil rights leaders lauded his message. Martin Luther King 
called the speech “a hallmark in the annals of American history” that would “bring a new 
sense of hope to the millions of disinherited people of our country.” Roy Wilkins offered 
his praise as well, though he noted Kennedy failed to include a focus on discrimination in 
employment in addition to his calls for desegregation.149   
Kennedy’s views on race in America certainly shifted during his time in office, but 
there was no doubt the catalyst of his speech was the escalating situation in Alabama. On 
the heels of the Birmingham crisis, attempts by black students Vivian Malone and James 
Hood to enroll at the University of Alabama led to standoff between Alabama Governor 
George Wallace and the Kennedy administration. After a federal court injunction was 
issued ordering the university to desegregate, Wallace, who made headlines when he had 
proudly exclaimed “segregation now! Segregation tomorrow! Segregation forever!” at his 
inauguration, stood in the doorway of the registration center with a contingent of state 
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troopers. In response, Kennedy federalized the Alabama National Guard to escort the 
students in to be registered, after which Wallace reluctantly stepped aside.150 No violence 
followed the situation as it had at Ole Miss the year prior, but Kennedy was concerned 
violent incidents might increase should “street demonstrations” continue. Civil rights 
legislation would offer federal protections to “get this…out of the street” and, perhaps just 
as importantly, out of the newspapers. Direct-action was working to force federal action.151 
Evers watched the historic presidential address and then attended a mass meeting 
at the New Jerusalem Baptist Church. According to several participants, Evers praised the 
brave souls willing to continue picketing stores and promoted a voter registration drive, 
but he looked tired and sad.152 Kennedy’s speech was an eloquent promise to protect the 
rights Evers had spent so long fighting to achieve in Mississippi. Yet just as his years of 
embattled organizing began yielding fruit, his efforts to push the movement forward were 
cut off at the knees by Wilkins and the National Office. Jackson’s white officials refused 
to back down to desegregation demands. On June 6th, Mayor Thompson encouraged the 
Hinds County Chancery Court to issue an injunction restraining the NAACP, CORE, and 
movement participants from carrying out boycotts and public demonstrations. Attendance 
at mass meetings fell, and the energy of militancy surrounding the Jackson movement 
diminished. Dave Dennis, who had been conducting classes on nonviolence, returned to 
the Delta region with several others to work in SNCC projects. They were followed out of 
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town by several newspaper reporters who no longer felt the need to stay around for 
lengthier periods of time. The movement had stalled. Evers’ death would deal it another 
devastating blow.153 
Given the escalation of death threats he endured in the final year of his life, it was 
as unsurprising as it was tragic his was taken by an assassin’s bullet. Shot in the back by a 
gunman hidden in a vacant lot across the street, Evers managed to crawl the thirty or so 
feet to his front porch before collapsing in a heap. Myrlie and the children opened the door 
to find Evers barely breathing and losing his battle with consciousness. Amidst the chaos, 
neighbors arrived to help assess the situation and provide transport to the hospital, but there 
was little hope for survival. Even in his semi-conscious state, Evers seemed to understand 
this. Or perhaps in those last moments, he felt he had done everything he could. The last 
words he spoke before succumbing to his wounds were “turn me loose.” Back at the house, 
frightened onlookers watched as Jackson police officers assessed the scene. On the 
driveway, a stack of sweatshirts lay amidst piles of Evers’ papers, covered in blood. Written 
across the front of the sweatshirts, in bold lettering, were the words “Jim Crow Must 
Go.”154 
News of the assassination sent shockwaves across the nation and seemed to 
reinforce the fears of Wilkins and others who believed escalating direct-action protests 
would lead to additional violence. But the reality of the situation was far more complex. 
Throughout his career, Evers had learned to live with fear and relentlessly pushed forward, 
never wavering in his goals to dismantle Mississippi’s white supremacist system. In nine 
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years with the NAACP, he almost single-handily compelled the National Office to not only 
pay attention to Mississippi’s plight, but to force the federal government and the world to 
see it too. In the process, he helped embolden a new generation to action across urban/rural 
and class lines. In the years that followed his murder, Mississippi became ground zero for 
the national movement, led by young activists determined to push against the white power 
structure at all costs. They were Mau Mau in Mississippi.
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CONCLUSION: 
 
“HISTORY HAS REACHED A TURNING POINT, HERE AND OVER THE WORLD” 
 
As the sun rose on the day of his funeral, five thousand people made their way 
into the Masonic Temple to celebrate the life of Medgar Evers. People packed into every 
available space inside the main hall, and those who could not find room spilled into the 
corridors. Seated in the front row with her children was Myrlie Evers, the personification 
of strength and grace. For almost a decade, she had worked alongside Medgar to procure 
black freedom in Mississippi. His sacrifice was hers too. She had lost her husband. Her 
children had lost a father. Next to her sat Charles Evers. Always the troublemaker of the 
family, his was not the life ultimately taken by violence. The absurdity of the moment 
was not lost on him. Seated a few rows behind them in a reserved section of the 
auditorium was Martin Luther King, Jr. and several SCLC associates. On stage were Roy 
Wilkins, U.S. diplomat Ralph Bunch, and other NAACP officials. Dr. T.R.M. Howard 
gave the eulogy. Throughout the room stood people from all walks of life and places in 
Mississippi. They came from the Delta, the Gulf Coast, the pine belt, and the hill country. 
They were young and old, students, professionals, ministers, businessmen, homemakers, 
and farmers. Many had participated in mass demonstrations or voter registration drives, 
but some had not. As the music swelled, their voices raised in chorus. We shall 
overcome.1 
 Outside, city officials steeled themselves for the mass march from the Masonic 
Temple to the Collins Funeral Home. As the throng of thousands exited the ceremony, 
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law enforcement officers lined the streets while photographers and news cameras grabbed 
close-up footage. For two hours, marchers slowly walked in 102-degree heat. The line of 
people, dressed in their Sunday best and carrying bibles, stretched so far it was difficult 
to see where it ended. At the front of the column were several Jackson ministers, Roy 
Wilkins, and Dr. King. When they turned into the black business neighborhood and 
reached the funeral home, the marchers stopped. For several moments, it was quiet and 
still until a voice rang out in song and spread over the crowd. Oh, freedom! Oh, freedom 
over me. And before I’ll be a slave, I’ll be buried in my grave, and go home to my Lord 
and be free. The police officers, in their blue helmets and night sticks, demanded the 
marchers return home. The song changed. This little light of mine. One by one, people 
turned their eyes toward downtown and sang. All over Capitol Street, I’m going to let it 
shine! Then the crowd surged toward the intersection of Farish and Capitol, demanding 
equality and justice for Medgar Evers. John Salter, caught up in the stream of people, 
noted “there was no fear, no fear-based apathy, no servility, no more of the past of 
Jackson and Mississippi, not even a spirit of violence – only the toughness bred by hard 
lifetimes combining with the hopes and the aspirations of generations into a determined 
and powerful forward thrust.”2 
Though the marchers did not display fear, police officers did. As the crowd 
moved toward them, they broke into a run and retreated down Capitol to form a new 
barricade. The summer heat had reached a boil as the marchers closed in on the 
intersection, sweating, singing, and crying out for freedom. Back at the Masonic Temple, 
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Dr. King watched as the mass demonstration took shape, but was quickly whisked away 
by aides who feared for his life. Only a few hours after he arrived in Jackson, he headed 
back to the airport. In the street, police officers unleashed dogs, mercilessly beat 
marchers with their guns and clubs, held them at gunpoint, and herded twenty-seven 
people into paddy wagons. In response, someone threw a brick at the officers and others 
joined in. As the demonstration dissolved into a melee of violence, Justice Department 
officials and cameramen rushed to document the situation. For several more minutes, the 
battle between police and angry marchers raged on until John Doar, Assistant Attorney 
General in the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, walked forward, arms 
outstretched, and implored the crowd to disperse. He was soon joined by CORE’s Dave 
Dennis and the NAACP’s Willie Ludden. Together, they convinced the angry crowd to 
disperse, and the confrontation come to an end.3 
It was the largest black protest in the history of Mississippi.4 News accounts of 
that day differed in their coverage of the demonstration and ensuing violence. 
Predictably, Jackson’s mainstream newspapers praised the brutally repressive tactics of 
the officers and blamed the situation on white outside agitators resolved to destroy the 
city’s peaceful race relations. White Mississippians refused to believe blacks were 
capable of leading mass demonstrations, even in their angry and mournful state.5 Articles 
in national black newspapers underscored the sense of despondency permeating Jackson 
and black communities across the nation. In the Chicago Defender, columnist Alfred 
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4 Salter, Jackson, Mississippi, 219. 
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Duckett asked “how abysmally deep is hate?” An editorial by Ray Abrams in the 
Baltimore Afro-American described the Mississippi capitol as no less repressive than it 
was in 1846.6 Writing for the New York Times, veteran civil rights reporter Claude Sitton 
was circumspect in his description of the events. He carefully reconstructed each moment 
and highlighted the frustration felt by many in the Jackson movement at the more 
moderate aims of Wilkins and recently arrived NAACP officials. Though the violence 
was the top story, his report on the frustrations of the militant students provided them a 
degree of legitimacy missing from the analysis of other mainstream outlets.7  
This publicity was particularly important given the situation that unfolded inside 
the Pearl Street Church following the day’s riotous events. Once the crowd was 
dispersed, Gloster Current called together a meeting of NAACP officials and the Jackson 
movement strategy committee. From the moment the meeting began, it was clear to John 
Salter that NAACP officials, partnered with conservative ministers, had decided to end 
the mass direct-action phase of the movement. There was talk of federal involvement, but 
when pressed to explain what that meant, NAACP officials were vague. They also 
pushed back against additional SNCC involvement on the strategy committee, which 
prompted several SNCC representatives and Salter to walk out in protest. According to 
Salter, the decision to end the first real mass movement in Jackson, “in the most 
intractably segregated state in the Union, a movement that had the full support of the 
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grassroots people and that had plowed through mass arrests, widespread police brutality, 
and murder…seemed like a nightmare.”8   
His despair was well-founded. The success of the Jackson movement led SNCC, 
CORE, and the SCLC to publicly declare they would shift more field secretaries and 
volunteers to participate in the protests. Students from Jackson, its surrounding areas, and 
the rural parts of the state were ready to converge on the city and press the movement 
forward. For the first time since Evers began his work nine years before, the people had 
come together across rural/urban and class lines in mass demonstrations and linked 
themselves with the larger movement for black freedom nationwide. In the televised 
speech he gave a few days before his murder, he declared “history has reached a turning 
point, here and over the world,” and added “how much better to have turbulence to effect 
improvement, rather than turbulence to maintain a stand-pat policy.” In a tragically ironic 
way, Evers’ death was a catalyst for the expansion of that turbulence and the culmination 
of his efforts to unite black Mississippians and induce them to shake the foundations of 
white supremacy in Mississippi until it was destroyed.9 
NAACP national officials disagreed. Rather than celebrate the sense of inter-
organizational solidarity brought on by Evers’ death, they viewed it with suspicion. This 
was especially true after the violence broke out at the intersection of Capitol and Farish. 
No one was more direct about this than Roy Wilkins. At an NAACP rally in Alexandria, 
Virginia the day after the funeral, Wilkins delivered what Washington Post staff reporter 
Anita Ehrman described as a “bitter attack on rival Negro civil rights groups for claiming 
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credit for advances won by the NAACP.” He specifically named CORE and King’s 
SCLC as groups that “start a little and then rush off somewhere else. They are here today, 
gone tomorrow.” Only the NAACP, he argued, could sustain and financially afford a long 
fight for civil rights in America. Giving money to one of the other organizations instead 
of the NAACP was, in his estimation, “like a Baptist church giving money to a 
Presbyterian church.” Where Evers had come to appreciate the contributions of rival civil 
rights organizations and worked to coordinate better communication among them, 
Wilkins continued to view them as a threat. In the months to come, he urged NAACP 
supporters to engage in Association campaigns pressuring Congress to pass federal civil 
rights legislation, which he claimed would “take care of most of the problems that have 
arisen.”10 
Just as Evers had understood and exploited, those problems were best understood 
within an international context. But just as mass demonstrations across the South had 
forced Kennedy to intervene in support of civil rights activists, the violence in Jackson 
threatened to undermine the image of stability the administration cultivated and the 
success of the civil rights legislation working its way through Congress by the summer of 
1963. With that in mind, NAACP officials supported behind-the-scenes efforts by Robert 
F. Kennedy to negotiate a peace settlement and concessions with local black ministers in 
Jackson. Those concessions included the hiring of six black police officers and eight 
crossing guards, the promotion of one black garbage truck driver, and consent for seven 
black municipal workers to operate heavy machinery. There was to be no biracial 
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committee, desegregation of public facilities, or any new mass demonstrations in the city. 
It was a slap in the face to the people who gathered at the mass meeting to hear the 
mayor’s concessions read aloud. But the group voted ten-to-one to accept the concessions 
anyway. According to Dorie Ladner, one of the first Tougaloo students and NAACP 
youth council members to promote the use of mass demonstrations in Jackson, angry 
meeting participants accepted the agreement under duress. To do otherwise would have 
led to “all out war and likely more loss of life.”11 
By the end of June, 1963, the direct-action phase of the Jackson movement was 
over. For many of the young militant students who willingly risked their lives to protest 
and spent nights jailed like cattle at the state fair grounds, the peace settlement was a 
betrayal of everything they and Medgar Evers had stood for. NAACP officials pressed 
the need to continue participating in voter registration drives as Congress debated civil 
rights legislation, but several students left Jackson altogether. Some returned to their 
homes, while many others moved on to participation in SNCC-led projects in 
Mississippi’s rural areas. In the meantime, Jackson residents turned their attention to the 
investigation and trial of the man accused of murdering Evers, forty-two-year-old 
Greenwood resident and Citizens’ Council member Byron De La Beckwith. A salesman 
for a fertilizer company, Marine Corps veteran, and avid collector of guns, Beckwith was 
described by friends as “a chronic letter-writer on the racial issue.” In one of those letters, 
published by the Jackson Daily News in April of 1957, Beckwith declared that during 
World War II, “I proudly served my nation in a segregated Marine Corps. We fought on a 
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segregated battlefield to preserve the right and privileges of all Americans.” His belief in 
segregation, he explained, was a strong as his belief in God.12  
Like a hunter stalking his prey, Beckwith tracked Evers for days before he shot 
him. On several occasions his car slowly crept past the Masonic Temple as members of 
the Jackson movement conferred inside. There was no questioning his intent. Beckwith 
planned to murder Evers and was searching for the perfect opportunity. He found it on 
the night of June 12th as he lay hidden in a vacant lot across the street from Evers’ home. 
Because of the uptick in threats to his life, Evers worried about the possibility of someone 
hiding there and warned his wife and children to always exit their car on the right side 
and under the cover of darkness when returning home at night. Just as Beckwith 
understood the importance of perfect angles in sharpshooting, so did Evers. But the 
precautions he took were not enough to save him. Beckwith’s weapon of choice was a 
model 1917 Enfield high-powered rifle with an attached United telescopic sight, loaded 
with seven Super Speed Springfield live rounds. The bullet hit Evers with such force and 
produced so much damage that Jack Young, who arrived on the scene minutes later, 
remarked he never knew there was so much blood in the human body. The rifle was 
discovered half concealed in nearby woods amidst honeysuckle vines and contained one 
fingerprint on the scope. On the twelfth day of the investigation by local police and FBI 
agents, Beckwith was arrested and charged with murder.13  
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13 Williams, Medgar Evers, 291. 
  
 315 
His trial commenced seven months later in Jackson. Despite District Attorney Bill 
Waller’s efforts to construct a strong case against Beckwith, the atmosphere of the 
proceedings was circus-like from the beginning. The Mississippi legislature allowed the 
courtroom to be integrated to avoid accusations of racial bias, but on several occasions 
Governor Ross Barnett confidently strode into the chamber, shook hands with Beckwith, 
and conversed with him in front of the all-white male jurors.14 These actions were 
consistent with his Barnett’s initial reaction to Evers’ death. Though he promised 
cooperation with federal authorities to locate the perpetrator and that justice would be 
served, his words lacked conviction or sympathy. “Apparently, it was a dastardly act,” he 
remarked.15 Local news coverage was condemnatory of the murder, including Beckwith’s 
hometown newspaper, the Greenwood Commonwealth, which denounced the killing as a 
savage crime committed by a warped soul. But for all the shock and public rebukes by 
white Mississippians, there was no precedent for a murder conviction and few people 
expected one. Beckwith was on trial in a system designed to protect him, not Evers.16 
If this was not obvious to some outside observers, it was to Beckwith. He was 
jovial at times during the proceedings, chatting with jury members, drinking soda pop, 
and offering cigars to Prosecutor William Waller. His defense centered on the argument 
his rifle was stolen and that there was no conclusive proof he had been near the Evers 
home the night of the murder, even though several witnesses testified to seeing him in the 
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area that evening.17 The result of the case was a mistrial. For Mississippi, even a few 
white jurors voting to convict a white man of murdering a black man was significant, but 
not enough to avoid the problem of a hung jury.18 A second trial followed two months 
later. Again, an all-white male jury decided Beckwith’s fate. This time the jury split 8-4 
in favor of acquittal, prompting another mistrial.19 Beckwith was released on a $10,000 
bond and returned to his hometown a local hero. Waller did not ask for a third trial. It was 
yet another blow to Evers’ family and the black citizens of Jackson. Their calls for justice 
went unheeded. Evers’ death was another lynching without consequence in Mississippi.20 
Yet for all the setbacks endured by civil rights activists in Mississippi, there was 
no denying the existence of a movement there. For so long, Mississippi had been ground 
zero for racial oppression, filled with black citizens terrified to speak out together for 
equality. But Medgar Evers tapped into traditions of armed self-reliance and networks of 
community support to build a crucial organizational base for the NAACP. Rather than 
accept that the system of white supremacy was too deeply entrenched and dangerous to 
challenge, Evers did so at every possible opportunity by facilitating a rise of militancy 
among the youth and shaping them into the Mississippi version of Mau Mau-type force 
for change. In the process, he promoted an understanding of the importance of fastidious 
grassroots organizing and the ability to alter strategies on the ground. Though it 
ultimately cost him his life, his work helped birth a new generation of activists who 
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carried on Evers’ legacy as they fanned across Mississippi and connected to the larger 
national movement. At every turn on the road to freedom, they faced obstacles. But they 
did not stop pushing ahead. They learned that change followed unrelenting, determined 
action that forced the federal government, and the world, to pay attention. 
The situation unfolding in Kenya seemed to reinforce this philosophy. Following 
the embarrassing unveiling of the Hola camp massacre and Lennox-Boyd’s resignation as 
colonial secretary, British conservatives were compelled by new secretary Iain Macleod 
and Labour Party officials to consider colonization of Kenya as no longer beneficial to 
Britain’s global interests. Though they remained somewhat dismayed by the rising tide of 
African nationalism, their larger fears stemmed from the possibility that African 
nationalists would fall under the control of communist elements. To prevent this, officials 
argued decolonization and a handover of power to African personnel considered 
agreeable to British interests was the best option moving forward. Eventually, this 
included the release of Jomo Kenyatta in August of 1961. He was a powerful symbol of 
freedom for African Kenyans, and colonial officials worried his continued imprisonment 
might divide the newly created national government and reinforce feelings of resentment 
toward Britain. His discharge from prison in 1961 signaled a first important step to 
rehabilitating his image in a way that downplayed his attachment to the violent Mau Mau 
(which he continued to deny having led) and promoted his belief in the positive aspects 
of a functioning coalition government.21  
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Yet despite these moderating influences, Kenyatta remained a freedom fighter in 
the minds of Kenyans and admirers the world over. Even though the insurrection against 
the colonial government failed to liberate Kenyan Africans from their state of perpetual 
exploitation and repression, the Mau Mau shook the foundations of the British imperial 
system and ultimately contributed to its collapse. In Mississippi, movement activists 
aimed to shake the system of white supremacy to its core and bring about its eventual 
downfall. They had a blueprint: mass participation, in the form of direct-action and 
voting rights campaigns, fostered publicity, helped embolden black communities, and 
challenged the federal government to intervene and uphold the rights of its citizens. Just 
as Evers well understood, it was never easy to achieve these ends and confusion often 
reigned in the process. This was especially true when Charles Evers appointed himself 
NAACP Field Secretary in place of his brother. Unlike Medgar, Charles spent 
considerable time living out of state in Chicago and engaged in some unscrupulous 
activities, including bootlegging. His less than stellar image was not the only problem. 
His domineering personality and determination to be his own man apart from Medgar’s 
legacy alienated him from black leaders throughout the state. Rather than work with other 
civil rights organizations, Charles retreated from facilitating grassroots, inter-
organizational participation.22  
Nonetheless, the militant wing of the Mississippi movement pushed onward 
despite these setbacks. As summer turned into fall, COFO-sponsored organizations set in 
motion a new campaign that pitted the forces of mass participation against the state’s 
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white power structure. Local NAACP branches, together with CORE and SNCC, began 
work on a statewide “Freedom Ballot Campaign.” By registering black voters in a mock 
election to correspond with the state gubernatorial election in November of 1963, 
organizers hoped to demonstrate to the nation and the world that blacks in Mississippi 
would vote en masse if given the opportunity. The campaign officially kicked off in 
Jackson in October. The chief strategists selected Aaron Henry as their candidate for 
governor. To reach their goal of 200,000 ballots, organizers built a campaign 
infrastructure from top to bottom that included rallies, a publicity arm, and volunteers 
knocking on doors across the state. Despite constant harassment from white authorities, 
the freedom vote was a success. With only a month of preparation, almost 84,000 cast 
votes in an election that unified participants and pressed them to see past their fears. 
There was much work to be done, but the campaign proved the COFO coalition could 
successfully work together to coordinate statewide campaigns for change.23  
The election was especially resonant given the assassination of President Kennedy 
later that November. His administration had consistently stepped carefully where 
Mississippi was concerned, only intervening if all other options were exhausted and, in 
the case of Jackson, transforming that intervention into a means of halting the direct-
action phase of the movement. Yet the president’s decision to endorse federal civil rights 
legislation was a strong indicator direct-action pressure and mass action worked to bring 
much needed pressure to bear on administration officials. COFO strategists understood 
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the gravity of those concerns about America’s image abroad and maneuvered with them 
in mind. This was also indicated by the support of black Mississippians for the SCLC-led 
March on Washington earlier that summer, when 200,000 people marched to the Lincoln 
memorial. Sympathy marches occurred around the world, and international newspapers 
praised the messages, size, and solidarity of the participants. It left Kennedy very little 
choice but to support it despite continued Southern opposition and signaled a new era in 
American foreign relations. According to Mary Dudziak “the moral power of the 
movement, the brutality of resistance, and the ever present international gaze meant that 
civil rights could not be subordinated.” It was no longer possible for the President to be 
seen as a strong leader abroad unless he exhibited strong leadership on civil rights.24 
Being “seen” as a strong leader was different than acting like one, however. 
While Kennedy publicly endorsed a civil rights bill in Congress that aimed to destroy 
segregation in public accommodations and education, he balked on the addition of voter 
protections to placate the anger of Southern Senators. Still, his endorsement went a long 
way in gaining Kennedy support abroad, and his assassination only intensified pressure 
on Congress to move the bill through both houses. Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon Baines 
Johnson, was determined to push it through the Senate and past the filibustering Southern 
contingent. In the meantime, COFO assessed the successes and failures of the Freedom 
Ballot Campaign. They discovered that while the campaign was effective in encouraging 
blacks to register, it was less effective in generating media coverage. Newspapers had 
been largely focused on outside student volunteers - particularly white students – who 
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had taken part. In Mississippi Mau Mau-fashion, organizers altered their strategies to fit 
these new parameters and bring greater public attention to mass voter registration efforts. 
They put out a call for student volunteers to join in a new COFO-sponsored summer 
project to expand on the freedom ballot efforts that became known as Freedom 
Summer.25  
As President Johnson marshaled the civil rights bill through the Senate, hundreds 
of students descended on Mississippi in June of 1964.26 Violence was ever present. The 
Ku Klux Klan, which had been largely dormant in Mississippi since the 1930s, 
reappeared to terrorize the student volunteers as they registered blacks to vote and 
established community centers called “freedom schools.” The worst of the terror was 
unleashed on student volunteers James Chaney, Mickey Schwerner, and Andrew 
Goodman. While investigating the alleged bombing of a black church in Philadelphia, 
Mississippi, Chaney, a black native of Meridian, and Schwerner and Goodman, white 
New Yorkers in Mississippi for the first time, were murdered by Klansmen. For over a 
month they remained missing until their bodies were discovered by FBI agents buried 
under an earthen dam. Press accounts quickly gripped readers worldwide, particularly 
because two of the murdered students were white men. Over and over again, Mississippi 
was spotlighted in a way that damaged American credibility.27 
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Despite the deaths, Freedom Summer went on. In the freedom schools, COFO 
workers taught basic knowledge, skills, and job training, but the larger goal of their 
existence extended beyond immediate results. According to Charlie Cobb, a SNCC Field 
Secretary working in the Delta, the freedom schools were to be serve as the basis for 
“statewide student action” in the future. Much like Evers had worked tirelessly to 
cultivate a generation of young activists to challenge white supremacy through the 
NAACP youth councils, the freedom schools did so with an added element: to celebrate 
and preserve the culture of black Mississippians across rural/urban and economic lines.28 
This philosophy also led COFO to expand their program into a political party that directly 
challenged the legitimacy of the sitting Democratic delegation from Mississippi in the 
1964 primary elections.29 The Freedom Democratic Party, led by 64 delegates, marched 
into the Democratic Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey with a fierce determination 
to force President Johnson and the rest of the Democratic Party to remove the Mississippi 
delegation for systematically excluding blacks from its activities. It was a shot across the 
bow at Johnson, who one month prior had signed the Civil Rights Act into law.30 Though 
that legislation had been landmark in its intent and scope, black Mississippians refused to 
accept the continued entrenchment of white supremacy in Mississippi’s political 
system.31  
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It was a little over one year after Evers’ death. In the months and years that 
followed, the Mississippi movement experienced a series of additional victories and 
fractures, including the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 and the eventual rupture 
of SNCC. The path forward remained difficult and filled with obstacles. But one thing 
was for certain: Mississippi was the center of worldwide attention in the fight for racial 
equality in America. This was Evers’ greatest legacy. 
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